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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the impact of tick size reduction on spot index liquidity and in 
turn on the inter-market pricing relationship between spot and futures indices. Three 
empirical chapters are presented. The first study investigates the impact on the spot 
index liquidity in emerging Malaysian capital market. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are first to investigate this issue. We find higher trading volume following tick size 
reduction. Further, we find lower mispricing between the spot and futures indices after 
the reduction. This is an indication that traders benefit from the lower tick sizes. In our 
second study, the price discovery role of the index futures is assessed. We find that the 
index futures adjust to equilibrium level ahead of its underlying. Interestingly, the spot 
index adjusts to equilibrium level at a higher speed in comparison to pre-reduction 
period. This implies that the lowering of tick sizes facilitates better incorporation of 
stock specific information. Altogether, the lowering of tick sizes seems to improve 
index futures price discovery role. In our third paper, we investigate the effectiveness of 
the index futures as a hedging instrument. We find evidence that the ability of the 
futures in reducing price risk is greatly enhanced due to the positive impacts of the 
lower tick sizes.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction: background and summary of findings 
1.1. The tick size: A background 
A Financial Exchange is defined as a place (physical or electronic) where traders gather 
to trade financial instruments (common stocks, bonds, derivatives amongst others). To 
name a few, London Stock Exchange (LSE), New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) are some of the world’s major stock exchanges. These 
financial exchanges exist to facilitate the movement of capital between investors and 
borrowers. 
 
In doing so, financial exchanges must provide liquidity and price discovery. Liquidity is 
perhaps best defined as the ability to convert stocks into cash at lowest trading costs, 
while price discovery refers to the ability of the market in finding the equilibrium price. 
These two functions are inseparably linked because a market that provide the most price 
discovery tend to be highly liquid and vice versa (O'Hara 2001). 
 
An exchange that performs these two functions well is said to possess the characteristics 
of a good quality market; i.e., a market that ensures a level playing field for all market 
participants. Consequently, market quality determines investors’ confidence so that 
investors are more willing to invest in the exchange’s listed companies. This in turn 
attracts issuers to list their securities with them. The exchange thereby obtains greater 
revenue from listing and transaction fees, and their agents make greater profits. 
 
Thus, it is crucial for exchanges to maintain and continually improve the quality of its 
market in meeting their clients’ needs and meeting the ever-challenging external forces. 
This is especially true given that markets are increasingly becoming global and 
competitive. Exchanges around the world have no choice but to compete for new 
listings and new investors. The inability to compete will result in closure, Nasdaq 
Europe and Nasdaq Deutschland for example, ceased their operations in 2003 due to the 
intense competition in the European market. 
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To foster liquidity and enable price discovery, O’Hara (2001) suggests that exchanges 
must carefully consider their market design, the trading rules that govern their daily 
trading operations. Specifically, she suggests that market should be designed by taking 
into account the types of investors trading and the types of securities traded. In other 
words, there is no consensus on which market design is the most optimal. Consequently, 
exchanges around the world continue to strive for the optimal market design that will 
ensure market quality. This is important because everyone benefits from having a well 
functioning market. 
 
One of the key features of market design is the tick size, defined as the minimum price 
that a stock is allowed to change.1 It determines the price at which investors could 
execute their trades. For example, a stock with a tick size of 10p and a current price of 
£1.00, could only moves up (down) in multiple of 10p, hence the price that traders 
could quote would be £1.10 (90p). This implies that traders may be force to buy (sell) 
above (below) equilibrium prices (Anshuman & Kalay 1998). Thus, tick size effectively 
determines the minimum size of the spread, defined as the difference between seller’s 
ask price and buyer’s bid price. On one hand, a larger tick may induce larger spreads 
because the spread would never be lower than the tick size (Harris 2003, p.531). For 
liquidity demander a large spread means higher trading cost. Also, price discovery will 
be disrupted because traders would not be able to trade near the equilibrium level if the 
tick is large (Kurov 2008). On the other hand, a narrow spread lowers profitability and 
increases the risk of front-running, the risk that a trader may gain priority in the order 
book simply by offering a relatively better quotation in comparison to a quotation that 
was previously offered by another trader. As a consequence, liquidity supplier may 
reduce their supply i.e. market depth.2 Further, price discovery may be delayed because 
when the tick is narrower, the number of possible prices at which to trade increases, and 
this may complicate negotiation process leading to slower speed of execution (Harris 
1991).  
                                                            
1 Market design features of an exchange include market type (order- and/or quote-driven market), order 
priority rules, market linkages, market fragmentation and short-selling restrictions, amongst others. Tick 
size is also known as the minimum price variations/increments and price-steps. 
2 Market depth is defined as the orders ‘que’ in the book pending for execution based on price-time 
priority, the longer the ‘que’ the deeper is the market, usually the best 5 price steps will be displayed. 
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Table 1.1 below illustrates the trade-off between a large and narrow tick size. In 
general, the size of tick affects liquidity and price discovery through its effect on 
trader’s profitability (Harris 1999).  
 
Table 1.1: Trade-off between large and small tick size 
Tick 
Size 
Liquidity Demander Liquidity Supplier Impact on Liquidity 
Large High transaction cost High profit - willing to supply more 
liquidity because the risk of front 
running is lower (high market depth). 
Low liquidity due to high 
transaction cost 
Small Low transaction cost Low profit - unwilling to supply more 
liquidity because the risk of front 
running is higher (low market depth). 
Low liquidity due to 
lower market depth 
 
 
 
Tick size (and relative tick size3) varies substantially across exchanges and also within 
exchanges4.  In some exchanges, for example in the US markets the tick for all stocks 
over $1 is $0.01. However, in Tokyo Stock Exchange, the minimum price increment 
varies with stock price. For example, the relative tick size for stocks trading in the range 
of (Japanese Yen) ¥2000 to (Japanese Yen) ¥2295, is between 0.25% to 0.22%, while 
for stocks trading between (Japanese Yen) ¥3000 to (Japanese Yen) ¥29,990, the 
relative tick size is between 0.33% to 0.03% (please refer Appendix 1 on page 130). 
Exchanges around the world, however, have been experimenting with their tick sizes in 
search for the optimal tick that will ensure high liquidity and price discovery. In 
particular, there is a trend for exchanges to lower their minimum price increment. We 
shall discuss the arguments and concerns of this trend in the following section. 
 
1.2. The lowering of tick size: arguments and concerns  
During the past two decades or so, it has become a trend for exchanges around the 
world to reduce their minimum price increments. In the United States, the tick had been 
reduced from to on 24 June 1997 and again to $0.01 on 29 January 2001 
following the decimalisation exercise. Similarly, in emerging markets such Taiwan and 
Malaysia, the ticks were reduced on the 1 March 2005 and 3 August 2009, respectively. 
                                                            
3 Tick size as a percentage of price per share. 
4 See Comerton & Rydge (2006) for an excellent overview of market design in the Asia-Pacific region. 
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Table 1.2 below lists some other exchanges around the world that had also reduced their 
minimum price increments. 
 
Table 1.2: Stock exchanges that have lowered their minimum price increments 
Stock Exchange Date 
Australia Stock Exchange 04 December 1996 
Bursa Securities Berhad 03 August 2009 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange 24 July 2006 
Jakarta Stock Exchange 03 July 2000 
AMEX 29 January 2001 
NASDAQ 29 January 2001 
NYSE 29 January 2001 
Singapore Stock Exchange 18 July 1994 
Taiwan Stock Exchange 01 March 2005 
Thailand Stock Exchange 05 November 2001 
Tokyo Stock Exchange 13 April 1998 
Toronto Stock Exchange 29 January 2001 
 
 
 
Proponents of a lower tick argue that lower tick improves market liquidity. The reason 
is that a lower tick would induce a reduction in bid-ask spread due to increased 
competition between liquidity suppliers. As a result, trading cost decreases which in 
turn may lead to higher trading volume (Harris 1997). This is especially true if the 
current tick binds or restricts the stock from reflecting its intrinsic value (Harris 1994). 
In other words, liquidity demanders benefit from the lower trading cost caused by a 
lower tick size (Bacidore 1997; Bessembinder 2003; Smith et al. 2006). They further 
argue that a lower ticks facilitates efficient price discovery (Sugato et al. 2004) because 
a lower trading cost increases traders’ incentives to gather information (Gibson et al. 
2003). 
 
Opponents of lower tick size, however, argue that a lower spreads may beneﬁt liquidity 
demanders at liquidity suppliers’ expense (Graham et al. 2003). The lower profitability 
and higher risk of front-running would adversely affect liquidity suppliers’ readiness to 
provide liquidity (Jones & Lipson 2001). Consequently, trading volume may not 
increase given that a lower tick also increases the cost of negotiation (Hameed & Terry 
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1998). Thus, the impact of tick size reduction on the trading volume is not 
straightforward as it relies on how the demand and supply of liquidity are affected by 
lower trading costs because of smaller tick sizes. Whether a lower tick results in a 
higher trading volume is of concern to exchanges because not only will they derive 
higher revenue from it, but it indicates an improvement in market quality (Angel 2012, 
p.8). 
 
Given the inconclusive impact of a lower tick size on the trading volume of the 
constituents stocks that make-up an index, there are also concerns that a lower tick may 
weaken the relationship between the underlying index and index futures markets. The 
reason is that spot index volume affects the basis5 (Roll et al. 2007). The basis in turn 
determines the reliability and effectiveness of index futures as a price discovery and 
hedging instrument. The price discovery role of index futures refers to the ability of the 
market in finding the equilibrium price ahead of the underlying index, while hedging is 
defined as the ability of the market in reducing price risk. In other words, the price 
discovery role and hedging effectiveness of index futures depend on the magnitude and 
stability of the basis (Garbade & Silber 1983; Sutcliffe 2006). 
 
The basis may narrow if the unexpected trading volume in the underlying market 
following the tick size reduction represents those of arbitrageurs’ (Henker & Martens 
2005) and as a consequence of better incorporation of firm specific information in the 
underlying market (Chordia et al. 2008). However, the basis may widen, if the 
unexpected trading volume represents trade by speculators that causes the index futures 
to delay in responding to both firm specific and market-wide information (Cummings & 
Frino 2011). If this is the case, the reliability of index futures as price discovery tool and 
hedging instrument will be adversely affected. 
 
In this study, we aim to contribute to the literature by addressing the above concerns 
posed by a lower tick size. Specifically, we examine the impact of a lower tick on spot 
index trading volume and in turn on the inter-market relationship between the spot and 
futures in the emerging Malaysian market. Also, we aim to contribute to the literature 
                                                            
5 In this study, the term basis and mispricing are used interchangeably. 
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by examining the price discovery role and hedging effectiveness of the index futures 
given that these two main functions of index futures rely on the strength of the inter-
market relationship. Fig. 1.1 below shows the focus of this study. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.1: Focus of the study 
 
Malaysian market is chosen due to its distinctive market design in comparison to other 
markets. In an order driven market such as Bursa Malaysia, the only source of liquidity 
is the limit order book, which is greatly influenced by the size of the tick due to the 
order priority rules. In addition, Bursa Malaysia uses a tick structure that varies with 
price, therefore even higher priced stocks are most likely be constrained by the tick. 
These suggest that the impact of the tick reduction on liquidity may be larger for Bursa 
Malaysia. Further, there is little research evidence about the interaction between index 
futures and stock market in Malaysia. The following section briefly discusses some 
background on Bursa Malaysia. 
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1.3. Bursa Malaysia Berhad 
Stock trading begun in Malaysia in the 1930s when Singapore Stockbroker’s 
Association was established. In 1937 the association was re-registered as Malayan 
Stockbroker’s Association and subsequently renamed as Malayan Stock Exchange in 
1960 with trading floors in Kuala Lumpur and Singapore linked by telephone. 
Following the withdrawal of Singapore in 1973, the exchange was divided into Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) and Stock Exchange Limited (SGX). The KLSE 
became a limited company on 14 Dec 1976 and changed its name to Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad (BMB) on 14 April 2004 following the demutualisation exercise.6 BMB is an 
integrated exchange, it provides, operates and maintain a complete range of exchange-
related services including trading, settlement, clearing and depository services (please 
refer Fig. 1.2).7   
 
1.3.1. Capital market masterplan 
Following the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the Malaysian government initiated a 
strategic 10-year plan known as Capital Market Masterplan (CMP), and was officially 
launched by the Malaysian Securities Commissions (SC) in February 2001. The CMP is 
intended to fortify the financial market and so be in a better position to meet the 
challenges of regional competition and globalisation.  
 
The four key challenges at hand were to address the lingering effects of the Asian 
financial crisis in 1997/1998, to meet the demands of the growing economy, to heighten 
global competition for business and investment, and finally to meet the changing 
demands on the regulatory framework and authorities (please refer Fig. 1.3). In order to 
achieve its vision i.e. to be internationally competitive, it is crucial that the Malaysian 
capital markets addressed these challenges. 
 
 
                                                            
6 Demutualisation led to the conversion of the exchange from an entity limited by the guarantee of its 
members into a public company limited by shares. On 4 March 2004, the exchange raised Ringgit 
Malaysia 521 millions (≃ £105 millions) from its intial public offering (IPO). 
7 The establishment of a single Malaysian exchange by consolidating all existing exchanges i.e. 
derivatives exchange and offshore financial exchange) was the first recommendation in the Capital 
Market Masterplan. 
 8 
 
Fig. 1.2: Bursa Malaysia Berhad and its subsidiaries         
Source: Bursa Malaysia Annual Report, 2012 
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Fig. 1.3: Challenges for the Malaysia capital market 
 
There are 152 recommendations outlined in the CMP to address the challenges above 
(refer Appendix 2 on page 136). These recommendations have been formulated on the 
basis of the capital market’s vision and objectives with consideration of the trends and 
challenges the capital market will have to deal over the next 10 years. Moreover, where 
appropriate, further recommendations will be introduced over the course of the period 
of the Masterplan to ensure that it is remain relevant. In other words, the Masterplan is a 
dynamic plan, not static. The CMP covers various segments of the markets. For 
example, the recommendations from 17 to 32 are directly related to the equity market 
and from 50 to 64 are for the derivatives market. Bursa Securities and Bursa Derivatives 
run the equity and derivatives markets, respectively under their parent company. 
 
Table 1.3 below lists some of the recommendations concerning the stock market as 
outlined in the CMP.  One of the key recommendations was to reduce the tick sizes for 
stocks listed in the Bursa Securities with the objective of promoting liquidity and 
enhancing price discovery. 
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Consequently, the tick sizes were reduced on the 3 August 2009. Table 1.4 illustrates 
the differences between the old tick sizes and the new tick sizes.  All stocks listed on the 
exchange are affected by this reduction. It is also worth noting that the tick size 
reduction is also effective on the exchange-traded funds (ETFs)8 as shown in Appendix 
3 on page 142. 
 
Table 1.3: Main market design changes in Bursa Securities over the past decade  
Date Description 
26th May 2003 Full implementation of smaller board lots of 100 
shares each, from 1000 shares per lot previously. 
26th June 2006 Launch of FTSE Bursa Malaysia Index Series in 
collaboration with FTSE Group, the global index 
provider. 
3rd January 2007 Securities borrowing and lending (SBL) and 
Regulated short-selling (RSS) were reintroduced. 
6th July 2009 Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (KLCI) was 
renamed FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI (FBM-
KLCI). The index adopted the FTSE’s global 
index methodology which is free-float adjusted, 
liquidity-screened and calculated  on a fifteen 
second basis. 
3rd August 2009 Reduction of tick size 
3rd August 2009 New one hour trading halt 
Source: Bursa Malaysia annual reports 
 
 
The impact of the tick reduction on liquidity may be larger for an order-driven market 
such as Bursa Malaysia (Harris 1997). The reason is that the size of the tick determines 
the cost of obtaining priority in the limit order book, the only source of liquidity.9 In an 
order-driven market, traders’ orders are arrange by the price-time-public priority rule. 
This rule states that priority is given to buyers (sellers) who bid (offer) the highest 
(lowest) price. If however orders are received at the same price, priority is given to 
traders who first shown their willingness to trade at that price and to public limit orders. 
In other words, this priority rule is in place to protect public limit traders from front-
running by professional traders. However, the tick reduction may instead increase the 
risk of front-running if the tick is set too small, making it possible for any traders to 
obtain priority by merely submitting a trivial amount. Traders then may be reluctant to 
display their orders and/or may switch to market order strategies. Consequently, 
                                                            
8 The FBM-KLCI exchange traded funds (ETFs) were first listed on 19 July 2007. 
9 Currently, no official market makers operate on Bursa Malaysia Bhd. In contrast, market makers are 
well established in the highly developed markets (Comerton-Forde & Rydge, 2006). 
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liquidity and price discovery may not improve as intended.  Therefore, it is important 
for us to examine the impact of the tick reduction on the spot index liquidity and in turn 
on the strength of relationship between the index futures and its underlying. Also, it is 
important to examine the price discovery role and hedging effectiveness of the index 
futures given that these two main functions of index futures rely on the strength of the 
inter-market relationship. 
 
Table 1.4: New tick sizes for securities 
Stock price (Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM))ª 
Old tick size (sen) New tick size (sen) 
Below 1.00 0.5 0.5 
1 to 2.99 1 1 
3 to 4.99 2 1 
5 to 9.99 5 1 
10 to 24.99 10 2 
25 to 99.98 25 2 
Above 100 50 10 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Annual Report 2009 
ªRM1 = 100sen ≃ £0.20 
Note: In summary, tick size remain unchanged for stocks trading below RM1 and for stocks trading in the 
price range of RM1 to RM2.99 i.e. RM0.005 and RM0.01 respectively. For stocks trading in the price 
range of RM3 to RM4.99 and RM5 to RM9.99, the tick size have been reduced to RM0.01, previously it 
was RM0.02 and RM0.05 respectively. While stocks trading in the price range of RM10 to RM24.99 and 
RM25 to RM99.98, the new tick size is RM0.02 reduced from RM0.10 and RM0.25 respectively. Finally, 
stocks that are trading above RM100 per share, the tick size is reduced from RM0.50 to RM0.10. 
 
 
In examining the impact of the tick reduction on liquidity, we shall focus on the FBM-
KLCI stock index given that the liquidity of the 30 constituent stocks are directly 
affected by the tick reduction. The FBM-KLCI composite index was first introduced in 
Malaysia on 4 April 1986 and serves as the barometer of the Malaysian stock market. 
The constituent stocks are screened for liquidity before and after its inclusion in the 
index and the index is calculated in real-time for every 15 seconds. The FBM-FKLI 
index futures derives its value from the underlying stock index FBM-KLCI. As such, 
we assess the inter-market relationship between the FBM-KLCI spot index and FBM-
FKLI index futures taking into account the impact of the tick reduction. 
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1.3.2. Bursa Derivatives Berhad 
Derivatives trading began in Malaysia with the establishment of the Kuala Lumpur 
Commodity Exchange (KLCE) in October 1980. The KLCE was later renamed the 
Commodity and Monetary Exchange of Malaysia (COMEX) and in December 2000 
merged with the Kuala Lumpur Options and Financial Futures Exchange (KLOFFE) to 
form the Malaysia Derivatives Exchange (MDEX). MDEX was acquired by Bursa 
Malaysia in January 2004 and subsequently renamed Bursa Derivatives (BD) following 
the demutualisation exercise. BMD is the only derivatives exchange in Malaysia, it 
provides, operates and maintains a futures and options exchange.  
 
Derivatives trading continue to contribute to the group’s revenue. In 2013, revenue from 
derivatives trading improved by 11% to RM70.3 million compared to previous year. 
The growth in trades was largely attributed to foreign institutions which grew by 32%. 
Perhaps, this may in part be explained by the strategic alliance between Bursa Malaysia 
Berhad and Chicago Mercantile Exchange, formed in September 2009, with the specific 
aim of improving the accessibility to its derivatives offerings globally.10 On the 20 
September 2010, all derivatives products were successfully migrated onto Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME) Globex®, the electronic platform of CME which enable 
global traders to access BMD’s product electronically. 
 
Futures Industry Association (FIA), in its reports published in 2014 ranked Bursa 
Derivatives the 39 largest derivatives exchange by volume. The number of contracts 
traded and/or cleared during the year 2014 was 12,313,490 contracts, an increment of 
15.90% from the previous year. The ranking for other derivative exchanges around the 
world for the year 2014 is shown in Table 1.5 below.  
                                                            
10 CME holds 25% of the equity stake in Bursa Malaysia Derivatives. 
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Table 1.5: Exchange rank by volume for the year 2014  
Rank  Exchange  Jan-Dec 2014 
Volume 
Jan-Dec 2013 
Volume  
  % 
Change  
1 CME Group 3,442,766,942 3,161,476,638 8.90% 
2 Intercontinental Exchange 2,276,171,019 2,558,489,589 -11.00% 
3 Eurex 2,097,974,756 2,190,727,275 -4.20% 
4 National Stock Exchange of India 1,880,362,513 2,127,151,585 -11.60% 
5 BM&FBovespa 1,417,925,815 1,603,706,918 -11.60% 
6 Moscow Exchange 1,413,222,196 1,134,477,258 24.60% 
7 CBOE Holdings 1,325,391,523 1,187,642,669 11.60% 
8 Nasdaq OMX 1,127,130,071 1,142,955,206 -1.40% 
9 Shanghai Futures Exchange 842,294,223 642,473,980 31.10% 
10 Dalian Commodity Exchange 769,637,041 700,500,777 9.90% 
11 BSE 725,841,680 254,845,929 184.80% 
12 Korea Exchange 677,789,082 820,664,621 -17.40% 
13 Zhengzhou Commodity Exchange 676,343,283 525,299,023 28.80% 
14 Hong Kong Exchanges & Clearing 319,577,388 301,128,507 6.10% 
15 Japan Exchange 309,732,384 366,234,062 -15.40% 
16 JSE Securities Exchange 304,003,143 254,514,072 19.40% 
17 ASX 244,070,858 261,790,908 -6.80% 
18 China Financial Futures Exchange 217,581,145 193,549,311 12.40% 
19 Taiwan Futures Exchange 202,227,653 153,225,238 32.00% 
20 BATS Exchange 201,985,667 151,814,889 33.00% 
21 TMX Group 168,474,076 155,753,473 8.20% 
22 Euronext Derivatives Market 3 144,058,758 147,355,797 -2.20% 
23 Miami International Securities Exchange  134,535,972 39,430,903 241.20% 
24 Multi Commodity Exchange of India 133,751,848 264,627,693 -49.50% 
25 Metropolitan Stock Exchange of India 4 124,245,938 529,373,957 -76.50% 
26 Singapore Exchange 120,398,368 112,077,267 7.40% 
27 Rosario Futures Exchange 65,187,932 51,176,700 27.40% 
28 Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange 64,052,496 60,514,431 5.80% 
29 Borsa Istanbul 58,703,603 53,172,365 10.40% 
30 MEFF 56,304,885 54,694,502 2.90% 
31 London Stock Exchange Group 50,492,691 50,384,211 0.20% 
32 Tokyo Financial Exchange 40,900,423 65,527,790 -37.60% 
33 Thailand Futures Exchange 36,021,150 16,164,126 122.80% 
34 National Commodity & Derivatives Exchange 30,129,128 32,435,100 -7.10% 
35 Mexican Derivatives Exchange 29,913,972 27,358,232 9.30% 
36 United Stock Exchange of India  24,819,403 45,132,176 -45.00% 
37 Tokyo Commodity Exchange 5 21,856,063 26,845,712 -18.60% 
38 Oslo Stock Exchange 16,966,331 11,693,959 45.10% 
39 Malaysia Derivatives Exchange 12,313,490 10,621,629 15.90% 
40 Dubai Gold & Commodities Exchange 11,789,063 13,759,255 -14.30% 
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Table 1.5: Continued 
Rank  Exchange  Jan-Dec 2014 
Volume 
Jan-Dec 2013 
Volume  
  % 
Change  
41 OneChicago 10,907,977 9,515,194 14.60% 
42 Athens Derivatives Exchange 10,798,988 9,204,155 17.30% 
43 Warsaw Stock Exchange 9,481,427 12,615,336 -
24.80% 
44 CEE Stock Exchange Group 7,631,540 8,106,798 -5.90% 
45 Pakistan Mercantile Exchange 3,572,003 4,608,831 -
22.50% 
46 Minneapolis Grain Exchange 2,177,740 1,483,657 46.80% 
47 Dubai Mercantile Exchange 2,119,936 1,600,918 32.40% 
48 New Zealand Futures Exchange 1,138,576 1,140,966 -0.20% 
49 Bolsa de Valores de Colombia 941,620 685,133 37.40% 
50 Indonesia Commodity & Derivatives Exchange 691,238 934,685 -
26.00% 
51 Eris Exchange 489,305 304,080 60.90% 
52 Osaka Dojima Commodity Exchange 309,874 261,445 18.50% 
53 Mercado a Termino de Buenos Aires 234,351 255,537 -8.30% 
Note: Volume refers to the number of contracts traded and/or cleared during the year. 
Source: Futures Industry Association 
 
 
Currently, BD offers three categories of derivatives namely; commodity derivatives, 
equity derivatives and financial derivatives. Commodities derivatives include; gold and 
crude palm oil futures, among others. Equities derivatives include index futures, index 
options and single stock futures (SSFs), while interest rates derivatives include 3-month 
KLIBOR futures and 3-year MGS and 5-year MGS futures (refer Table 1.6 below). The 
derivatives are available for trade from 8.45 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. and 2:30 p.m. to 5:15 
p.m., Monday to Friday. 
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Table 1.6: Products available at Bursa Derivatives  
Type Code 
Commodity derivatives  
Gold futures FGDL 
Crude palm oil futures FCPO 
USD RBD Palm Olein Futures FPOL 
USD Crude Palm Oil Futures FUPO 
Crude Palm Kernel Oil Futures FPKO 
Options on Crude Palm Oil Futures OCPO 
  
Equity derivatives  
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Futures FBM-FKLI 
FTSE Bursa Malaysia KLCI Options FBM-OKLI 
Single Stock Futures SSFs 
  
Financial derivatives  
3 Month Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered Rate Futures FKB3 
3-Year Malaysian Government Securities Futures FMG3 
5-Year Malaysian Government Securities Futures FMG5 
Note: All BMD products are traded on CME Globex trading platform beginning 20 September 2010. 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges 
 
 
The FBM-FKLI index futures were introduced on the 15 December 1995. Its value is 
derived from FBM-KLCI stock index which tracks the performance of the 30 
constituent stocks with the largest market capitalisation. Over the years, the contract 
continues to experience steady growth in terms of volume and open interest owing to its 
importance as a price discovery and risk-management tool. Thus, it is important to 
gauge how these two important functions of the index futures are likely to be affected 
by the tick size reduction in the underlying market. It is worth noting that the index 
futures continue to trade in its original tick size of RM25 as shown in the contract 
specification below. 
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Table 1.7: Contract specification for the index futures contract 
Contract Code FKLI 
Underlying Instrument FTSE Bursa Malaysia Kuala Lumpur Composite Index (FBM KLCI) 
Contract Size FBM KLCI multiplied by RM50 
Minimum Price 
Fluctuation 0.5 index point valued at RM25 
Daily Price Limits 20% per trading session for the respective contract months except the spot 
month contract. There shall be no price limits for the spot month contract. 
There will be no price limit for the second month contract for the final five 
Business Days before expiration. 
Contract Months Spot month, the next month and the next two calendar quarterly months. 
The calendar quarterly months are March, June, September and December. 
Trading Hours ✓First trading session : Malaysian time 8:45 a.m. to 12:45 p.m. 
 ✓Second trading session : Malaysian time 2:30 p.m. to 5:15 p.m. 
Final Trading Day The last Business Day of the contract month. 
Final Settlement Cash Settlement based on the Final Settlement Value. 
Final Settlement Value The Final Settlement Value shall be the average value, rounded to the 
nearest 0.5 of an index point (values of 0.25 or 0.75 and above being 
rounded upwards), taken at every 15 seconds or at such intervals as may be 
determined by the Exchange from time to time from 3.45:30 p.m. to 4.45:15 
p.m. plus one value after 5.00pm of the FBM KLCI on the Final Trading 
Day excepting the 3 highest and 3 lowest values. 
Speculative Position Limit ✓Maximum number of net long or net short positions to be held: 10,000 
contracts for all months combined. 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Berhad 
 
1.4. Summary of hypotheses and findings 
As noted above, tick size plays an important role in the overall functioning of a market. 
Thus, exchanges would be interested in finding answers to the following two research 
questions: 
 
1. What is the impact of lowering the tick sizes on the spot index trading volume 
and in turn on the inter-market relationship between the spot and futures market? 
2. What is the impact of the tick size reduction on the price discovery role and 
hedging effectiveness of the index futures?  
 
We address the first question in Chapter 4. In general, the empirical evidence suggest 
that reducing the tick size leads to a decline in spreads, however the effect on depths is 
less certain and hence on trading volume. 
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In the context of Bursa Malaysia, however, it is expected that the lower tick size will 
lead to higher trading activity. First, Chung, Kim & Kitsabunnarat (2005) find that the 
tick sizes are not only a significant binding constraint on the spreads for large stocks but 
also for higher priced stocks given that the exchange uses tick that varies with prices. 
Therefore, the constituent stocks may experience greater reduction in spreads because 
these stocks are large and some are trading at higher prices (Hsieh et al. 2008). 
Consequently, the lower trading cost will induce traders to trade more often and attract 
new investors to start trading, leading to higher trading volume (Harris 1994). Second, 
Chung et al. (2005) also find that traders do not usually quote higher depth for stocks 
with larger tick, which implies that the impact of the lower tick sizes on market depth is 
minimal and hence on traders’ ability to trade. As expected, we find evidence to suggest 
that spot index volume is significantly higher post-tick period. In the same line of 
arguments, we expect that the unexpected component of spot index volume represents 
trade that serves to strengthen the inter-market relationship between spot and futures 
indices. First, traders will be able to incorporate stock specific information more 
efficiently due to lower trading costs after the tick reduction. In other words, the ability 
to trade the underlying reduces the basis (Alexander 2008b, p.67). Secondly, it can be 
implied that the impact of the lower tick on arbitrageurs’ ability and willingness to 
execute their trades is minimal, given that traders in Bursa Malaysia do not normally 
quote higher depth for higher tick stocks (Chung et al. 2005). Our results suggest that 
the unexpected trading volume after the tick reduction represents trades that serves to 
narrow the mispricing, an indication that traders are able to incorporate information 
effectively and respond to mispricing more quickly. Alternatively, it could be inferred 
that the lower tick does not causes speculators’ trades to exceed those of arbitrageurs’ in 
the composition of the unexpected trading volume (Cummings & Frino 2011).  
 
Thus, the lower tick size leads to higher trading activity in the underlying market, which 
in turn reduces inter-market price discrepancies between the spot and futures indices. 
The second research question is addressed in Chapters 5 and 6.  
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In Chapter 5, we examine the price discovery role of the index futures, the ability of the 
market to incorporate information ahead of the underlying. Specifically, we measure the 
speed at which both markets revert to the equilibrium level. We find that the futures 
continue to incorporate information ahead of its underlying, while the spot reverts 
towards equilibrium at a greater speed after the tick reduction, confirming better 
incorporation of stock specific information in the underlying market. Clearly, these 
suggest that the lower tick improves the reliability of the index futures as a price 
discovery tool. Finally, in Chapter 6, we assess the hedging effectiveness of the index 
futures pre-and-post tick reduction. The hedge ratios are significantly higher after the 
tick reduction indicating stronger relationship between the spot and futures indices. 
Likewise, when we compare the hedging effectiveness using risk minimisation and 
utility maximisation criterions, we find evidence to suggest that traders are able to 
hedge price risk more effectively after the tick reduction. 
 
In conclusion then, the lowering of tick size in emerging Malaysian market seems to 
improve spot index liquidity and in turn strengthens the inter-market relationship 
between the spot and futures indices. Consequently, we find improvement in the 
reliability and effectiveness of the index futures as a source of price discovery and 
price-setting mechanisms.  
 
1.5. Structure of the thesis 
The thesis is structured as follows. The following chapter comprehensively discusses 
the theoretical and empirical literatures on how likely would reduction in tick sizes 
affects the spot index liquidity and in turn on the inter-market relationship between the 
spot and futures indices. In addition, literatures concerning the price discovery role and 
hedging effectiveness of the index futures are also reviewed given that these two main 
functions of index futures are critically dependent on the strength of the inter-market 
relationship. The chapter also develops the hypotheses tested in our empirical studies. 
Chapter three discusses the data and methodology used in this study. Chapter four, five 
and six present the empirical findings. Chapter seven concludes the study, highlighting 
the limitations and suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Theoretical and empirical literature 
From the discussion in the previous chapter, it is evident that tick size plays an 
important role in the overall functioning of the capital markets as it directly affects 
market liquidity. The interesting question to be asked is whether lowering the tick size 
improves spot index liquidity and in turn strengthens the relationship between spot 
index and index futures markets. If so, does the tick reduction favourably affect the 
price discovery role and hedging effectiveness of the index futures? 
 
We begin this section by first discussing the reasons on why exchanges impose tick 
rules and how would stock market liquidity be affected if it is reduced. Next, we review 
the theoretical relationship between spot and futures and why would this relationship 
may not hold in practice. We focus our attention on trading cost differential between 
these two markets because it is directly related to the size of the tick. Then, we discuss 
the reasons on why increment in liquidity caused by the lower tick may not necessarily 
improve the pricing efficiency of the index futures. Finally, we review the literature on 
the price discovery role and hedging effectiveness of the index futures, which critically 
depend on whether the index futures are efficiently priced. Our hypotheses are 
discussed at the end of this chapter. 
 
2.1. Tick size and stock market liquidity 
In this section, we discuss the theory on why exchanges impose tick rules, the benefits 
and costs associated with it and the importance of setting an optimal tick size. Next, we 
discuss the argument for and against the move of lowering the tick and the possible 
effects on stock market liquidity if the tick is reduced. The justification for using the 
underlying trading volume as the proxy for liquidity is also presented.  
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2.1.1. The benefits & costs of tick size 
Contrary to popular beliefs the optimal level of tick size is not zero. The extant 
literature highlights several reasons as to why exchanges impose tick rules. These are 
discussed below. 
 
2.1.1.1. Reduced time in negotiation 
First, tick size limits the number of prices available for traders to use. This reduces the 
time spent in negotiations (Harris 1991). For example, suppose a buyer place a limit 
order to buy at £15.09 and a seller place a limit order to sell at £15.11, assuming that the 
tick size is £0.01, then it is likely that no trade would take place. However, if the tick is 
£0.05, trade would most likely to take place if both traders are willing to round their 
orders to the nearest price point i.e. £15.10. Thus, tick size serves as a way to deter 
excessive negotiation amongst traders (Brown et al. 1991; Pavabutr & Prangwattananon 
2009).  
 
2.1.1.2. Simplified trading environment and reduce errors 
Second, a wider tick size decreases the amount of information that need to be tracked by 
traders (Angel 1997). For example, assuming that the tick is £0.05, it is easier for 
traders to track the 20 prices points available between £10 and £11 in comparison to if 
the tick is £0.01. In other words, tick size serves as a tool to reduce costly human 
mistakes, such as key-in errors, while trading (Angel 2012). 
 
2.1.1.3. Provides a floor on the bid-ask spread 
Third, tick size provides a floor on the bid-ask spread, which determines traders’ 
profitability. For liquidity demanders, the spread represents the round-trip transactions 
cost (excluding commissions) for buying and selling shares. For liquidity supplier, 
however, the bid-ask spread is an important part of revenue. Thus, a lower tick size may 
benefits liquidity demanders, however, it may discourage liquidity suppliers from 
posting liquidity in the market due to increased cost of supplying liquidity. 
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2.1.1.4. Protection for limit orders limit order traders 
Finally, the tick serves as a protection for liquidity suppliers who have displayed their 
orders in the limit order book11 by making other liquidity suppliers pay an economically 
significant amount more, which is determined by the tick size, to trade ahead of them. 
For example, suppose that an investor places a limit order to purchase a stock at £10.00 
and the order is displayed in the limit order book. If another investor arrives who also 
wants to buy at £10.00, then the new investor’s order would have a lower priority. 
When a market sell order comes in, the first investor’s order at that price gets filled first. 
 
However, if the second investor is allowed to bid at £10.01, assuming that the tick is 
£0.01, then the higher price would put that second investor at the front of the queue, 
even though there is a little difference in price. If this is the case, investors may switch 
from limit order to market order strategy due to higher risk of front-running. As a 
consequence, traders may incur higher trading cost and lower depths, which ultimately 
may lead to deterioration in market transparency (Harris 1999).12  
 
2.1.2. The optimal tick size 
The optimal tick size thus represents a tradeoff.  A wider tick can improve liquidity as it 
gives more incentives for investors to supply liquidity and reduces the negotiation time 
of traders. Conversely, a wider tick can reduce liquidity simply by making it too 
expensive for investors to trade. 
 
A narrower tick size, on the other hand, can improve liquidity by attracting more 
investors. However, a narrower tick may reduce liquidity as it can increase the cost of 
supplying liquidity and the risk of risk of front-running.  Thus, in setting the optimal 
tick size, exchange must balance the benefits and costs of tick size so as to ensure a 
level playing field for all market participants.  
 
                                                            
11 A limit order is an order to trade that specifies a specific price. For example, an investor may place an 
order to purchase 1,000 shares of BP at ₤5.00. This means that the investor is not willing to pay more than 
₤5.00 and the order cannot be executed at a higher price, but it can be executed at a lower price. 
12 Public orders in limit order books allow investors to trade fast in quantity they require at reasonable 
prices. This reduces investors trading costs and makes market less volatile. Thus, it is important to protect 
liquidity suppliers in the limit order books. 
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2.1.3. The case for and against lowering the tick size 
As noted in the previous chapter, there has been a trend for exchanges around the world 
to reduce the tick size. The objective is to find the optimal tick size that will improve 
liquidity and enable price discovery.  
 
Proponents of lower tick size argue that a lower tick could lower the bid-ask spread 
(Harris 1994), as competition amongst liquidity supplier increases (Ahn et al. 2007), 
especially so if the tick size represent a significant binding constraint on the stock price 
i.e. for one-tick spread stocks.13 Consequently, trading volume may increase given the 
lower transaction costs.  
 
Opponents on the other hand, argue that a lower tick size may cause the order priority 
rules less meaningful and thus increases the risk of front-running (Harris 1997). 
Consequently, liquidity suppliers are likely to reduce market depth (Zhao & Chung 
2006), adversely affecting traders who trade in sizes far larger than what available at the 
inside spread14 (Jones & Lipson 2001). Further, they argue that lower tick may increase 
negotiation cost (Hameed & Terry 1998), and thus trading volume may not increase as 
anticipated. 
 
Therefore, although a lower tick may help cut transaction costs, due to possible decline 
in profitability coupled with higher risk of front-running, there are possibilities that 
trading volume may not improve (Pavabutr & Prangwattananon 2009).  
 
2.1.3.1. Empirical evidence 
There is quite an extensive academic literature that has examined the effect of reducing 
the tick size on stock market liquidity. However, the findings are inconclusive. In 
general, these studies find that when the ticks are reduced, bid-ask spreads fell. 
However, the impact on depth is less certain, and hence on trading volume. In other 
words, the impact of tick size reduction on the trading volume is not straightforward as 
                                                            
13 That is, the tick size binds the bid-ask spread by not allowing the spread to decline to competitive levels 
(Kurov & Zabotina 2005). The literature suggest that low-priced and large stocks are more likely to be 
binded by a given tick size (Porter & Weaver 1997; Chung & Chuwonganant 2002) and therefore are 
most likely to experience greater reduction in spread due to reduction in tick size (Hsieh et al. 2008). 
14 The space between the current best bid and offer. 
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it depends on how the demand and supply of liquidity are affected by lower trading 
costs because of smaller tick sizes.  
 
The AMEX has been lowering its tick size since 1992. The tick was reduced from  
to  (teenies) for all stocks traded below $5 on 3 September 1992. Ahn, Cao, & 
Choe (1996) find the spreads decline substantially following the reduction. However, 
they find no significant impact of the tick reduction on market depth and trading 
volume. When the tick was reduced to teenies for all stocks above $1, Ronen & Weaver 
(2001) also find spreads decline, however depths do not. In fact, they do find trading 
volume is significantly higher post-tick reduction period. 
 
The NYSE move to teenies on 24 June 1997, Goldstein & Kavajecz (2000) find lower 
spreads and depths after the tick reduction. Further, they find that liquidity demanders 
trading small orders benefit from the tick size reduction. However, liquidity demander 
trading large orders did not benefit, especially if those stocks are inactively traded.15 
They conclude that the optimal tick should be lower (higher) for actively (inactively) 
traded stocks.  In support of Goldstein & Kavajecz’s findings, Jones & Lipson (2001) 
find that trading costs increases, even though spreads decline, for traders submitting 
large orders due to reduction in depth after the change to teenies. Similarly, Wu, 
Krehbiel & Brorsen (2011) show that a reduction in tick size can indeed increase 
transaction costs especially for high-price and low-volume stocks, due reduction in 
market depth. 
 
Similarly, Van Ness, Van Ness & Pruitt (2000) examine the impact of the move from 
eigths to sixteenths on market liquidity. They find spread decline significantly, depth 
increases in Nasdaq but declines on the NYSE and AMEX. Further, trading volume 
remain unchanged for AMEX and Nasdaq but increases on the NYSE.  
 
On 15 April 1996, Toronto Stock Exchange reduced the tick size from (Canadian 
Dollars) C$ to (Canadian Dollars) C$0.05 for stocks trading above (Canadian 
Dollars) C$5. Bacidore (1997) finds both spreads and depths decline. Porter & Weaver 
                                                            
15 This is consistent with Werner’s et al.(2015) prediction. 
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(1997) suggest that reduction in spreads is greater for low-priced and high-volume 
stocks. However, Bacidore (1997) find that trading volume remain unchanged. 
 
Aitken & Comerton-Forde (2005) investigate the impact of a lower tick in the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). The new tick structures was implemented on 4 
December 1995, for stocks priced below (Australian Dollars) $A0.50 and above 
(Australian Dollars) $A10. They find lower spreads and depth for the stocks priced 
below (Australian Dollars) $A0.50. Using depth to number of shares outstanding ratio, 
they observe that liquidity is higher especially for high volume stocks. For the high-
priced stocks, however, they find that spread increases by 30% for the inactively traded 
stocks. They reason that the tick was too narrow for these stocks. Thus, they conclude 
that ASX may consider to incorporate the level of trading activity, in addition to the 
price level, in setting their optimal tick size. In other words, the optimal tick size for a 
stock should be related to its liquidity and price (Buti et al. 2013). 
 
The Tokyo Stock Exchange, on April 13 1998, reduce the size of their tick. Ahn, Cai, 
Chan & Hamao (2007) find spread declines by 20% to 50%. However, they do not find 
any significant evidence to suggest an increment in trading volume. 
 
Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES), on 18 July 1994, reduced the minimum price 
increments from (Singapore Dollars) $0.50 to (Singapore Dollars) $0.10 for stocks 
trading above $25. Lau & Mcinish (1995) find that the reduction causes both the 
spreads and depths to significantly decline but not on trading volume. In contrast, 
Hameed & Terry (1998) find higher trading volume for the actively traded but not for 
the inactively traded stocks, which they attributed to higher negotiation cost caused by 
the lower tick size. 
 
In Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX), the tick size was (Rupiah) Rp25 regardless of stock 
prices. On 3 July 2000, it was reduced to (Rupiah) Rp5. Purwoto & Tandelilin (2004) 
find that both spread and depth declined significantly. Further, they find trading volume 
increases for low-priced stocks. For high-priced stocks, however, they suggest that the 
absolute tick size of (Rupiah) Rp5 is too low which decrease the investors' willingness 
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to trade. They conclude their study by recommending that the JSX moves from using a 
single absolute tick size to using a tick size that is a step function of the stock price. 
 
On 3 January 2005, the JSX introduced a new tick size structure of (Rupiah) Rp10 
affecting stock prices in the range of (Rupiah) Rp500 to (Rupiah) Rp2000. Ekaputra & 
Ahmad (2007) find that the spreads and depth of the affected stocks decline 
significantly. Using depth to spread ratio as a proxy for liquidity, they conclude that the 
introduction of the new tick improves liquidity for the affected stocks. 
 
For the Stock Exchange of Thailand (SET), Pavabutr and Prangwattananon (2009) 
report a fall in bid-ask spreads and depth for the stocks priced below (Thai Baht) 
THB25 affected by the tick reduction on the 5 Nov 2001. However, they do not find 
significant change in trading volume for the period, from 5 Oct 2001 to 30 Nov 2001, 
considered in their study. 
 
Hsieh, Chuang, & Lin (2008) investigate the impact of the tick size reduction 
implemented on March 1, 2005, in Taiwan Stock Exchange. They find both spread and 
depth decline, and that trading volume is lower especially for low-priced and inactively 
traded stocks. Kuo, Huang & Chen (2010) suggest that traders employ smaller trade 
size following the reduction to hide private information, which leads overall decline in 
liquidity. 
 
In Hong Kong Exchanges (HKEx), Pan, Song & Tao (2012) find that both spread and 
depth decline for stocks trading in the range of (Hong Kong Dollar) HK$2 to (Hong 
Kong Dollar) HK$20 after the tick reduction on the 24 July 2006. Further, they find that 
depth decreases significantly for the actively traded stocks, while there is no 
significance change for the low volume stocks. They suggest that large traders are 
negatively affected by the tick size reduction. They did not however examine the impact 
on trading volume. 
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2.1.3.2. Proxy for market liquidity 
Liquidity is proxied by many variables such as trading volume, bid-ask spread and 
market depth. In this study, the focus is on the spot index trading volume. There are 
several reasons as to why we choose trading volume. First, trading volume captures the 
net impact of tick size on the spreads and depth. In other words, trading volume is an 
important factor in explaining spread and depth (Hsieh et al. 2008). Further, trading 
volume is one of the most important measures of market quality (Angel 2012). Second, 
trading volume could also proxy for information arrival in the market. This is 
particularly important for us in addressing the first research question concerning the 
impact of the tick size reduction on the inter-market relationship between the spot and 
futures market. For this purpose, we decompose the raw trading volume into its 
expected and unexpected components, whereby the unexpected components represents 
trades that may weakens or strengthens the spot and futures relationship (Cummings & 
Frino 2011).  
 
Let us now review the theoretical relationship between futures and spot prices. 
 
2.2. The pricing efficiency of index futures 
The cost-of-carry model gives the theoretical relationship between the price of an index 
futures and its underlying spot index as follows: 
 
                         (II.1.1) 
where  and  are the prices of index futures and spot index observed at time , 
respectively. is the net cost of holding the underlying stocks in the spot index, 
where  and , respectively, are the risk-less interest rate (the opportunity cost of 
holding shares) and dividend yield (benefits accrued from holding a stock index 
portfolio) on the underlying index. is the expiration date, so  is the time to 
maturity of the futures contract. The futures price converges to the price of the spot 
index as the futures contract approaches maturity because the basis i.e. the difference 
between the futures and spot prices, converges to zero at expiration. In this particular 
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model, it is assumed that the risk-less interest rate and dividend yield are known, 
constant and compounded continuously through time. 
 
In a perfectly efficient market and in the absence of market frictions or impediments, in 
particular, no transaction costs, no margin requirements, no taxes, unlimited short 
selling, etc, the cost-of-carry relationship should hold at every instant  throughout the 
futures contract life because prices are assumed to adjust fully and instantaneously to 
incoming information. If so, the rate of price appreciation in the index futures,  is 
equal to the relative price change of the stock index,  minus the net cost of carry, 
 as follows:  
 
                                                                                                         (II.1.2) 
where and . 
 
Stoll & Whaley (1990) discuss five important implications of  Eq. (II.1.2) based on the 
assumption that the cost-of-carry relation in Eq. (II.1.1) holds at all points in time. First, 
the expected index futures return, equals the expected spot index returns, 
minus the net cost of carry, . Second, the standard deviation of index 
futures return equals the standard deviation of spot index return. Third, the 
contemporaneous returns of both index futures and spot index are perfectly positively 
correlated. Fourth, the non-contemporaneous returns of both index futures and spot 
index are uncorrelated, and finally, the returns on both index futures and spot index are 
serially uncorrelated. The above implications imply that one market should not lead the 
other or one market should not help to predict returns in the other. That is, the prices of 
the index futures and spot index should simultaneously reflect the new information as 
the information reaches the markets. In other words, there should be no price 
discrepancies between index futures and its underlying index. 
 
In practice, however, Eq. (II.1.1) does not exactly hold. Instead of observing , we 
observe as follows: 
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(II.1.3) 
 
where the second component on the right hand side of Eq. (II.1.3) is the mispricing, 
defined as the difference between the observed futures price,  and its intrinsic 
price,  deflated by the observed spot price16 at time . There are several factors that 
may cause this mispricing as we shall discuss next.  
 
2.2.1. Reasons for mispricing 
Mispricing or deviations from the cost-of-carry relation may occur due to four main 
reasons as outlined by Stoll & Whaley (1990). 
 
First, some of the constituent stocks may not trade in every interval when the stock 
index is recalculated. A component stock that is not traded at the time the index is 
updated will be captured in the index by its last recorded transaction price. This causes 
some delay in responding to market-wide information. The futures price, on the other 
hand, adjusts instantaneously to new information because of its tradability.  
 
Second, bid-ask bounce effect may cause negative serial correlation in both spot and 
futures returns series even though the true returns are serially independent. Bid-ask 
bounce effect exist because, in the absence of new information, the transaction prices 
used in computing the returns series tend to fluctuate randomly between bid and ask 
levels. However, it is more prevalent in futures as it is a tradable instrument (Stoll & 
Whaley 1990). 
 
Third, time delays in the calculation and reporting of the stock index value would also 
tend to show futures market returns to lead stock index returns. Stoll & Whaley (1990) 
identify three possible time delays that may cause this: delay in entering the stock 
transaction into the computer; delay in computing and transmitting the new index value 
and; delay in recording stock index value at the futures exchange. However, the effect 
of this is minimal as most exchanges around the world are now able to recalculate and 
                                                            
16 It is also common to deflate the mispricing by the intrinsic futures price,  (Sutcliffe 2006, p.85) 
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disseminates the updated spot index in every fifteen seconds given the advent of new 
technology. 
 
Finally, traders may prefer to exploit market wide information by trading the index 
futures rather than the constituent stocks because transaction costs are lower and higher 
degree of leverage attainable. In this case futures prices moves first and then the stocks 
prices will adjust accordingly when arbitrageurs respond to the mispricing. When the 
mispricing is positive, arbitrageurs sell futures and buy index portfolio and if the 
mispricing is negative, arbitrageurs’ can earn risk-less profit by buying the futures and 
selling the portfolio of stocks, and in doing so minimises the mispricing. Thus, it is 
widely accepted that the cost-of-carry relationship is maintained by arbitrageurs (see for 
example, MacKinlay & Ramaswamy 1988). 
 
It is also worth noting that, the difference between the observed futures and observed 
spot prices (i.e the basis, ) is given by the following: 
 
                                                     
(II.1.4) 
 
There are two components in the basis, the fair basis and the mispricing. It is the 
mispricing that is of concern to traders because there is less uncertainty with regard to 
the fair basis. The reason is that; discount rates, dividend yields and time are the only 
factors affecting the fair basis (Alexander & Barbosa 2008). Whereas, it is more 
challenging to predict the mispricing. Therefore, in this study the term basis, mispricing 
or rather the pricing efficiency of index futures are used interchangably. 
 
2.2.2. Empirical evidence 
Numerous previous studies find evidence of deviation from the no-arbitrage 
relationship.  In the US, Neal (1996) analyses the pricing efficiency S&P500 index 
futures. He finds that the contract is overpriced roughly 67% of the time, for the period 
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from January to March 1989. For the MMI17 index futures, Finnerty & Park (1988) find 
that the mispricing is large enough to cover for transaction costs. 
 
In Canada, Park & Switzer (1995) find that the futures are on average underpriced 
throughout the sample period from 1988 to 1992. Further, they find that the magnitude 
of mispricing gets very small especially after the introduction of the TIPs (ETFs) on 9 
March 1990. In Korea, Gay & Jung (1999) find evidence of underpricing which they 
attribute to difficulty of short-selling the constituent of the KOSPI index. In Germany, 
Bühler & Kempf (1995) find that underpricing accounts for 79% of the mispricings for 
the DAX futures during the period from 1990 to 1992 even after allowing for 
transaction costs. 
 
Puttonen & Martikainen (1991) find that the Finnish FOX index futures are underpriced 
(allowing for transaction costs) during the period from 1988 to 1990, which Puttonen 
(1993) reasons due to the absence of short selling in the underlying market. Similarly, in 
Netherland, Berglund & Kabir (1995) find evidence of underpricing for the EOE index 
futures throughout the period from 1991 to 1993. In Greece, Fassas (2010) find that the 
FTSE/ATHEX-20 index futures contract to be fairly priced, the deviations from the 
cost-of-carry model ranging between 0.4% and -1%. They suggest that difficulty in 
shorting the underlying stocks explain why underpricing accounts for 83% of the 
mispricing observed in their study. 
 
Using daily data for the FTSE100 for 1984-1988, Yadav & Pope (1990) find that the 
average mispricing decline from 0.5% to 0.2% due to the Big Bang.18 In their 
subsequent studies, using hourly data for 1986 to 1990, Yadav & Pope (1994) find 
frequent mispricing in excess of transaction costs and that there is no clear pattern of 
over or underpricing. 
 
Butterworth & Holmes (2000) investigate the pricing efficiency of the FTSE 100 and 
the FTSE mid-250 index futures contracts relatives to their underlyings. Their results 
                                                            
17 AMEX Major Market Index (MMI) is a price-weighted stock market index made up of 20 Blue Chips 
industrial stocks of major U.S. corporations. 
18 Big Bang refers to the day i.e. 27 October 1986 when the London Stock Exchange was substantially 
deregulated which led to lower trading costs. 
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show that these contracts tend to be efficiently priced. That is, mispricing tends to be 
smaller in magnitude especially for the well-established FTSE 100 index futures. They 
suggest that the mispricing observed for the newly introduced FTSE mid-250 futures 
are due to relatively higher costs of trading the constituent stocks. This implies that a 
lower tick may improve liquidity and in turn minimises the mispricing (Kumar & Seppi 
1994). The reason is that the ability to trade the underlying stocks facilitates 
incorporation of information (Alexander 2008b, p.67). Further, higher liquidity in the 
underlying market facilitates arbitrage trades  (Roll et al. 2007).  
 
2.2.2.1. Liqudity and the index futures' pricing efficiency 
However, the positive effect of lower tick sizes on liquidity and subsequently on the 
pricing efficiency is conditional on whether the unexpected trading volume represents 
trades by arbitrageurs and how quickly the stock specific information is reflected in the 
stock prices. Henker & Martens (2005), provide evidence of lower inter market 
discrepancies between S&P 500 index futures and its underlying due to significant 
increase in number of arbitrage trades following the introduction of the lower tick size 
in the NYSE. Further, Roll, Schwartz & Subrahmanyam (2007) and Chordia, Roll, & 
Subrahmanyam (2008) show that the increased liquidity after the tick size reductions in 
the NYSE is due to quicker incorporation of firm specific information in the market. In 
NASDAQ market, Chung & Hrazdil (2010) find improvement in market efficiency and 
liquidity following tick size reduction (from the sixteenth to decimalisation). 
 
In contrast, Chen, Chou, & Chung (2009) find that reduction in the tick size leads to a 
deterioration in the pricing efficiency between SPDRs & S&P500 e-mini futures and 
ETFs & NASDAQ100 e-mini futures. They show that even though the bid-ask spreads 
decrease, the market depth also declines thus increasing the cost of trading particularly 
for large traders. As a result, arbitrageurs’ ability and willingness to initiate trade 
weakens, which subsequently leads to deterioration in the pricing efficiency of the e-
mini futures indices. In other words, an increase in trading volume following the tick 
size reduction may not represent arbitrageurs’ trades, which helps in reducing the inter-
market pricing discrepancies. 
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Further, even if arbitrageurs are not adversely affected by the tick size reduction, there 
are two other possibilities why the inter-market discrepancies may increase. First, if 
index futures are mispriced relative to its underlying, there is a possibility that 
speculators may use this signal by trading in the constituents stocks due to lower bid-
ask spreads instead of trading in the futures market. As a consequence, inter-market 
pricing discrepancies may widen if speculators’ trades exceed those of arbitrageurs’ 
trades. Second, the deviation from the no-arbitrage relationship may be further 
magnified by the possibility of speculators with stock specific information trading more 
often and thereby attracting new speculators, given the lower trading cost  (see, Bollen 
& Whaley 1998). This is particularly so for stocks with higher market capitalisation 
where speculators are able to act on stock specific information (Sutcliffe 2006, p.162). 
Similarly, there are two components of unexpected spot trading volume. One represents 
those of arbitrageurs, which narrow down inter-market price discrepancies, and the 
other represents those of speculators which widen these price discrepancies. 
 
While the impact of tick size reduction on pricing efficiency remains a point of 
academic debate, there is an agreement that market efficiency is improved with the 
introduction of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) as they contain attractive features for 
index arbitrage. Park & Switzer (1995) find that the Toronto 35 index futures price has 
conformed to the theoretical value of Toronto 35 index much better after the 
introduction of TIPs. Switzer, Varson & Zghidi (2000) and Chu & Hsieh (2002) 
investigate the impact of the introduction of SPDRs on market efficiency. Both 
conclude that the introduction of the SPDRs improve the S&P500 index futures’ pricing 
efficiency. Their results provide support for the hypothesis that ETFs facilitate arbitrage 
by simplifying the process of shorting. Kurov & Lasser (2002) find there is an increase 
in the speed of the adjustment to deviation from equilibrium prices which they attribute 
to the ease of establishing a spot NASDAQ-100 index position after the introduction of 
the tracking stock. They conclude that the introduction NASDAQ-100 Index Tracking 
Stocks (QQQs) facilitate spot-futures arbitrage and in turn improve the pricing 
efficiency of the futures index. 
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Traders use index futures as a price discovery tool and hedging instrument. That is, 
traders rely on futures prices to predict the spot prices and to minimise the price risk in 
their spot position. The magnitude and stability of the mispricing is of concern to them. 
A large mispricing suggest that it is unlikely that traders would be able to predict the 
spot price accurately and manage price risk efficiently (Garbade & Silber 1983). In the 
following two sections we review the literatures on the price discovery role and hedging 
effectiveness of index futures. 
 
2.3. The price discovery role of index futures 
Price discovery is an essential function performed by futures markets. This is so given 
the inherent advantages of trading futures. As such information may be reflected in the 
futures market more quickly than the spot market and hence adjusts to equilibrium level 
ahead of the underlying. Consequently, traders may find futures markets more 
informative about the true value of the underlying asset. In the following section, we 
discuss why futures are expected to incorporate information ahead of the spot. Next, we 
consider the reliability of futures in predicting the expected spot price. Finally, we 
review the empirical evidence concerning the lead-lag relationship between these two 
markets taking into account the effect of a lower tick size. 
 
2.3.1. Why index futures are expected to incorporate information ahead of its 
underlying 
There are a number of reasons as outlined by Chu, Hsieh & Tse (1999) for expecting 
the index futures to be the dominant source of price discovery. These are briefly 
discussed below: 
 
2.3.1.1. Leverage hypothesis 
The leverage hypothesis predicts that high leverage instrument such as index futures 
provide the best price discovery. The reason is that high leverage instrument provides 
higher return on investment. Thus, informed traders prefer to trade futures instead of the 
constituent stocks because with the smallest initial outlay, the traders get the same 
exposure as in the stock market. Chu, Hsieh & Tse (1999) suggest that the leverage 
hypothesis explain the dominant role of S&P 500 index futures in price discovery. 
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2.3.1.2. Information hypothesis 
The information hypothesis predicts that index futures serve a more significant price 
discovery function because traders prefer to exploit market-wide information by trading 
in the futures market (Fleming et al. 1996). On the other hand, traders prefer to exploit 
stock specific information in the underlying stocks because the movement in the futures 
price will be much smaller in comparison to the prices of the affected shares (Sutcliffe 
2006, p.162). Hence, it is more likely for informed traders to trade the index futures. 
This causes index futures price movement to lead spot price movement, provided that 
information specific to a few companies does not have trivial impact on the spot index 
(Cummings & Frino 2011). Frino, Walter & West (2000) empirically shown that traders 
with stock-specific (market-wide) information prefer to trade the spot index (index 
futures) in support of the information hypothesis.  
 
2.3.1.3. Up-tick rule hypothesis 
Due to no short-sell restrictions, bearish information may be incorporated first in the 
futures market and only later in the stock market. For example, if there is a bad news 
concerning the market in general, traders could take a short position by selling index 
futures, thereby immediately incorporating the effect of the information. Further, selling 
shares short may not be easily implemented due to uptick rule. That is, short selling 
could only be implemented in a rising market or when the last recorded return is non-
negative. Thus, the uptick rule hypothesis favours futures in the process of price 
discovery. 
 
2.3.1.4. Transaction cost hypothesis 
The transaction cost hypothesis predicts that price discovery occurs mainly in markets 
with the lowest transaction cost. For market wide-information, establishing a position 
that consist of all the constituent stocks is very expensive because each of the 
constituent stocks are subject to bid-ask spreads and broker’s commission, whereas 
index futures are quoted in narrower bid-ask spreads. Thus, informed traders prefer to 
exploit their information in the futures market due to lower trading cost. For example, 
Fleming, Ostdiek & Whaley (1996) find that the S&P500 futures lead both the S&P500 
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and S&P100 indices (purged of stale price effects) and the S&P500 options consistent 
with the transaction hypothesis. 
 
However, there is one exception with regard to the conclusion concerning the 
transaction cost hypothesis above, Fleming et al. (1996) argue that the transaction cost 
to buy one particular stock is lower compared to buying the index futures. Hence, firm 
specific information would tend to be revealed first in the stock market. Thus, if 
information specific to a few influential companies in the index have a huge impact in 
the prices of a few companies, the spot index price may lead the index futures  instead.19  
 
2.3.1.5. Technical reasons 
In addition to the above predictions, there are other technical reasons as noted earlier 
that may explain why index futures lead the spot index. These include thin trading 
effect, bid-ask bounce effect and time delays in reporting of the index value (please 
refer page 28). 
 
Thin trading effect may induce positive autocorrelation in the spot return series. To 
account for this, Stoll & Whaley (1990) use ARMA model to purge thin trading effect. 
Alternatively, quote data may be used instead of transaction data. For example, Shyy, 
Vijayraghavan & Scott-Quinn (1996) find that the CAC 40 index futures lead the CAC 
40 index, however, the feedback effect from spot to futures is much more stronger when 
quotes data are used. However, it is noted that in general futures’ lead over spot is 
stronger even after thin trading effects have been taken into account. For example, Tse 
(1995) finds that the lead of Nikkei 225 futures does not disappear even after 
controlling for thin trading effects.  
 
To recap, index futures market enjoys the advantages of high leverage, low trading 
costs and absence of uptick rule, which explains why futures market is expected to 
incorporate information ahead of its underlying. This implies that futures market could 
be used as an instrument to infer the expected price of the underlying asset and hence 
assist them in making sound financial decisions.  
                                                            
19 This contradict the leverage hypothesis which suggests that index futures should lead the spot index 
due to small outlays required to transact in the index futures (Fleming et al. 1996). 
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We review the theoretical background on how do traders use futures price to infer the 
future spot price in the following section. 
 
2.3.2. How well does the futures price forecast the expected spot price 
There are four theories that explain how traders may use futures price to predict the 
expected spot price. These are the expectations hypothesis, normal backwardation, 
contango and the modern portfolio theory. We briefly explain each in the following 
section.20 
 
The expectations hypothesis states that the current futures price,  equals the expected 
price of future spot price, , i.e. . It is assumes that traders are risk 
neutral and thus expect no profit in trading futures. This hypothesis, however, ignores 
the risk premiums in futures pricing especially when the expected spot prices are 
uncertain. 
 
The backwardation theory suggests that, short hedgers must compensate speculators to 
take the opposite position. That is, speculators will only take the long position if the 
futures price is below the expected spot price i.e. . In this market, futures price 
is below the future spot price and converge at maturity.  The opposite is for the 
contango, which suggest that long hedgers must provide provide profit for speculators 
to take the short position. Thus, the contango theory holds that current futures price,  
must exceed the expectation of spot price, . 
 
The above three traditional hypotheses all suggest that speculators are willing to trade if 
they are sufficiently compensated for the risk they take. Figure 2.1 shows the expected 
path of futures under the three traditional hypotheses. 
 
The modern portfolio theory refined these hypotheses, whereby the the existence of risk 
premium is considered. To illustrate, consider a stock paying no dividends. If  
denotes the expected stock price at time and denotes the required rate of return on 
                                                            
20 For detailed explanation, reader may refer to Bodie, Kane & Marcus (2009). 
 37 
the stock, then today’s stock price should equal the present value of its expected future 
payoff as follows:  
                              (II.2.1) 
Also, from the spot-futures parity relationship, today’s stock price is: 
                                  (II.2.2) 
It is obvious that Eqs. (II.2.1) and (II.2.2) must be equal.  Equating these terms yield:  
                                                     (II.2.3) 
 
If  is greater than (positive systematic risk/beta),  will be less than the 
expectation of . A long futures position will provide a profit of .  While short 
position profit is the negative of  and will have negative systematic risk. We shall 
now review the empirical evidence concerning the price discovery of index futures and 
how it may be affected by a lower trading costs caused by the lowering of tick sizes in 
the underlying market. 
 
 
Fig. 2.1: Futures price over time, with the assumption that the expected spot price remains unchanged. 
Source: Bodie, Kane and Marcus (2014) 
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2.3.3. Empirical evidence 
The extant literature suggests that futures and spot returns are imperfectly, albeit 
strongly, contemporaneously correlated (see for example, Frino & West 1999; Zhong et 
al. 2004). That is, a lead-lag relationship exists between these two markets and hence 
one could be used to predict the other.  
 
Generally, most of the empirical results show a bi-directional asymmetric lead-lag 
relationship, that is, a strong lead of the futures over the spot and a weak feedback effect 
of the spot lead over the futures. In other words, price discovery to some extent occurs 
in both markets, although futures’ lead over spot is much stronger. Thus, in such cases, 
the futures market is said to contribute significantly to the discovery of the spot asset 
price. There are however evidence that suggest the lead of spot over futures is much 
stronger. 
 
In Australia, Frino & West (1999) find the SPI futures lead the All Ordinary Index and 
that there is  feedback effect from the the spot index to the index futures. In Germany, 
Grünbichler, Longstaff & Schwartz (1994) find the DAX futures leads spot by about 
15-20 minutes and spot leads futures by 5 minutes. Similarly, in the United States, for 
the S&P500, stronger futures lead over spot is observed. For example, Kawaller, Koch 
& Koch (1987) find S&P500 futures prices lead spot prices by 20-45 minutes while the 
spot only affects futures prices less than 1 minute. Stoll & Whaley (1990) finds 
evidence that S&P500 and MMI futures leads the spot by about 5 minutes and at times 
as much as 10 minutes or more, and weak evidence of spot leads futures, a finding 
supported by Chan (1992). Further, Kutner & Sweeney (1991) examine the causal 
relationship between S&P 500 spot and futures using intraday data. Their results show 
that the futures lead the index (spot) by at least 20 minutes, where the index (spot) 
influences the futures for only 15 minutes. Ghosh (1993a) finds evidence of causality 
for the S&P500. De Jong & Nijman (1997) find the S&P500 spot leads the futures by 2 
minutes, and the futures lead by 11 minutes. Pizzi, Economopoulos and O, Neill (1998) 
find S&P500 futures market leads the spot market by at least 20 minutes and spot lead 
futures by 3 to 4 minutes. These findings imply that the transmission of information 
from futures to spot is much stronger than from spot to futures.  
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In contrast however, Wahab & Lashgari (1993) find stronger evidence of spot lead the 
futures for S&P500 rather than from futures to spot of which they attribute to 
application of the cointegration analysis. Likewise, Chiang & Fong (2001) find that the 
Hang Seng Index (HSI) leads the futures and attribute this to the domination of HSI by 
a few major stocks, which have symmetric lead-lag relations with futures. 
 
There is also evidence of uni-directional lead-lag relationship. For example, Shyy, 
Vijayraghavan & Scott-Quinn (1996) examine the issue of whether the lead-lag 
relationship would differ if bid-ask quotes midpoint data were used instead of 
transaction data. Using transaction prices data, they find futures lead spot. Using bid-
ask prices, however, the lead relationship from futures to spot diminishes and feedback 
effect from spot to futures become significant. They argue that thin-trading and 
differences in trading mechanisms may explain why previous results show futures 
leading spot. Recent evidence by Judge & Reancharoen (2014) indicates that the SET50 
index has a uni-directional lead over futures. They argue that the higher trading volume 
in the stock market in comparison to futures market21 may explain the spot’s lead over 
futures. 
 
However, in Taiwan, Lee, Wu & Yang (2013) find that futures significantly lead spot 
returns and that foreign institutional trades represent the major source of information. 
The above findings imply that whenever new information arrives, traders may exploit 
the information in either futures or spot markets, thus price discovery occurs mainly in 
market in which traders choose to trade.  
 
In the context of Malaysian market, Pok & Poshakwale (2004) find that the introduction 
of the index futures contracts improved information flows to the underlying stocks. This 
implies that the index futures in the emerging Malaysia market do play its price 
discovery role. Tan (2002) and Pok (2007) investigate the temporal relationship 
between futures and spot returns. The focus of their studies is on the impact of the 
imposition of selective capital controls.  
                                                            
21 The trading volume in the spot markets ranges from 1 billion and 6 billion shares, while the number of 
futures contracts peaks at 45,000. Judge et. al. (2014) attribute this to the on going financial liberalisation 
in the Thailand capital market. 
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Tan (2002) finds futures lead the spot in the long run and a bi-directional short-run 
causality and that the capital control has significant impact on the futures market but not 
on the spot market. Pok (2007) finds that the withdrawal of foreign institutional 
investors significantly affect the lead-lag relationship between index futures and spot. 
Specifically, she finds that futures’ lead are longer after the imposition of capital control 
and argues that it is due to the absence of foreign institutional investors. 
 
It is believed that the relationship between stock index and index futures in emerging 
Malaysian market has changed due to the lowering tick sizes because traders may find it 
less costly for them to exploit information in the underlying market (Chan 1992). 
Further, due to maturation effect, both market may have become more integrated i.e. 
closely linked over time (Stoll & Whaley 1990). 
 
Existing empirical evidence suggests that reduction of tick size improves the reliability 
of index futures as the bellwether instrument as it allows for better incorporation of 
stock specific information. For example, in Toronto Stock Exchange, Beaulieu, 
Ebrahmim & Morgan (2003) suggest that tick size reduction improves the price 
discovery role of TSE 35 index futures.  Similarly, Chou & Chung (2006) find that the 
lower tick size on the ETFs (S&P500 ETFs; Nasdaq-100 ETFs; and DJIA) facilitates 
incorporation of information and that the index futures still the main source of price 
discovery. Chen & Gau (2009) find that the contribution of the index market to price 
discovery increases after the reduction in the minimum tick size, which they attribute to 
the transaction hypothesis.  
 
On one hand, the move to lower the tick may facilitate the incorporation of stock 
specific information. If this is the case, the index futures ability to find the equilibrium 
price should improve. On the other hand, however, the lower tick size may cause index 
futures to delay in responding to both stock specific and market-wide information. First, 
if index futures are highly mispriced relative to its underlying, there is a possibility that 
speculators may use this signal by trading in the constituents stocks due to lower bid-
ask spreads instead of trading in the futures market. As a consequence, mispricing may 
widen if speculators’ trades exceed those of arbitrageurs’ trades. Second, the mispricing 
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may be further magnified by the possibility of speculators with stock specific 
information trading more often and thereby attracting new speculators, given the lower 
trading cost (Bollen & Whaley 1998). This is particularly so for stocks with higher 
market capitalisation where speculators are able to act on stock specific information 
(Sutcliffe 2006). In short, there are possibilities that the lowering of tick size may 
adversely affect the price discovery of index futures, it it causes futures to delay in 
responding to both market-wide and  stock specific information. Therefore, it is 
important for us to assess the speed at which both spot and futures returns adjust to 
equilibrium level. 
 
It is noted that the widely used lead-lag based regression models in investigating the 
lead-lag relationship between spot and futures do not provide an estimate that measures 
the extent of differential price movement. In other words, it only addresses the question 
of how far futures are leading or lagging the spot, but it does not tell us anything about 
the speed at which the futures and spot revert to equilibrium level. The speed of 
adjustment estimators used in Theobald & Yallup (1998) and Poshakwale & Theobald 
(2004) will enable the examination of differential speeds of adjustment when assessing 
the futures and spot lead-lag relationships.  Consequently, we will be able to explain 
and justify the impact of the tick size reduction on the price discovery role of index 
futures. That is, by assessing the speed at which both prices adjust to equilibrium level, 
before and after the introduction of lower tick, we provide new evidence on the 
temporal relationship between futures and spot markets in the emerging Malaysian 
market. The speed of adjustment estimator(s) which is based on the partial adjustment 
model (Amihud & Mendelson 1987) is discussed in the methodology section. In 
addition, the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) is also estimated for robustness. 
 
2.4. Hedging effectiveness of the index futures 
One important function of futures contract is to enable effective hedging. With futures 
contract traders are able to hedge price risk without the need to readjust their portfolio 
composition. Further, futures allow traders to hedge their positions either in a bullish or 
a bearish market. For example, a portfolio holder who expects to receive funds in four 
months’ time, to buy additional stocks, and in the opinion that stocks are cheaper now 
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compared to four months later, could hedge the risk of having to pay more four months 
later, by buying current index futures. In the event that the portfolio holder’s opinion is 
correct, losses in having to acquire the stocks at a higher price will be offset or 
minimise by closing his index futures position at a higher price. Similarly, if the 
investor expects the market to move downward, the trader could execute short hedge 
strategy to protect his/her current positions. 
 
2.4.1. How hedging transforms price risk to basis risk 
Although hedging with futures eliminates price risk in the underlying spot, the hedger is 
exposed to basis risk, i.e., the risk that futures returns over time does not track exactly 
the spot returns. That is, hedging transforms price risk to basis risk22 (Jorion 2007). 
Suppose, the pay-off of an unhedged spot position is given by the difference 
between today’s and yesterday’s prices i.e. . This pay-off is very much 
uncertain due to price risk. Whereas, the pay-off a hedged position  is; 
 
                                             
(II.3.1) 
 
Where  is the basis, the difference in prices between spot and futures. Thus, 
the profit of a hedge strategy depends only on the movement in the basis. Similarly, a 
large basis or rather the mispricing (because of its dominant in the component of the 
basis, refer page 29) may affect hedgers’ profitability and therefore on the effectiveness 
of a hedge strategy. In other words, the magnitude and stability of the mispricing is 
crucial for a successful hedging (Figlewski 1984). It is important for us to assess the 
hedging effectiveness of the FBM-FKLI stock index because the mispricing may widen 
following the introduction of the lower tick sizes given its inconclusive impact on the 
FBM-KLCI spot index liquidity (see for example, Ahn et al. 1996; Goldstein & 
Kavajecz 2000; Ronen & Weaver 2001; Jones & Lipson 2001). By doing so, we 
contribute to the literature and extend Pok, Poshakwale & Ford (2009) studies. 
 
                                                            
22 Price risk refers to the risk of a decline in the value of a security of a portfolio. 
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In the next section, we discuss the theoretical perspective on why the need to hedge, 
following which we discuss the two main issues in futures hedging, namely; the 
determination of hedge ratio and the evaluation of hedging effectiveness. Finally, we 
review the existing empirical evidence. 
 
2.4.2. The motives for hedging 
According to Sutcliffe (2006) there are three main motives for hedging: (1) risk 
minimisation, (2) profit maximisation and (3) portfolio optimisation. We shall now 
briefly discuss each one of these motives. 
 
2.4.2.1. Risk minimisation 
A trader who views hedging as a risk minimisation strategy undertakes opposite but 
equal in magnitude a position in futures so as to immunise his/her standing against 
market uncertainties, rather than just liquidating the initial position in a risky asset. In 
this theory, investors are assumed to be extremely risk averse and endeavour to off-set 
or eliminate all possible losses in the underlying market by trading futures. 
 
The hedge ratio is thus:  
 
                                         (II.3.2) 
 
where and  are the value of the futures contracts and the spot assets held by the 
investor, respectively. This naïve or perfect hedge eliminates all the price risk provided 
there is no basis risk. As we discussed earlier, mispricing which is the dominant 
component of the basis risk may never be zero due to the dynamic relationship between 
index futures and spot index.  
 
Thus, given the lack of perfect correlation between spot and futures prices, the optimum 
hedge ratio can never be one, even when the spot portfolio to be hedged replicates the 
underlying of the futures contract. In other words, it is unrealistic to assumed that the 
variance of futures returns equals the covariance between spot and futures returns. This 
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will be explained further when we discuss the static hedging model concerning the 
naïve hedging in the following section. 
 
2.4.2.2. Profit maximisation 
The Working’s (1953) theory of hedging assumes that hedgers are risk taker, rather than 
a risk averse. That is, the aim for hedging is to profit from the basis, the price difference 
between spot and futures prices, rather than to reduce risk although this may be an 
incidental effect. 
 
2.4.2.3. Portfolio optimisation 
A more popular view is the portfolio optimisation approach which was pioneered by 
Johnson (1960) and Stein (1961). Ederington (1979) argues that portfolio optimisation 
approach is superior to both the risk minimisation and the profit maximisation because 
both approaches as the objectives of hedging are considered. He observes that hedging a 
spot position using futures contracts is synonymous with the construction of a two-asset 
portfolio: the spot position and the futures contract, whereby the most optimal hedge 
ratio, is given by: 
  
                                         (II.3.3) 
 
where, is the covariance between spot and futures prices,  the variance of futures 
prices. Consequently, an efficient frontier of expected return and risk can be found by 
this portfolio for a wide range of risk aversion parameters. If the trader’s risk aversion 
parameter is zero (infinite), the profit maximising (risk minimising) solution is obtained 
(Sutcliffe 2006, p.257).  
 
2.4.3. Estimating optimal hedge ratios 
There are two integrally related questions that should be tackled together with regard to 
futures hedging. First, how to estimate the number of futures contracts optimally i.e. the 
optimal hedge ratio. Second, how to measure the effectiveness of the hedging strategy. 
To estimate the optimal ratio, static and dynamic models are widely used. In this 
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section, we discuss these two models. In the following chapter, we discuss the 
measurement of hedging effectiveness. 
 
2.4.3.1. The static hedging model 
In static model, the joint distribution of spot and futures indices is assumed constant 
through time. Suppose  represent the hedged portfolio return at time : 
 
                                          (II.3.4)
  
 
 
where and  are spot and futures returns, respectively.  is the 
number of futures contract to be shorted in order to optimally hedge the long position in 
the spot market. The expected return,  and variance,  of the hedged portfolio, 
would therefore, respectively be: 
 
                                          (II.3.5)
  
 
and 
 
                                       (II.3.6)
  
 
Assume that a hedger possesses the following mean-variance expected utility function:  
 
                                         (II.3.7) 
 
where  is the investor’s coefficient of risk aversion . The hedger chooses the 
portfolio that will maximise . Substituting Eqs. (II.3.5) and (II.3.6) into Eq. 
(II.3.7) and the taking the derivative of the resultant expression with respect to , we 
find: 
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                                         (II.3.8) 
 
where  is the optimal hedge ratio. Further, if futures prices follows a martingale 
process, i.e., the expected returns of the futures contracts does not depend on the past 
information, that is , the above expression would reduce to: 
  
                                          
(II.3.9) 
 
The optimal hedge ratio, could conveniently be estimated by regressing spot return 
against futures return, hence it is also known as the OLS hedge ratio.23 One advantage 
of the OLS hedge ratio is that it takes into account the imperfect correlation between 
futures and spot returns.  
 
In naïve hedging, however, the hedge ratio is unrealistically assumed one. That is a 
hedger takes equal but opposite positions in spot and futures. To see this, we substitute, 
 from Eq. (II.3.9) into the variance of the hedged portfolio, Eq. (II.3.6) and 
rearranging yields: 
 
                                   
(II.3.10) 
 
where  is the correlation coefficient between the returns on the spot and the futures. 
Clearly, a perfect hedge is only achievable with a perfectly positive correlation between 
futures and spot returns.24  
 
                                                            
23 Also known as the traditional, conventional or minimum-variance hedge ratio. 
24 However, one-to-one hedge ratio may be optimal for long duration hedges especially in developed 
markets such as the US (Chen et al. 2004). 
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2.4.3.2. The dynamic hedging model 
In a dynamic hedging model, relevant conditioning information are taken into account 
in deriving the optimal hedge ratio. Alternatively, the joint distribution of spot and 
futures returns is assumed time-varying not constant. Suppose the returns at time  on a 
hedged portfolio consisting of one long unit of spot holdings and  short units of 
futures contracts at period  is given by (see for example, Kroner & Sultan 1993): 
 
                                       (II.3.11) 
 
 
where and  represent the spot and futures prices changes for time  to , 
respectively, and  represents the number of futures contracts bought at time . 
Similarly, we assume that the investors at each time  would maximise the mean-
variance expected utility function: 
 
                                     (II.3.12) 
 
The utility maximising hedge ratio at time , in a mean-variance framework is 
therefore:  
 
                                                           (II.3.13)
 
 
Again, the above expression reduces to Eq. (II.3.14), if the futures prices follow a 
martingale process:  
 
                                                              (II.3.14)
  
 
Thus, in contrast to the static hedge ratio in Eq. (II.3.9), the dynamic hedge ratios in Eq. 
(II.3.14)
 
are conditioned on the information, as it arrives.  
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Given the advantages of dynamic over static hedge, three widely known multivariate 
GARCH models are used in this study to estimate the time-varying hedge ratio. These 
models and the criterions to evaluate the effectiveness of a hedging strategy are 
discussed in the Methodology section. For now, let us review the empirical evidence 
concerning the effectiveness of hedging spot position using index futures. 
 
2.4.4. Empirical evidence 
Early studies adopted the constant or traditional OLS model (see for example, Figlewski 
1984; Figlewski 1985). However, this model has been subject to many criticisms.  
 
First, there are some statistical problems in OLS regression, in particular, the possible 
presence of autocorrelation and/or heteroskedasticity in the residuals which may yield 
biased estimates of optimal hedge ratio causing it to be unreliable. To address this issue, 
numerous studies use ARMA and/or GARCH specifications in estimating the optimal 
hedge ratio. 
 
Second, the use of OLS ignores the short-run and long-run dynamic between futures 
and spot prices/returns which lead to misspecification. Ghosh (1993b) argues that the 
cointegration relationship (see Engle 1987) between futures and spot prices should be 
taken into account in order to estimate unbiased hedge ratios. By incorporating the 
cointegration relationship between S&P500 futures and the underlying for the period 
from 1990 to 1991, Ghosh (1993b) find higher hedge ratio in comparison to the 
bivariate OLS without ECM.  
 
Using weekly Nikkei 225 data for 1989 - 1994, Chou, Denis & Lee (1996) find the 
hedging effectiveness of the ECM model is 2% better than the OLS model. This finding 
is concurred by Lien & Tse (1999), in their study for the period from 1989 to 1997. In 
addition they suggest that ECM with GARCH is the best approach. It is worth noting, 
however that the exclusion of the cointegration relationship between futures and spot 
should have minimal effect on hedging effectiveness evaluation (Lien 2004). 
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Finally, the assumption that the variance of futures prices and the covariance between 
spot and futures prices are equal and hence constant hedge ratio throughout the duration 
of a hedge is unrealistic as it ignore all relevant conditioning information. Thus a 
dynamic hedge ratio is deemed to be more realistic. 
 
Numerous studies compare the performance of a hedging strategy using futures by 
utilising several methods for estimating the hedge ratios. In general, it is found that the 
dynamic models are superior compared to the static model.  
 
For example, in Canada, Gagnon & Lypny (1997) utilise weekly TSE35 data for the 
period from 1987 to 1993. They find that the GARCH(1,1) hedge ratios yields higher 
hedging effectiveness in comparison to the static OLS and naïve hedge ratios. Using 
daily data on the FTSE100 from 1985 to 1999, Brooks, Henry & Persand (2002) find 
that the multivariate VECM-GARCH(1,1) model with BEKK parameterisation is 
superior in comparison to the naïve hedge. 
 
In Australia, Yang & Allen (2005) use daily data for 1988-2000 of the SPI.  They find 
that for the 20-day hedges, the MGARCH strategy is better than the VAR, ECM and 
static OLS models. 
 
Olgun & Yetkiner (2011) use standard OLS regression and bivariate GARCH to 
investigate the optimal hedging strategy using the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE)-30 
index futures by comparing hedging performance of constant and time-varying hedge 
ratios under the mean-variance utility criteria. Their empirical results reveal that the 
dynamic hedge strategy outperforms the static and the traditional strategies. 
 
Choudhry (2003) examine the Nikkei225, Hang Seng, SPI, FTSE100, DAX30 and the 
JSE Industrial 25 and their associated underlying using daily data for the period from 
1990 to 1999. He finds that the GARCH models out-performed the OLS between 1% to 
14%. In a subsequent study, Choudhry (2004) investigates hedging effectiveness for the 
Nikkei 225, SPI and Hang Seng using weekly data for the period from 1990 to 2000. 
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Similarly, he find time-varying GARCH hedge ratios tend to be more effective than 
OLS and naïve hedge. 
 
In Greece, Floros & Vougas (2004) consider daily data on the FTSE-ASE 20 and 
FTSE-ASE Mid 40 futures indices for the period from 1999 to 2001. They find that the 
hedge ratios estimated by multivariate GARCH exceeded those estimated using OLS, 
which exceeded those estimated by VECM. Sim & Zurbruegg (2001) utilise daily data 
on the Kospi 200 for the period from 1996 to 1999. They find that the dynamic model, 
EC-GARCH(1,3) is more effective than the OLS. Similarly, in Taiwan, Wang & Low 
(2003) find GARCH(1,1) strategy is about 19% more effective than the OLS hedge 
using the MSCI Taiwan futures during the period from 1997 to 2000. 
 
Pok, Poshakwale & Ford (2009) is the first study that investigates the hedging 
effectiveness of index futures in emerging Malaysian market. Using bivariate 
GARCH(1,1) models, they find that the index futures perform effectively as a hedging 
instrument albeit the Asian financial crisis and impositions of selective capital control 
regulations. They conclude that the index futures are as effective as those reported in 
developed markets.  
 
This study differs from Pok et al. (2009). First, by using new data from 2002 to 2012, 
we provide new evidence on the hedging performance of the FBM-FKLI index 
futures.25 Second, we consider the impact of tick size reduction on the hedging 
performance of FBM-FKLI index futures. We reiterate that this is important because the 
introduction of the lower tick directly affects the spot liquidity and in turn on the basis. 
Consequently, the hedging effectiveness using the FBM-FKLI index futures is 
conditional on the stability and magnitude of the basis. We are unaware of any studies 
that have investigated this issue in Malaysia. 
 
 
                                                            
25 We acknowledge the problem of the global financial crisis in 2008. However, the focus of our study is 
to examine the hedging effectiveness of the index futures before and after the reduction in tick sizes. That 
is, we do not evaluate which hedging strategy is the best during the crisis and thus the findings must be 
interpreted with cautious. 
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2.5. Hypothesis development 
This section discusses the development of our hypotheses.  
 
2.5.1. Tick size and stock trading volume 
In a competitive market, the introduction of a lower tick will induce lower spreads 
because traders will be able to trade at narrower spreads. This is especially true if the 
stocks were previously constrained by the tick size and when the relative tick size is 
high. In Bursa Malaysia, Chung, Kim & Kitsabunnarat (2005) find that the tick sizes do 
impose a significant binding constraint on stock prices. Given that Bursa Securities uses 
a tick structure that varies with price, even higher priced stocks are constraint by the 
tick size.26 Therefore, the large capitalisation stocks that make-up the composite index 
are most likely to benefit from the tick size reduction. Further, in contrast to other 
markets, Chung et. al (2005) also find that traders in Bursa Malaysia do not quote larger 
depth. This implies that the adverse impact on market depth is minimal and hence on 
traders’ willingness to trade. Based on the above, we predict that the reduction of the 
tick leads to higher spot index trading volume. The null and alternative hypotheses are 
as follows: 
 
: The reduction of tick size has no impact on spot index trading volume. 
: The reduction of tick size leads to higher spot index trading volume.  
 
 
2.5.2. Liquidity and the index futures' pricing efficiency 
In similar veins, the unexpected component of the spot trading volume serve to 
strengthen or improve the pricing efficiency of the index futures if it represents 
arbitrageurs’ trade. Also, the magnitude of mispricing will decrease if the unexpected 
component of spot trading volume represents trades that exploit stock specific  
information efficiently. We predict that the lowering of tick size will improve the 
pricing efficiency of the index futures. First, traders will be able to incorporate stock 
specific information more efficiently due to lower trading costs after the tick reduction. 
                                                            
26 For example, in Korea stock exchange, which also uses a tick structure that varies with price, Chung, 
Kang, & Kim (2011) show that if stock price moves to lower tick size category, the spread would 
decrease on average from 0.8941 to 0.4542%. They suggest that the tick size for the high-priced stocks 
should be reduced as it is a significant binding constraint on spreads. 
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In other words, the ability to trade the underlying reduces the basis (Alexander 2008b, 
p.67). Secondly, it can be implied that the impact of the lower tick on arbitrageurs’ 
ability and willingness to execute their trades is minimal, given that traders in Bursa 
Malaysia do not normally quote higher depth for higher tick stocks (K. H. Chung et al. 
2005). In addition, the tick size reduction is also effective on the exchange-traded fund, 
which may further facilitate arbitrageurs in reducing negative mispricing. Thus we test 
the following hypotheses: 
 
: The unexpected spot index volume following the tick reduction has no impact on  
        the mispricing. 
: The unexpected spot index volume following the tick reduction reduces mispricing. 
 
: The reduction of tick size has no effect on mispricing. 
: The reduction of tick size leads to lower mispricing. 
 
 
2.5.3. The price discovery of role of index futures  
We expect that the tick reduction will improve the spot’s speed of adjustment towards 
equilibrium. The reason is that the constituent stocks are large and are actively traded 
(Hsieh et al. 2008) and therefore may experience greater reduction in spreads. As a 
consequence traders are in a better position to exploit stock specific information. If this 
is the case, the price discovery role of the index futures will improve due to the fact that 
the ability to trade the underlying more efficiently strengthened the relationship 
between the spot and futures (Alexander 2008b). This leads us to question whether the 
tick size reduction improves the price discovery role of index futures. Put differently, 
does the price of the constituent stocks adjust towards intrinsic value at a higher speed 
as a result of the reduced tick sizes? Therefore, we hypothesise that the tick size 
reduction improves the spot index speed of adjustment towards equilibrium level. 
 
The reduction of tick size has no significant impact on the spot index speed of  
       adjustment towards equilibrium level. 
The reduction of tick size improves spot index speed of adjustment towards  
       equilibrium level. 
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2.5.4. The hedging effectiveness of the index futures 
For the same reasons as above, we predict that the lower tick improves the hedging 
effectiveness of the index futures. In particular, the relationship between the spot and 
futures will strengthened following the tick size reduction. As such, the hedge ratio will 
be higher post-tick period, consequently the hedging effectiveness of the index futures 
improves because the success of a hedge strategy relies on the higher correlation 
between these two indices regardless of methods used to estimate the hedge ratio 
(Alexander & Barbosa 2007). Therefore, we test the following hypotheses: 
 
 Hedge ratios estimated for the post-tick period is similar to the pre-tick period. 
 Hedge ratios estimated for the post-tick period is significantly higher compared to  
       the pre-tick period. 
 
 Hedge effectiveness for the post-tick period is similar to pre-tick period. 
 Hedge performance is significantly greater for the post-tick period in comparison  
       to pre-tick period. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Data and Methodology 
This chapter describes the data and methodology used in this study. 
 
Daily data are collected for the spot, futures and money/debt markets. The sample 
period is from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2012 consisting of 2704 observations 
(adjusted for non-trading days).27 
 
Daily observations for the spot include closing prices of the index, trading volume and 
dividend yield. Trading volume represents the total value (in thousand of Ringgit 
Malaysia) of the constituent shares traded on a particular trading day. For analysis 
purposes, this variable is scaled by 1000. Dividend yield is the total actual dividend 
amount for the index expressed as a percentage of the total market value of the 
constituent stocks. 
 
For the futures, daily observations include settlement price, the total number of 
contracts traded and the number of days before the contract expires. The settlement 
price is a continuous series whereby the first values starts at the nearest28 contract 
month until the first business day of the next nearest contract month, a volume 
weighting calculation between the nearest and the next nearest contract months is 
applied to the prices until the nearest contract reaches its expiry date, at this point the 
contract rolls over to the next nearest contract month.29 Daily trading volume in value 
(thousand of Ringgit Malaysia) is obtained by the multiplication of the settlement price, 
                                                            
27 Observations on non-trading days (if any) i.e. Saturdays, Sundays and public holidays were crossed out 
by using the Stata® Business Calendar feature. This was done to eliminate data errors which, may 
contaminate the accuracy of our analysis leading to spurious conclusions. 
28 Similar to previous studies (see for example, Theobald & Yallup 1998; Switzer et al. 2000; Pok et al. 
2009), we use the nearest contract month instead of the next nearest contract month continuous series in 
investigating the relationship between futures and spot. 
29 A detailed description of the futures continuos series, which is compiled by DataStream is accessible at 
http://extranet.datastream.com/data/Futures/Documents/Datastream%20Product%20Futures%20Continuo
us%20Series.pdf 
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contract multiplier and the total number of contracts traded. The contract size is RM50 
as per the contract specifications (please refer Table 1.7 on page 16). 
 
Daily data on money and debt market variables include; overnight Kuala Lumpur 
Interbank Offered Rates (KLIBOR), 3-month T-bill rates and 10-year Malaysian 
Government Securities (MGS) yield. In addition, we collected monthly 10-year Private 
Debt Securities (PDS) yield, which was interpolated using the cubic spline30 method to 
generate its corresponding daily frequency. KLIBOR is the average interest rate at 
which deposits are offered between banks in the Malaysian money market. MGS are the 
coupon-bearing, long-term bonds issued by the Malaysian government, and PDS are 
debt instruments issued by corporations, which include commercial papers (CPs), 
bonds, asset-backed securities (ABS) and medium term notes (MTNs), amongst others. 
For analysis purposes these rates/yields were annualised and continuously compounded. 
 
Our study utilises time series methods. For the first empirical chapter, we use OLS 
regression to explain daily changes in spot trading volume. That is, we assess whether 
trading volume is significantly higher after the tick reduction. Next, we decompose the 
raw trading volume into its expected and unexpected components. Using quantile 
regression (Koenker & Basset 1978), we assess how the unexpected spot trading 
volume influence mispricing at differing quantiles taking into account the introduction 
of the lower tick sizes. In addition, we examine the interaction between the unexpected 
spot volume and the mispricing using vector autoregression (VAR). This is important 
because a large mispricing, for example, may influence the level of the unexpected spot 
volume (Roll et al. 2007). 
 
In our second empirical chapter, we estimate the speed at which both spot and futures 
returns adjust to equilibrium level. The estimators utilised are based on the partial 
adjustment model (Amihud & Mendelson 1987). By doing so we are able to justify the 
impact of the tick reduction on the price discovery role of the index futures. For 
robustness, the long-term relationship between spot and futures returns is also assessed 
using vector error correction model (VECM).  
                                                            
30 Details on the Stata® to perform cubic spline interpolation is accessible at 
https://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s457005.html. 
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We address the impact of the tick reduction on the hedging effectiveness of the index 
futures in our third and final empirical chapter. Several multivariate generalised auto-
regressive conditional heteroskedasticity (MGARCH) models are utilised to estimate 
the hedge ratios. This is done by using the residuals from VECM estimated in our 
second empirical chapter. The performance of the hedge ratios is then evaluated using 
risk minimisation and utility maximisation criterions.  
 
3.1. First empirical chapter: Lower price increments, index market liquidity 
and index futures' pricing efficiency 
Our first empirical chapter i.e. Chapter 4 attempts to answer research question one.  
Specifically, we address three hypotheses concerning the impact of lower tick on spot 
index liquidity and on the pricing efficiency of index futures. We shall next discuss the 
methodologies and variables used in addressing the relevant hypothesis. 
 
3.1.1. Lower tick and trading volume 
For our first hypothesis we employ the following model to examine the impact of the 
reduction in tick sizes on the daily changes in stock index trading volume (Chordia et al. 
2001):  
            (III.1.1)
  
 
where is the daily spot trading volume (scaled by 1000). The independent variables 
and their theoretical justifications, as per Chordia, Roll & Subrahmanyan (2001), for 
explaining the spot index volume are discussed below: 
 
Tick size reduction : The key variable is a dummy that equals 1 following the tick 
size reduction (from 3 August 2009 to 31 Dec 2012) and zero otherwise. A significant 
positive coefficient indicates that the tick reduction leads to an increase in trading 
volume. 
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Interest rates affect the level of trading volume. To control for this, short-term interest 
rates, term spread yield and quality spread yield are included in the model.  
 
Short-term interest rates : Decline in short-term rates, reduces the cost of holding 
inventory of stocks and the cost of margin trading. As a result demand and supply of 
equities increases.  is the KLIBOR rates to proxy for short-term interest rates. 
 
Term spread : Increase in term spread indicates positive market outlook, which may 
influence investors to reallocate their wealth between equity and bond to maximise their 
earnings. Trading activities may increase as a result. Term spread is defined as the 
difference between long-term debt and short-term interest rates.  is term spread 
defined as the daily difference between 10-year MGS and the KLIBOR. 
 
Quality spread : Quality spread is the yield spread corporate and government long 
term bonds. An increase in quality spread implies higher perceived risk of holding 
inventory of stocks and thereby may lead to a decline in the liquidity. is quality 
spread, the daily difference between 10-year PDS and 10-year MGS. The preceding 
denotes the daily change in the variable. 
 
Other control variables include the past 5-day absolute spot returns, , to proxy for 
stock market volatility. Dummy variables ,  and are included to proxy for 
concurrent market performance, momentum effects and daily variations in trading 
volume, respectively.  
 
Market volatility : Numerous studies report of a positive relationship between 
volume change and absolute price change, both in equity and futures markets (see, 
Karpoff 1987). This implies that large increases in trading volume may be associated 
with either a recent large increase or a large decrease in price of the constituents stocks. 
Sudden recent increases or decreases in prices represents risk of trading in the equity 
markets, which may deter traders from trading during periods of high stock market 
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volatility (Foster & Viswanathan 1990). Market volatility is proxied by the past five 
trading-day averages of index daily absolute index returns.  
 
Equity market performance : A dummy variable to proxy for concurrent equity 
market performance, which takes the value 1 if the concurrent spot index return is 
positive, and zero otherwise. This dummy variable is included because recent price 
movements may affect investors’ perception, which in turn may influence their portfolio 
composition. Signed concurrent daily spot returns are used as a proxy for recent market 
performance. 
 
Momentum effect : Dummy variable equals one if the past five trading-day of daily 
spot index returns is positive or zero otherwise. This variable is included in the model 
due to the fact that most trading strategies, in particular momentum/contrarian accounts 
for recent price trends. Further, technical analysis techniques also involves past market 
moves. 
 
Day of the week: Dummy  is used to capture the effect of daily variations in trading 
volume. These dummy variables are included in our model to access whether the day of 
the week effect on trading volume exists in emerging Malaysian market.31 The variables 
for our first hypothesis are listed and briefly summarised in Table 3.1 below.  
                                                            
31 Brooks & Persand (2001) find significant positive Monday average returns and significant negative 
Tuesday returns in emerging Malaysian market. However, we are unaware of any studies that have 
examined day of the week effect on volume in emerging Malaysian market. 
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Table 3.1: Data description for hypothesis one 
First empirical chapter (Hypothesis one): The impact of tick size reduction on stock market trading 
volume 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variable  
 Daily stock market trading volume represents the total 
value of constituent stocks traded on a particular trading 
day, expressed in thousands of Ringgit Malaysia (RM). For 
analysis purposes, this variable is scaled by a thousand. 
Datastream 
Independent 
variables 
  
 Dummy variable equals 1 following the implementation of 
the tick size reduction i.e. 3 August 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
- 
 The daily Kuala Lumpur Interbank Offered Rates 
(KLIBOR)ª as a proxy for short-term interest rates.  
Datastream 
 Term spread defined as the daily difference between 10-
year Malaysian Government Securities (MGS)ᵇ yield and 
KLIBOR.  
Datastream 
 
 Quality spread defined as the daily difference between 10-
year Private Debt Securities (PDS)ᵈ yield and 10-year 
MGS.  
Datastream/Bloomberg 
 Dummy variable to proxy for concurrent stock market 
performance, which takes the value 1 if the concurrent spot 
index return is positive, and zero otherwise. 
- 
 Dummy variable equals one if the past five trading-day of 
daily spot index returns is positive or zero otherwise. This 
variable is included in the model due to the fact that most 
trading strategies, in particular momentum/contrarian 
accounts for recent price trends.  
- 
 
The past five trading-day moving average of daily absolute 
spot index returns to proxy for stock market volatility.  
Datastream 
 Dummy variable to capture the effect of daily variations in 
trading volume. 
- 
ª KLIBOR is the average interest rate at which term deposits are offered between prime banks in the 
Malaysian wholesale money market.  
ᵇ MGS are the coupon-bearing, long-term bonds issued by the Malaysian government. 
ᵈ PDS are debt instruments issued by corporations, which include commercial papers (CPs), medium term 
notes (MTNs), bonds, asset-backed securities (ABS), amongst others. For analysis purposes these 
rates/yields are annualised and continuously compounded.  
 
Table 3.1 shows the correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables. The 
coefficients are somewhat low or negative which suggests that multicollinearity is not a 
significant problem. 
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Table 3.1: Correlation matrix: explanatory variables for daily changes in spot trading volume 
     
 1 - - - 
 -0.3117 1 - - 
 -0.0503 -0.6715 1 - 
 -0.0344 0.0272 0.0045 1 
 
 
The model is fitted using ARMA (2,2) to account for autocorrelation and due to the 
presence of ARCH effect, GARCH (1,1) is fitted to account for the conditional 
variance.  
 
Modelling diagnostic indicates that the residuals from the estimated model are of white 
noise as shown in Fig. 3.1 below. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.1: Diagnostics for ARCH standardised residuals (Eq. (III.1.1)) 
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3.1.2. Lower tick, trading volume and index futures' pricing efficiency 
This section describes the methodology used to address our second and third 
hypotheses, which address whether the liquidity improves the pricing efficiency of the 
index futures.  
 
3.1.2.1. Decomposition of spot trading volume 
In order for us to investigate the impact of liquidity on the inter-market relationship 
between the spot and futures indices, we need to decompose the raw spot trading 
volume into its expected and unexpected components. We shall focus on the unexpected 
component because it may represents trades that serves to widen or narrows down the 
mispricing (see, Cummings & Frino 2011). On one hand, the unexpected spot volume 
may strengthen the inter-market relationship if it represents arbitrage trading. On the 
other hand, the mispricing may widen if the unexpected spot volume represents trading 
to exploit both firm-specific and market-wide information, whenever futures are slower 
to respond to both type of information (Sutcliffe 2006; Cummings & Frino 2011). 
Following Bessembinder & Seguin (1992), we decompose the raw spot index volume 
by first generating a 100-day moving averages. Next, the raw trading volume series is 
de-trended by deducting the 100-day moving averages. Finally, the de-trended series is 
segregated into its expected and unexpected components using ARMA(1,3)32 
specification determined using the autocorrelations and partial autocorrelation 
functions. The sums of constant and predicted residuals represent the unexpected spot 
index volume, . 
 
The index futures volume are also decomposed using similar method as above using 
ARMA(1,7) specification. The unexpected futures volume is then used as a control 
variable. 
 
 
                                                            
32 We use ARMA specification because we first detrended the raw series by deducting a 100-day moving 
average generated from the raw spot volume. The detrended series is stationary. However, ARIMA 
specification may be use directly to the raw spot volume to decompose the series into expected and 
unexpected components given that the raw spot volume is non-stationary. The sums of constant and 
predicted residuals represent the unexpected spot volume. Thus, both methods (ARMA and ARIMA) can 
be used to decompose the raw trading volume. 
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3.1.2.2. Computation of the mispricing 
As noted earlier (please refer page 26), the cost of carry model links the spot and futures 
prices. Thus, the intrinsic futures price at time , is estimated as follows: 
 
                                           (III.1.2)  
 
where is the observed price of the spot at time , is the risk-free interest rate as 
proxied by the daily continuously compounded yield on the 3-month T-Bill rate, is the 
actual dividend yield33 (continuously compounded) on the stock index portfolio, and 
is the index futures’ number of days to expiration. 
 
Similar to previous studies (see for example, Park & Switzer 1995; Kurov & Lasser 
2002; Roll et al. 2007; W.-P. Chen et al. 2009) we define mispricing as the difference 
between the observed futures price and its intrinsic price, deflated by the observed spot 
price at time as follows: 
 
                             (III.1.3) 
 
The index futures are overpriced if the mispricing is positive and vice versa. Conversely 
they are considered to be efficiently priced if there is no mispricing i.e. . The 
above measure of mispricing i.e.  is implied by the spot market. For robustness, the 
mispricing as implied by the futures market is also estimated. It is given as the 
difference between the intrinsic spot price i.e.  and the observed spot 
price , deflated by the spot price at time as follows: 
                                    (III.1.4) 
 
                                                            
33 Switzer et al., (2000) have shown that failure to use actual dividend of the constituents stocks that 
make-up the index could lead to measurement error in the cost-of-carry model. Thus, it is important to 
obtain the actual dividend yield in calculating the index futures intrinsic value. 
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The absolute mispricing for both measures are considered because either positive or 
negative mispricing are costly for investors (Park & Switzer 1995). In this study, the 
focus is on mispricing and not arbitrage opportunity. That is, we assess the impact of 
the tick reduction on the pricing efficiency of the index futures. Transaction cost is 
therefore not taken into account. 
 
3.1.2.3. Unexpected spot trading volume and index futures' pricing efficiency 
In examine the impact of the unexpected spot volume on mispricing, we use OLS and 
quantile regression. In addition, we also estimate bivariate VAR because although high 
liquidity facilitates arbitrage trading, wider mispricing in itself may trigger arbitrage 
trading and hence on liquidity.  
 
3.1.2.3.1. OLS and quantile regressions 
Following Cummings et al. (2011), the impact of the lower tick and the unexpected 
component of spot trading volume on the mispricing is investigated using the following 
model. 
 
                    (III.1.5)  
    
where,  is the daily absolute mispricing based on the spot prices (Eq. (III.1.3)) or 
the futures prices (Eq. (III.1.4)). The mispricing is computed based on the cost-of-carry 
model, details of which can be found on page 62. A total of six lags of the mispricing 
(for both measures) are included in the model, as identified using the partial 
autocorrelation functions. Table 3.2 on page 65 provides brief description and sources 
of variables that are used in addressing hypothesis two and three.  
 
The key explanatory variables are the dummy , the unexpected spot index 
volume,  and the interaction between and  i.e . The dummy  
equals one for the period after 3 August 2009, the date when the tick sizes were reduced 
and zero otherwise. A signiﬁcant negative coefficient of the dummy  indicates that 
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the reduction in tick sizes significantly lowers the daily absolute mispricing. The raw 
trading volume series, is decomposed using similar procedure employed by 
Bessembinder & Seguin (1992). represents the unexpected component of spot 
trading volume which would indicate trades that represents those of the arbitrageurs’ 
and/or trades that facilitate quicker incorporation of stock specific information, both of 
which help in reducing the mispricing if its coefficient is significantly negative 
(Cummings & Frino 2011). Likewise,  minimises the mispricing following the tick 
size reduction if the coefficient of  is significantly negative.  
 
Other variables that may have significant impact on the mispricing are also included in 
the model. The control variables are the unexpected index futures volume,  index 
futures volatility,  and dummies for the introduction of exchange-traded funds,  
and the global financial crisis of 2008, .  
 
represents the unexpected futures volume which is decomposed from raw futures 
volume using similar method used to decompose the spot index volume. is also 
interacted with  dummy i.e. .  
 
Index futures volatility is defined as (Bessembinder & 
Seguin 1992). Given the inherent advantages of trading, index futures are more volatile 
which in turn may significantly affect the mispricing. Thus, the variable, is included 
in the model to control for daily movements in the futures market. 
 
The introduction of the ETFs on the 19 July 2007 may have significant impact on the 
mispricing because it may facilitate traders in executing the cash-leg of an arbitrage 
strategy. This is true given that exchange traded funds are not restricted by the no short-
selling rules. This also implies that traders may be better able to incorporate stock 
specific information subsequent to the launching of the ETFs. Furthermore, the 
reduction of tick size is  also effective on the exchange-traded-funds that mirror the spot 
index. The dummy equals one for the period from 19 July 2007 to 31 December 
2012. 
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During period of high uncertainty, it is more likely for assets prices to temporarily 
deviate away from their equilibrium prices. The period characterised by the global 
financial crisis period spans from 16 January 2008 to 10 March 2009 and so the  
dummy takes value of one during this period and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 3.2: Data description for hypothesis two and three 
First empirical chapter (Hypotheses two and three): The impact of the unexpected spot trading volume 
and tick size reduction on the mispricing 
Variable Description Source 
Dependent variable  
or  The mispricing is defined as the price discrepancies between 
futures and spot markets based on the cost-of-carry model. 
and  are the mispricing as implied by the spot and the 
futures market respectively (Please refer page 62 for details on 
how the mispricing series was computed).  
Datastream 
Independent variable  
 Dummy variable equals 1 following the implementation of the 
tick size reduction i.e. 3 August 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
- 
 This dummy variable is included as a control variable. It equals 
1 for the period from 19 July 2007, the date when exchange 
traded funds (ETFs) was first launched to 31 December 2012 
and 0 otherwise. 
- 
 Dummy variable to control for the Global financial crisis of  
2008. It equals 1 from 16 January 2008 to 10 March 2009 and 0 
otherwise. 
- 
 Unexpected futures trading volumeª  Datastream 
 Unexpected spot trading volumeª  Datastream 
 Volatility of futures marketᵈ Datastream 
 Interaction between tick size dummy and unexpected futures trading volume Datastream 
 Interaction between tick size dummy and unexpected stock trading volume Datastream 
ª Both series are decomposed using similar procedure employed by Bessembinder & Seguin (1992). 
Specifically, 100-day moving averages for both trading volume series are generated. Next, the raw 
trading volume series are de-trended by deducting the 100-day moving averages. Finally, the de-trended 
series are decomposed into expected and unexpected components using ARMA specification. 
Specifically, ARMA(1,3) for spot volume and ARMA(1,7) for futures volume. The sum of constant and 
predicted residual represents the unexpected trading volume.  
ᵈDefined as , similar to Bessembinder & Seguin (1992).  
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The correlation between the unexpected volume of stock index, , the unexpected 
volume of index futures, and the volatility of index futures,  is minimal suggesting 
insignificant effects on the standard errors of the regression estimates as shown in Table 
3.2 below. 
Table 3.2: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables for mispricing 
    
 1.0000 - - 
 0.2607 1.0000 - 
 0.0761 -0.0107 1.0000  
 
The model is estimated by using OLS and quantile regressions (Koenker & Basset 
1978) which allows us to observe how the explanatory variables affect the mispricing 
under various quantiles i.e. = 0.99, 0.9, 0.75, 0.5, 0.25, 0.1 and 0.01. The 
bootstrapping method is used to estimate the quantile regression parameters.34  
 
3.1.2.3.2. Vector autoregressions (VARs) 
In addition to investigating the impact of the unexpected spot volume on the mispricing, 
it is also important to assess the causality relationship between the unexpected spot 
volume and mispricing. This is due to the fact that the magnitude of the deviation from 
no-arbitrage relationship, may trigger arbitrage trading and hence on liquidity (Roll et 
al. 2007). 
 
For this purpose, we fit vector autoregression (VAR) method to investigate the dynamic 
and short-term relationship between the unexpected spot volume and mispricing, which 
takes the following form: 
                                    (III.1.6)  
                                                            
34 We use quantile regression to describe the relationship between explanatory variables at different 
points in the conditional distribution of the dependent variable. Thus, we would be able to investigate the 
impact of tick reduction and the unexpected volume on the entire distribution of mispricing, depending on 
the quantile chosen. The OLS provides only a partial view of the relationship as it considers the impact of 
the independent variables merely on the conditional mean of dependent variable. Further, quantile 
regression is more robust to non-normal errors and outliers. 
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where  and  are the absolute mispricing (implied by the spot market) and the 
unexpected spot trading volume, respectively. Both series are stationary as indicated by 
the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. The test statistic for the unexpected spot volume is -
52.003, while it is -27.391 for the absolute mispricing. Table 3.6 below shows the 
correlation matrix between the absolute mispricing and the unexpected spot volume. 
The correlation is negative and significant at 10% level. This indicates that high 
liquidity in the underlying market is associated with lower absolute mispricing. 
 
Table 3.6: Correlation matrix for unexpected spot volume,  and absolute mispricing,  
   
 1.000  
  -0.0029 1.000 
Note: The coefficient is significant at the 10% level. The p-value is 0.8789. 
 
We use four lags as indicated by the Aikaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
Fig. 3.2 shows the roots of the companion matrix. All the eigenvalues lie inside the unit 
circle, indicating stability in the VAR system. 
 
 
Fig. 3.2: Eigenvalues of the companion matrix for bivariate VAR 
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Table 3.3 shows the Lagrange multiplier test for autocorrelation for the estimated VAR 
system. It indicates no significant evidence of autocorrelation. That is, the null of 
hypothesis of no correlation is not rejected. 
 
Table 3.3: Lagrange-multiplier test for autocorrelation (VAR) 
Lag    
1 4.4698 4 0.34615 
2 9.3956 4 0.05194 
3 7.231 4 0.12417 
4 12.6757 4 0.001297 
5 6.2075 4 0.18418 
6 2.3507 4 0.67156 
7 5.3698 4 0.25141 
8 3.1604 4 0.53135 
9 1.9296 4 0.7487 
10 3.1862 4 0.52716 
11 9.585 4 0.04803 
12 1.0143 4 0.90761 
 No correlation lag order 
 
 
3.2. Second and third empirical chapters: Lower tick sizes, price discovery 
and hedging effectiveness of the index futures 
We address our second research question in Chapters 5 and 6. For this purpose, time 
series of continuously compounded returns were calculated from the prices of the index 
futures and the spot index  as given by equations 
and , respectively. Table 3.3 below provides 
brief description and sources of these variables. 
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Table 3.3: Data description for hypothesis four, five and six 
Chapter 5 (Hypothesis four): Lower tick and price discovery role of the index futures 
Chapter 6 (Hypothesis five and six): Lower tick and hedging  effectiveness of the index futures 
Variable Description Source 
 Time series of continuously compounded returns 
calculated from the prices of the index futures, as 
given by equation  
Datastream 
 Time series of continuously compounded returns 
calculated from the prices of the spot index, as 
given by equation  
Datastream 
 
 
 
3.2.1. Lower tick and the index futures' price discovery role 
In Chapter 5, we assess the price discovery role of the index futures (hypothesis four). 
The data is divided into pre- and post-tick reduction periods. The pre-tick period runs 
from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2009 (1863 observations) and the post-tick period 
from 3 August 2009 to 31 December 2012 (840 observations). Please refer to Table 5.1 
on page 102 for the descriptive statistics.Several methods are employed in assessing the 
impact of the tick size reduction on the price discovery role of index futures. First, the 
cross-correlation between futures and its underlying is estimated. Second, the speed of 
adjustment estimators (Theobald & Yallup 1998; Poshakwale & Theobald 2004), which 
are based on the partial adjustment model (Amihud & Mendelson 1987), are employed 
to further assess how fast the return series revert to the equilibrium level. The aim is to 
investigate how the reduction in tick sizes affects the speed at which both returns series 
adjust to the equilibrium level. This will enable us to assess the impact of tick reduction 
on the price discovery role of the index futures. Finally, for robustness, the vector error 
correction (VECM) model is also estimated. 
 
3.2.1.1. The cross-correlations function 
The cross-correlation function is given by: 
 
                                                                                
(III.2.7)
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where and represent futures and spot returns, respectively. represents the number 
of leading or lagging periods. Positive values for the coefficients at leads  will 
indicate that the futures returns tend to lead those in the stock market, while positive 
values for the coefficients at lags  will indicate that the stock market tends to lead 
the futures market. The coefficients at  measures the strength of the 
contemporaneous relationship.  
 
3.2.1.2. Partial adjustment model 
With the cross-correlation function, although the existence of a differential price 
movement can be confirmed, it does not, however, provide a measure of the magnitude 
of the differential price movement (Theobald & Yallup 1998). Therefore, we employ 
the partial adjustment model of Amihud & Mendelson (1987), which is characterised as 
follows: 
 
                                                     (III.2.8) 
 
where is the observed price (in natural logarithm) for the instrument  ( , for spot 
or , for futures price) at time , partially adjusts to the intrinsic price, , which is 
assumed to follow a random walk with drift process (Amihud & Mendelson 1987), that 
is:  
 
                                                                    (III.2.9) 
 
is the speed of the adjustment factor, which measures the speed at which the observed 
price reverts to its intrinsic price. and are the noise (Black 1986) and innovations 
in the true pricing process. Both are assume to be independently and identically 
distributed. 
 
Within this modelling framework, the observed price is assumed to partially reflect 
information, while the intrinsic value is assumed to fully reflect information. Thus, 
 represents full adjustment towards intrinsic price i.e. price incorporates all 
information, whereas  and  corresponds to under-adjustment and over-
adjustment towards intrinsic price, respectively.  
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Following existing evidence, it is expected that the futures’ speed of adjustment towards 
equilibrium level is higher and closer to unity in comparison to the spot’s adjustment. It 
is also expected that the reduction of tick sizes would significantly affect the spot’s 
adjustment to equilibrium and in turn on the reliability of index futures as a price 
discovery tool. 
 
3.2.1.3. Cross-covariance ratio 
Based on the partial adjustment model with noise, Theobald & Yallup (1998) 
demonstrate that the speed of adjustment estimators, for futures, and spot, are given 
by: 
 
                                                            (III.2.10) 
 
and 
 
                                                            (III.2.11) 
 
where and are futures and spot returns, respectively. 
 
3.2.1.4. The ARMA estimators 
 
In addition, Theobald & Yallup (2004) developed and proposed alternative time series 
estimators by first differencing and rearranging Eq.(III.2.8) as: 
  
                            (III.2.12) 
 
and by substituting for  from Eq.(III.2.9), Eq.(III.2.12) becomes: 
 
                                                         (III.2.13) 
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The speed of adjustment are given by the coefficient of AR(1). When  i.e. 
adjustment is complete, “noise” such as bid-ask bounce effects drives the return 
process.35. That is the process will be an MA(1). The speed of adjustment assuming 
absence of noise and bid-ask bounces effect in the ARMA(1,1) is also estimated. 
 
Further, when thin trading effects are present, Eq. (III.2.13) modifies to: 
       
(III.2.14) 
where is the lag operator for steps back. Similarly, the autoregressive coefficient 
provides an estimate for the speed of adjustment i.e. (1- ). Thin trading effects are 
captured by the moving average component, which is determined by the Aikaiki 
Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
3.2.1.4.1. Non-random walk intrinsic value process 
One of the assumptions of the partial model is that observed prices are assumed to 
incorporate only a certain portion of market information i.e. there is a delay in price 
adjustment towards equilibrium value. The equilibrium value or theoretically price, on 
the other hand is the price that instantaneously and fully incorporates information as it 
arrives. Amihud & Mendelson (1987) postulates that the intrinsic value process follows 
a random walk process. In other words, the intrinsic value process is assumed to be 
informationally efficient.  
 
Poshakwale & Theobald (2004) develop an estimator of the speed of adjustment with 
the assumption that the intrinsic price may follow other processes. There are a number 
of reasons that the intrinsic value process may instead follow a mean-reverting process. 
Futures and spot prices converge at maturity (and hence the basis), implies that prices 
may have mean reverting characteristics (Theobald & Yallup 2001). In addition, thin 
trading effects (see for example, Campbell et al. 1997, p.89) and over or under-reaction 
to information (Barberis et al. 1998) may explain and justify non-random walk  
processes. Following Poshakwale & Theobald (2004), the underlying process is 
examined by characterising a process of the form: 
                                                            
35 The autoregressive component will be stationary only if   i.e. 0< <2. 
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                                                          (III.2.15) 
 
where is the parameter of the process and  is the disturbance.36  indicates 
that the process is a random walk, while with  indicates that the intrinsic value 
could be a mean reverting process.  
 
By combining Eqs. (III.2.8) and (III.2.15) yields:  
 
                    (III.2.16) 
 
Thus, by estimating  across futures and spot returns, the impact of differing 
assumption on intrinsic value process on the partial adjustment factor estimates could be 
assessed. Hence, conclusion concerning the futures and spot speed of adjustment is 
technically more robust. Due to non-linearity in the parameter, Eq. (III.2.16) is 
estimated by non-linear least squares37. 
 
3.2.1.5. Robustness check: Vector error correction model (VECM) 
Based on our analysis of the cross-correlation function and the speed of adjustment 
estimates, we could clearly determine whether the reliability of the index futures as a 
source of price discovery improves after the tick reduction. For robustness, however, we 
also assess the cointegrating relationship between the spot and futures. 
 
Numerous studies indicate that index futures tend to be very highly cointegrated with 
their underlying prices (Brooks et al. 2001; Roope & Zurbruegg 2002; Alizadeh & 
Nomikos 2004). The presence of cointegration implies that there is a long term 
association between their prices. In other words, their prices never drift too far apart, 
which may be explained by arbitrageurs’ trades and the fact that both instruments 
converge at maturity of the futures.38 Technically speaking, if spot and futures prices 
                                                            
36 The inclusion of the drift (intercept) had no major impact on predicted residual, therefore it was 
excluded. 
37 The equation at Eq. (III.2.16) is stationary whether or not  is equal to unity. 
38 This fact implies that the basis must be mean reverting process (Alexander 2008a, p.201). 
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are nonstationary but the deviations between them are stationary then spot and futures 
prices are cointegrated (Engle 1987). In other words, equilibrium relationship exists 
between futures and spot prices.  
 
Both series are required to be of the same order of nonstationarity to established 
whether cointegration between the spot and futures exist. We employ the standard 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test to test for nonstationarity. The result indicates both series 
are non-stationary. However, after first differencing both series are stationary indicating 
that the series are integrated of the order one i.e. I(1). Please refer Table 5.1 on page 
102. 
 
We could now conduct the cointegration test as we have established that both series are 
stationary after first differencing, that is the series are integrated of the same order i.e 
I(1). The cointegration test is to determine whether these two series have a long-run 
relationship. Given its simplicity and the fact that there could be at most one 
cointegrating vector, the Engle & Granger (1987) two-steps single equation technique is 
employed rather than the Johansen & Juselius (1990). The cointegrating regression is 
given by: 
 
                                                             (III.2.17)
  
 
where , the residuals from the first stage regression.39 Next, we test 
the estimated residuals,  for stationarity. The results are displayed in Table 3.4. The 
relationship between  and  is strong as indicated by a slope coefficient of 1.001. 
Also, it is clear that the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the residuals is rejected. 
This indicates that there is indeed exists a cointegrating relationship40, and thus there is 
a corresponding vector error correction model (VECM). 
 
 
                                                            
39 Alternatively, the cost-of-carry model could be used as the cointegrating regression (see for example, 
Judge & Reancharoen 2014) 
40 The number of lags in the Engle-Granger regression is determined by the AIC. Inclusion of lags up to 
20 does not alter the result. 
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Table 3.4: Augmented Engle-Granger test for cointegration 
 Test 
statistic 
1% critical value 5% critical value 10% critical value 
 -10.42 -3.900 -3.338 -3.046 
Engle-Granger 1st-step regression   
  Coefficient Standard error -value 
  0.767 0.5235  0.143 
   1.001 0.0004  0.000  
Engle-Granger test regression   
     
  -0.206 0.020  0.000 
  -0.403 0.024 0.000 
  -0.223 0.025 0.000 
  -0.174 0.025 0.000 
  -0.069 0.024 0.005 
  -0.079 0.023 0.001 
  -0.057 0.022  0.010  
  -0.059 0.019  0.002 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
Following Wahab & Lashgari (1993), the vector error correction model is of the 
following form: 
 
                                            (III.2.18) 
                                           
 
(III.2.19)
 
 
where and are spot and futures prices, respectively and the preceding denotes the 
first-difference of the variable. The lagged one-period equiblirium error, measures 
the speed at which the left-hand variable reverts to equilibrium level. It also indicates 
the direction of the causal relationship. For example, if the coefficient for in Eq. 
(III.2.18) is zero, then does not respond to previous period’s adjustment towards long-
run equilibrium. The lagged first differences represent short-run effects of the previous 
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period's returns on the current period's returns. If is zero and all  are zero in Eq. 
(III.2.18), then  does not Granger cause .  
 
If is zero and all  are zero, then  does not Granger cause . The 
autoregressive lag length is four as indicated by the Hannan and Quinn’s information 
criterion (HQIC). We use HQIC statistics because it provides consistent estimates of p, 
the lag length, while AIC statistics tend to overestimate the true lag lenght (Becketti 
2012). The number of lags are similar for both pre-and post-tick size reduction. 
Diagnostic tests indicate no evidence of instability (Fig. 3.3), nor there is evidence of 
autocorrelated errors (Table 3.5).  
 
 
Fig. 3.3: Eigenvalues of the companion matrix for bivariate VECM 
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Table 3.5: Lagrange-multiplier test for autocorrelation 
Lag    
1 2.5261 4 0.6399 
2 2.7208 4 0.6055  
 
 
3.2.2. Lower tick and index futures' hedging effectiveness 
The effectiveness of the index futures is assessed in Chapter 6 (hypotheses five and six). 
The data is divided into in-sample and out-of-sample periods. The in-sample data which 
runs from 2 January 2002 to 31 July 2012 (2602 observations) is used for estimation, 
while the out-of-sample data, from 1 August 2012 to 31 December 2012 (101 
observations) is for evaluating the performance of the bivariate GARCH(1,1) models 
considered in this study. The in-sample data is further segregated into pre-tick period, 
from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2009 (1863 observations) and post-tick period from 3 
August 2009 to 31 July 2012 (739 observations). The descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 6.1 on page 112.  
 
To assess the hedging effectiveness of the index futures one has to decide the best 
method to use for estimating the optimal hedge ratio before any assessment could be 
made. In this study, three parameterisations of MGARCH model are used to estimate 
the optimal minimum variance hedge ratios, which are then assessed using risk 
minimisation and utility maximisation criterions. The hedging effectiveness improves 
following the tick size reduction, if for example, the percentage reduction in variance is 
higher in comparison to before the reduction. In addition, we evaluate the out-of-sample 
hedging effectiveness by using the estimated post-tick period’s hedge ratios. This 
enable us to identify which of those three models performs better in terms of risk 
reduction and utility maximisation. The following sections discuss the MGARCH 
models and next, the hedging effectiveness evaluation criterions.  
 
3.2.2.1. Estimation of optimal hedge ratio 
The application of autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) models 
pioneered by Engle (1982) has been extended to multivariate models owing to the fact 
that financial volatilities move together over time across assets and markets. That is, 
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many financial variables react to the same information, and hence, covariances between 
financial variables, conditional on the information set are non-zero. Therefore, the 
multivariate ARCH models are particularly helpful for financial modelling which 
require the modelling of both time-varying variances and covariances. One such 
application is to find the optimal time-varying hedge ratios, the number of futures 
contracts to be acquired to optimally hedge a risky position in the spot market. 
 
Generally, the joint distribution of spot and futures returns is represented as follow: 
 
             (III.3.20) 
 
where is a vector of observations of the spot and futures returns; , and 
are column vectors of parameters; is the error correction term to account for the 
long term relationship between the two rates of return; is a row vector of lagged 
values of and  is a vector of residuals.  are assumed to be normally 
distributed and are conditional on past information, , with zero mean vector and 
with conditional variance-covariance matrix .  
 
Various specifications to model  have been proposed.41 In this study, we utilise three 
commonly used MGARCH models namely; diagonal VECH; diagonal BEKK and 
Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) to estimate the optimal time-varying hedge 
ratio. 
 
3.2.2.1.1. Diagonal VECH 
Bollerslev, Engle & Wooldridge (1988) provide the framework for a multivariate 
GARCH model. The general bivariate GARCH( , ) model  can be written as: 
 
            (III.3.21) 
          
                                                            
41 Bauwens, Laurent & Rombouts (2006) provide an excellent survey of multivariate GARCH models. 
 79 
where  is an  residuals vector,  is a  vector,  ,  , 
 are  matrices. When  and , i.e., a 
bivariate GARCH(1,1) model, the representation above takes the form: 
 
 
       
(III.3.22) 
 
There are, however, two main concerns regarding the specification of  above. First, 
the specification will be difficult to estimate for it has  
parameters, which for a bivariate case it adds up to 21 parameters.  
 
Bollerslev, Engle & Wooldridge (1988) used a natural simplification called diagonal 
representation where  and  matrices are forced to be diagonal, that is all the entries 
outside the main diagonal are set to zero.  
 
 
It is for this restriction that the model is known as a diagonal vech MGARCH model. 
Subsequently, diagonal bivariate GARCH(1,1) takes the following form: 
 
           (III.3.23) 
 
Each variance depends only on its own past squared residuals, and its own lag  
and each covariance depends only on its own past cross products of residuals 
and its own lag . In this diagonal bivariate GARCH(1,1) model, the number 
of parameters to be estimated has been reduced to 9.  
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3.2.2.1.2. Diagonal BEKK 
The other concern in estimating multivariate GARCH model is the requirement that  
to be positive definite for all values of .  
 
Engle & Kroner (1995) introduce a positive definite parameterisation known as BEKK 
parameterisation that ensures the conditional variances are always non-negative.  
 
The BEKK parameterisation for symmetric GARCH( , ) is: 
 
           
(III.3.24) 
 
where , and  are parameter matrices and is an  residuals vector. 
When  and , i.e., a bivariate GARCH(1,1) model, the representation 
above takes the following form: 
 
                  (III.3.25) 
 
This representation has only 11 parameters. The above system can also be estimated by 
setting the off-diagonal elements of A and B to zero, i.e., . 
This restricted version will be referred to as the diagonal BEKK model. 
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3.2.2.1.3. Constant Conditional Correlation 
Formally, the Constant Conditional Correlations (CCC) MGARCH model derived by 
Bollerslev (1990) can be written as: 
 
               (III.3.26) 
 
where is a diagonal matrix of conditional variances: 
 
              (III.3.27) 
 
in which each evolves according to a univariate GARCH model of the form: 
 
             (III.3.28) 
 
 is matrix of time in-variant unconditional correlations of the standardised residuals:  
 
              (III.3.29) 
 
CCC yield positive definite estimate only if the correlation matrix  is non-negative 
and definite. This model is known as the constant conditional correlations MGARCH 
model because is time invariant. 
 
3.2.2.2. Hedging efficiency in-sample and out-of-sample 
Similar to Pok, Poshakwale & Ford (2009), the optimal hedge ratios computed using 
estimates obtained from the three hedging models i.e. diagonal VECH, diagonal BEKK 
and Constant Conditioanal Correlations, are evaluated using risk minimisation and 
expected utility maximisation criterions. 
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3.2.2.2.1. The variance reduction comparison 
For the risk minimisation criterion, the optimal hedge ratio at time  is given by: 
 
              
(III.3.30) 
 
To evaluate the risk reduction before and after the lowering of tick sizes, we calculate 
the mean, and the variance, of the hedged portfolio (see, Kroner & Sultan 1993), 
respectively, given by : 
 
               (III.3.31) 
             (III.3.32) 
 
where  is the spot return ,  is the return of futures at time and is the computed 
hedge ratios. The percentage reduction in the variance of the hedged portfolio over the 
unhedged is estimated as follow: 
                
                 (III.3.33) 
 
where and . Obviously, greater 
percentage variance reduction post-tick period implies that the move of lowering the 
tick sizes enhanced the usefulness of the index futures as a risk management tool.  
 
In addition, we also study the hedge effectiveness in an out-of-sample comparison for 
the sake of determining the best hedging model. For this purpose, estimates from the 
post-tick size reduction period are used to forecast the out-of-sample hedge ratio, which 
is then used to estimate the hedged portfolio returns and variances using actual or 
observed spot and futures returns. The model that yields the highest percentage variance 
reduction is deemed superior in comparison to the other.  
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3.2.2.2.2. Utility maximization comparison 
Under the utility maximisation criterion, the optimal hedge ratio at time  is given 
by: 
 
           
(III.3.34) 
 
The risk aversion parameter,  indicates investor’s willingness to trade the futures. For 
reason of simplicity we assume that the investor’s risk aversion parameter equals 1. 
Likewise, the mean, and the variance of the hedged portfolio,  are respectively 
calculated as in Eqs. (III.31) and (III.32) above. 
 
Hedging using the index futures is more effective post-tick reduction if the hedge 
produces higher value of: 
 
 
                                 
(III.3.35) 
The subscript indicates the type of models used to estimate . An out-of-sample 
comparison is also carried out to identify the superior hedging model. 
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CHAPTER 4 
First empirical study: Lower tick, spot trading volume and index 
futures' pricing efficiency 
Our first empirical chapter examines the impact of the tick size reduction on the spot 
index trading volume and in turn on the pricing efficiency of the index futures. The 
following hypotheses are tested: 
 
: The reduction of tick size has no impact on spot index trading volume. 
: The reduction of tick size leads to higher spot index trading volume.  
 
: The unexpected spot index volume following the tick reduction has no impact on 
the mispricing. 
: The unexpected spot index volume following the tick reduction reduces mispricing. 
 
: The reduction of tick size has no effect on mispricing. 
: The reduction of tick size leads to lower mispricing. 
 
First, the descriptive statistics of the spot index volume and mispricing are presented 
and discussed. Next, we discuss the empirical results. 
 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
4.1.1. Trading volume 
Fig. 4.1 shows the level of trading volume for both spot and futures markets plotted 
against the level of prices. Obviously, trading volume for both markets are higher 
during the financial crisis of 2007/08, however, after the tick reduction, trading 
activities stabilised with higher trade levels compared to those before the crisis. This 
seems to be an indication that trading activities are higher after the ticks were reduced. 
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Fig. 4.1: Price and volume for both spot and futures. This figure plots the daily prices on the left-hand 
scale and daily trading volume (in billions of Ringgit Malaysia)42 on the right-hand scale for both spot 
and futures markets. The dark vertical line marks 3 August 2009, the day of the tick rule change. 
 
 
Table 4.1 provides summary statistics of spot and futures daily trading activities for the 
pre- and post-tick size reduction periods, as well as for the whole sample period 
considered in the study. Respectively, panel A and B show the summary statistics for 
the spot and futures volume (in thousand of Ringgit Malaysia (RM)) traded during a 
particular trading day. The volume of constituent stocks traded is higher post-tick 
period. This suggests that the constituents stocks may have benefitted from the 
reduction in the tick sizes. Similarly, trading activities are higher in the futures market 
after the lowering of tick sizes. In short, average trading volume for both markets are 
found to be significantly higher after the lowering of tick sizes. Further, the estimates of 
standard deviation,  and coefficient variation, for both measures of trading 
activities are lower for post tick period, which indicates that lower tick sizes have a 
positive impact on the market. Appendix 4 on page 143 reports summary statistics for 
the debt market variables. 
                                                            
42 In order to generate a presentable graph, the raw trading volume for both markets were scaled by a 
million. 
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of spot and futures daily trading volume (in thousand of Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM)ª  
 Pre-tick size reduction Post-tick size reduction Whole sample 
Panel A: Spot volume  
T 1864 840 2704 
Mean 566,505.790 777,680.544ᵈ 632,107.415 
Std. dev. ( ) 413,242.444 279,378.690 389,205.056 
ᵇ 0.729 0.359 0.616 
Minimum 19,029.00 254,268.00 19,029.00 
Maximum 3,300,398.00 2,744,341.00 3,300,398.00 
    
Panel B: Futures volume˚  
T 1864 840 2704 
Mean 247,830.20 464,524.50ᵈ 315,146.50 
Std. dev. ( ) 258,791.40 257,081.00 277,008.30 
ᵇ 1.044 0.553 0.879 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Maximum 1,705,703.00 1,985,066.00 1,985,066.00 
ª The whole sample period is from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2012. The pre-tick period is from 2 
January 2002 to 2 August 2009, and the post-tick period is from 3 August 2009 to 31 December 2012. 
ᵇThe coefficient of variance is calculated as; . 
˚Futures value (RM) is obtained by the multiplication of contract multiplier, futures price and the number 
of contracts traded during a particular trading day. 
ᵈ The null hypothesis that the mean spot and futures trading volume are equal for pre- and post-tick 
reduction is rejected at 1% significance level. The t-statistics are -13.4862 and -20.2413 for spot and 
futures volume respectively. 
 
 
4.1.2. Mispricing 
It is evident that mispricing exists between the spot and futures prices as shown in Fig. 
4.2 below. For the period before tick reduction, the mispricing seem to be of large 
magnitude. Interestingly however, following the tick reduction, it is obvious that the 
mispricing is lower, more stable and hovers around zero. This indicates an improvement 
in the pricing efficiency of the index futures. Put differently, the lower tick sizes seem 
to strengthen the spot-futures relationship regardless of which market the mispricing is 
implied from. 
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Fig. 4.2 Mispricings series (%): 02 Jan 2002 to 31 Dec 2012 
 
Table 4.2 reports the descriptive statistics of the mispricing.  Panel A and Panel B report 
the (absolute) mispricing as implied by the spot index (Eq. (III.1.3)). In Panel A, the 
mispricing is significantly lower (-0.05%) for the post-tick period. The first-order 
autocorrelation of the mispricing series during the pre-tick period is as high as 0.827, 
indicating high persistence in the mispricing that declines significantly in the post-tick 
period. Similarly, in Panel B the average absolute mispricing (0.297%) is significantly 
lower for the post-tick period compared to the pre-tick period (0.994%). Thus, the 
above suggests that mispricing declines following the lowering of tick sizes. Further, it 
is interesting to note that the first-order autocorrelation of the changes in mispricing and 
changes in absolute mispricing are negative throughout the sample period. This 
provides significant evidence of mean reversion in the series. The mispricing as implied 
by the index futures (Eq. (III.1.4)) has similar properties as shown in Panel C and D of 
Table 4.2. Based on that, we conclude that the lower tick sizes improve the index 
futures pricing efficiency. However, it would be interesting to see how mispricing under 
various quantiles would be affected by the unexpected spot index volume. The results 
for the quantiles regression estimates are presented and discussed in the following 
section. 
 88 
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for the mispricing (%)ª   
Descriptive statistics Pre-tick Post-tick Whole sample 
 
Panel A:  
   
Mean -0.368 -0.05 -0.269 
t-statistic -13.032ᵇ -3.875ᵇ -13.409ᵇ 
F-statistic  -7.417ᵈ  
Standard deviation 1.219 0.371 1.044 
First-order 
autocorrelation 
0.827 0.47 0.817 
First-order 
autocorrelation (changes) 
-0.351 -0.491 -0.368 
Panel B:     
Mean 0.994 0.297 0.777 
t-statistic 53.844ᵇ 37.801ᵇ 54.114ᵇ 
F-statistic  -24.899ᵈ  
Standard deviation 0.797 0.227 0.747 
First-order 
autocorrelation 
0.702 0.272 0.745 
First-order 
autocorrelation (changes) 
-0.376 -0.509 -0.387 
Panel C:     
Mean -0.239 -0.083 -0.19 
t-statistic -12.095ᵇ -6.827ᵇ -13.415ᵇ 
F-statistic  -5.112ᵈ  
Standard deviation 0.853 0.352 0.738 
First-order 
autocorrelation 
0.686 0.309 0.662 
First-order 
autocorrelation (changes) 
-0.373 -0.473 -0.389 
Panel D:     
Mean 0.662 0.278 0.542 
t-statistic 48.523ᵇ 34.980ᵇ 52.674ᵇ 
F-statistic  18.259ᵈ  
Standard deviation 0.589 0.23 0.536 
First-order 
autocorrelation 
0.542 0.189 0.571 
First-order 
autocorrelation (changes) 
-0.409 -0.526 -0.422 
ª The whole sample period is from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2012. The pre-tick period is from 1 
January 2002 to 2 August 2009, and the post-tick period is from 3 August 2009 to December 2012. 
ᵇ Indicates significant at 1% level.  
ᵈ Indicates average (absolute) mispricing is significantly lower post-tick period at 1% level.  
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4.2. Estimation results 
4.2.1. Trading volume 
Table 4.3 reports the ARMA(2,2)-GARCH(1,1) estimation of Eq. (III.1.1) for the scaled 
spot trading volume (in millions of Ringgit Malaysia). The intercept is significantly 
negative indicating a considerable decrease in trading volume on Fridays of the week. 
The day of the week dummies are positive for Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday, 
while it is negative for Monday. This suggests that trading volume is lower during the 
beginning and towards the end of the trading week whereas it is higher during the rest 
of the days of the week. 
 
The short-term rates and quality spread have negative coefficient signs. However, both 
apparently have little influence on trading volume. Consistent with the previous studies, 
the volatility as proxied by the past 5-day absolute index returns is negatively related to 
daily change in trading volume. That is, high levels of recent volatility are associated 
with a decrease in trading activity. Most importantly, the coefficient of the tick size 
dummy is positive and statistically significant at 5% level. This indicates that reduction 
in tick sizes positively impact the average trading volume in the emerging Malaysian 
market. Thus, we do not reject the alternative hypothesis that the tick reduction leads to 
higher spot index trading volume.   
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Table 4.3: Estimates of daily changes in spot trading volume (in millions of Ringgit) 
Variable Coefficient Standard error   
 -1.704 5.810  -0.29 0.769 
 -49.23 71.26 -0.69  0.490 
 15.00 36.38  0.41 0.680 
 -40.75 35.52  -1.15 0.251 
  -11.16 2.532  -4.41  0.000 
 8.922 3.156  2.83  0.005 
 -0.910 2.059 -0.44  0.658 
 -31.60 9.002 -3.51  0.000 
 18.61 8.789 2.12 0.034 
 7.941 8.729  0.91 0.363 
 8.566 9.859 0.87 0.385 
 1.594 0.688 2.32 0.020 
 1.251 0.0590 21.22 0.000 
 -0.304 0.0474  -6.41 0.000 
 -1.718 0.0485  -35.42 0.000 
 0.721 0.0476  15.15 0.000 
Constant 596.5 57.18  10.43 0.000 
 0.161 0.00942 17.13 0.000 
 0.857 0.00773  110.77 0.000 
 2,702    
 
                 
(III.1.1) 
The dependent variable is the daily changes in trading volume (in millions of Ringgit). The model is 
fitted using ARMA(2,2)-GARCH(1,1) specification. is the short-term rates (Kuala Lumpur Interbank 
Offered Rate (KLIBOR)). represents the term spread (10-year Malaysian Government Securities 
(MGS) yield minus KLIBOR rates). is the quality spread (10-year Private Debt Securities (PDS) yield 
minus MGS yield). The preceding denotes the daily changes in the variable. These rates/yield are 
annualised and continuously compounded. is the absolute spot returns, to proxy for the market 
volatility. is the dummy to proxy for concurrent market performance, equals 1 if concurrent spot 
returns is positive. is dummy variable to account for momentum effect, equals 1 if the past five 
trading-day of spot index returns are positive and zero otherwise. is the dummy for day of the week to 
capture daily variation in trading volume. is dummy variable which equals 1 following the 
implementation of tick size reduction.  
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4.2.2. Mispricing 
4.2.2.1. OLS and quantile regressions  
Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 report the results of OLS and quantile regressions for the 
absolute mispricing series as defined in Eqs. (III.1.3) and (III.1.4), respectively.  
 
In Table 4.4, for the OLS regression, there is a significant evidence of inter-market price 
discrepancies as reflected by the statistically significant constant term. The lowering of 
tick sizes seems to reduce the magnitude of this mispricing as indicated by the highly 
statistically significant  dummy. Further, it seems that the unexpected spot trading 
volume represent those trades that reduces the mispricing and this is enhanced 
following the tick size reduction, as traders are better able to incorporate stock specific 
information and respond faster to deviation in prices. It is worth noting that significant 
positive autocorrelation coefficients indicate that the mispricing is persistent (up to lag 
4).   
 
For the quantile regressions, we find that the effect of  at the 99th, 90th, 75th, 50th, 
25th ,10th and 1st quantiles are significantly not the same. The coefficients of the  
dummy are significantly negative indicating improvement in pricing efficiency after 
tick size reduction especially for the larger quantiles i.e. >0.5. These results suggest 
that arbitrageurs are better able to maximise their profit when the mispricing is large as 
indicated by the highly statistically significant coefficients of the unexpected spot 
trading volume following the tick size reduction. However, arbitrageurs may find it 
infeasible to exploit smaller mispricing, for quantile <0.5, which may explain the 
positive coefficients. Robustness checks using mispricing series implied by the futures 
market indicates identical result as shown in Table 4.5. Thus, it is concluded that the 
pricing efficiency of index futures improves following the lowering of tick sizes in 
emerging Malaysian market. 
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Table 4.4: Tick reduction, liquidity and the mispricing based the spot price,  
 OLS (0.99) (0.9) (0.75) (0.5) (0.25) (0.1) (0.01) 
 -0.091*** -0.391** -0.402*** -0.176*** -0.017** 0.048** 0.036* -0.002** 
 (0.032) (0.061) (0.076) (0.047) (0.035) (0.023) (0.021) (0.006) 
 0.057 0.708*** 0.216** 0.112 0.055 0.011 -0.002 -0.005 
 (0.037) (0.261) (0.096) (0.085) (0.060) (0.050) (0.024) (0.016) 
 -0.026** -0.002** 0.166** 0.003 -0.063 -0.072*** -0.047** 0.006* 
 (0.030) (0.036) (0.077) (0.051) (0.043) (0.022) (0.021) (0.006) 
 -0.021** 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.017** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.186*** 1.021*** 0.414*** 0.258*** 0.102*** 0.065*** 0.010 0.001 
 (0.024) (0.132) (0.043) (0.047) (0.025) (0.023) (0.015) (0.007) 
 0.061*** 0.557*** 0.119*** 0.063** 0.021 0.003 -0.005 0.005 
 (0.020) (0.126) (0.044) (0.029) (0.018) (0.011) (0.011) (0.004) 
 -0.135*** -0.879** -0.243*** -0.151** -0.067** -0.050* 0.011 -0.002 
 (0.044) (0.414) (0.073) (0.070) (0.032) (0.026) (0.022) (0.009) 
 -0.023** 0.017*** 0.000 0.000 -0.011** 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.361*** 0.530*** 0.561*** 0.500*** 0.356*** 0.236*** 0.107*** 0.009 
 (0.019) (0.100) (0.052) (0.036) (0.036) (0.031) (0.020) (0.010) 
 0.189*** 0.393** 0.195*** 0.202*** 0.168*** 0.114*** 0.086*** 0.008 
 (0.020) (0.161) (0.039) (0.044) (0.025) (0.019) (0.019) (0.006) 
 0.046** -0.016 0.027 0.085* 0.068*** 0.065*** 0.036 0.009* 
 (0.021) (0.123) (0.049) (0.048) (0.024) (0.019) (0.022) (0.005) 
 0.059*** 0.122 0.127** 0.047 0.029 0.039 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.021) (0.111) (0.050) (0.037) (0.036) (0.024) (0.022) (0.005) 
 0.001 0.145 -0.010 0.034 0.035 0.001 0.013 0.004 
 (0.020) (0.174) (0.039) (0.036) (0.037) (0.019) (0.017) (0.009) 
 0.028 0.088 0.061 0.020 0.022 0.016 0.003 0.002 
 (0.019) (0.151) (0.048) (0.032) (0.028) (0.016) (0.011) (0.007) 
 0.177*** 0.830*** 0.472*** 0.292*** 0.129*** 0.027 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.022) (0.111) (0.029) (0.032) (0.022) (0.018) (0.011) (0.009) 
T 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 
 0.406 0.452 0.396 0.312 0.212 0.117 0.052 0.008 
Standard errors are in parentheses. “***”,”**”, and “*” represents significance levels of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. The 
change in average absolute mispricing as implied by the spot market (Eq. (III.1.3)) after the reduction of tick sizes 
is tested by an autoregressive model with six lags, as identified via the partial autocorrelation function, defined in the 
following equation: 
                     (III.1.5) 
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 following the reduction of tick sizes i.e. 3 August 2009.  is a dummy variable 
equals 1 for the period from 16 January 2008 to 10 March 2009. is a dummy variable equals 1 from 19 July 2007, the date 
when exchange traded funds (ETFs) was first launched onwards.  and are the unexpected volume for spot and futures 
respectively, both of which are also interacted with dummy. is the futures volatility. OLS and linear quantile regression 
(Koenker & Basset 1978)methods are adopted to estimate this equation. 
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Table 4.5: Robustness check for the mispricing based on futures prices, . 
 OLS (0.99) (0.9) (0.75) (0.5) (0.25) (0.1) (0.01) 
 -0.094*** -0.385** -0.397*** -0.199*** -0.016** 0.053** 0.032** 0.002** 
 (0.031) (0.055) (0.080) (0.074) (0.040) (0.025) (0.022) (0.009) 
 0.051 0.769*** 0.204 0.100 0.037 0.006 -0.004 -0.009 
 (0.037) (0.289) (0.135) (0.095) (0.045) (0.034) (0.026) (0.014) 
 -0.020** -0.009** 0.158** 0.028** -0.052** -0.075** -0.047** -0.002** 
 (0.029) (0.021) (0.078) (0.076) (0.039) (0.029) (0.020) (0.010) 
 -0.015** 0.000 -0.000 -0.021** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.187*** 1.028*** 0.391*** 0.263*** 0.110*** 0.064** 0.034* 0.005 
 (0.023) (0.140) (0.059) (0.035) (0.022) (0.029) (0.018) (0.008) 
 0.063*** 0.582*** 0.135*** 0.061** 0.024 0.008 0.011 -0.002 
 (0.020) (0.147) (0.051) (0.029) (0.020) (0.018) (0.013) (0.004) 
 -0.135*** -0.899** -0.216*** -0.163*** -0.061** -0.055* -0.010 -0.005 
 (0.044) (0.386) (0.068) (0.055) (0.026) (0.031) (0.024) (0.009) 
 -0.026*** -0.013*** 0.000 -0.017* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.360*** 0.561*** 0.585*** 0.498*** 0.362*** 0.221*** 0.103*** 0.005 
 (0.019) (0.150) (0.046) (0.056) (0.034) (0.025) (0.020) (0.013) 
 0.185*** 0.386** 0.187*** 0.200*** 0.167*** 0.124*** 0.085*** 0.015 
 (0.020) (0.177) (0.039) (0.044) (0.026) (0.022) (0.016) (0.009) 
 0.044** 0.009 0.011 0.062 0.053* 0.068*** 0.020 0.006 
 (0.021) (0.116) (0.052) (0.042) (0.032) (0.025) (0.014) (0.010) 
 0.069*** 0.104 0.126*** 0.084** 0.033 0.031 0.008 0.013* 
 (0.021) (0.107) (0.034) (0.040) (0.026) (0.022) (0.021) (0.008) 
 -0.007 0.105 -0.004 0.018 0.037 0.004 -0.004 -0.008* 
 (0.020) (0.167) (0.059) (0.028) (0.029) (0.017) (0.024) (0.005) 
 0.027 0.113 0.049 0.023 0.012 0.016 0.008 0.007 
 (0.019) (0.118) (0.041) (0.037) (0.028) (0.014) (0.015) (0.006) 
 0.175*** 0.773*** 0.465*** 0.291*** 0.126*** 0.024 0.007 -0.004 
 (0.021) (0.156) (0.039) (0.025) (0.020) (0.017) (0.015) (0.007) 
T 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 2,691 
 0.401 0.456 0.396 0.308 0.203 0.11 0.048 0.011 
Standard errors are in parentheses. “***”,”**”, and “*” represents significance levels of 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
The change in average absolute mispricing as implied by the futures market (Eq.(III.1.4)) after the reduction of 
tick sizes is tested by an autoregressive model with six lags, as identified via the partial autocorrelation function, 
defined in the following equation: 
   (III.1.5) 
is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 following the reduction of tick sizes i.e. 3 August 2009.  is a dummy variable 
equals 1 for the period from 16 January 2008 to 10 March 2009. is a dummy variable equals 1 from 19 July 2007, the date 
when exchange traded funds (ETFs) was first launched onwards.  and are the unexpected volume for spot and futures 
respectively, both of which are also interacted with dummy. is the futures volatility. OLS and linear quantile regression 
(Koenker & Basset 1978)methods are adopted to estimate this equation. 
 94 
 
4.2.2.2. Vector autoregressions (VARs) 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7 report the result of Eq. (III.1.6) for pre- and post-tick periods. The 
results indicate that the coefficient of the lagged unexpected spot volume is insignificant 
in explaining absolute mispricing. In the reverse regression of unexpected spot volume 
on lagged of mispricing, up to three lags of the absolute mispricing are significant in 
explaining unexpected spot volume. This implies a larger magnitude of deviation from 
the no-arbitrage relationship may adversely affect liquidity as indicated by the negative 
coefficients. We now turn to the causal relationship, which allow for a richer dynamic 
structure between the absolute mispricing and unexpected spot volume. 
 
Table 4.6: OLS regression coefficients (VAR) for the pre-tick period 
Panel A: Absolute mispricing as dependent variable,  
Independent 
variable 
Coefficient Standard error   
  0.38474  0.02310   16.65  0.000 
 0.17833   0.02475   7.20  0.000 
 0.05399 0.02476   2.18 0.029 
 0.07994  0.02316   3.45 0.000  
 0.00007 0.00005   1.19  0.234 
 0.00006 0.00005  1.01  0.313 
 0.00012  0.00005   2.09    0.037  
 0.00000 0.00005   0.06  0.949 
Constant 0.19491 0.01913 10.18  0.000 
Panel B: Unexpected spot index volume as dependent variable,  
Independent 
variable 
Coefficient Standard error   
   25.30087   8.95400   2.83  0.005 
   -23.08095   9.59477 -2.41   0.016   
  -26.54056    9.59932   -2.76   0.006 
 6.33711  8.97743  0.71   0.480  
 0.04193 0.02317  1.81 0.070  
   -0.02765 0.02315   -1.19    0.232  
  0.01560    0.02308   0.68 0.499 
 0.04391  0.02309  1.90  0.057 
Constant 11.60801  7.41744  1.56   0.118  
Note: Number of observations is 1861. The pre-tick period is from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2012. 
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Table 4.7: OLS regression coefficients (VAR) for the post-tick period 
Panel A: Absolute mispricing as dependent variable,  
Independent 
variable Coefficient Standard error 
  
   0.12524   0.03456    3.62 0.000 
 0.18804   0.03474   5.41  0.000 
 0.04968  0.03473  1.43   0.153  
 0.04047   0.03451   1.17 0.241  
  0.00005 0.00003    1.70   0.090 
  0.00004 0.00003   1.18   0.238  
  -0.00007 0.00003   -2.05  0.040  
 -0.00003 0.00003    -0.89  0.374  
Constant  0.16389  0.01643  9.97  0.000 
Panel B: Unexpected spot index volume as dependent variable,  
Independent 
variable Coefficient Standard error 
  
 3.213581   34.89602   0.09  0.927 
  -16.25393 35.08017   -0.46   0.643    
  -29.29285   35.07273   -0.84    0.404 
    -0.06961   34.84765  -0.48 0.632  
  -0.06961  0.03448  -2.02  0.043 
 0.04111 0.03459     1.19     0.235  
  -0.02730  0.03455   -0.79  0.429 
 -0.07498 0.03454  -2.17   0.030 
Constant  14.17449  16.5912  0.85   0.393  
Note: Number of observations is 840. The post-tick period is from 3 August 2009 to 31 December 2012. 
 
 
Table 4.8 reports the Granger-causality tests between the unexpected spot volume and 
the absolute mispricing. For the null hypothesis that variable  does not Granger-cause 
variable , we test whether the lagged coefficients of  are jointly zero when  is the 
dependent variable in the VAR. Prior to the tick reduction, the results suggest that 
unexpected spot volume Granger-cause the absolute mispricing, while the mispricing 
does not Granger-cause the unexpected spot volume. This indicates that liquidity in the 
underlying market plays a crucial role in influencing the size of the mispricing. 
Interestingly, after the tick reduction, the absolute unexpected spot volume Granger-
cause the mispricing. Perhaps this is due to the lower trading costs caused by the tick 
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reduction, which enable traders responds to deviation from no-mispricing.  Let us now 
examine the impulse response functions (IRFs) to get a much clearer picture. Fig. 4.3 
and Fig. 4.4 show the impulse response functions for the VAR system for the pre- and 
post-tick periods.  
 
Table 4.8: Granger-causality Wald test for bivariate VAR 
Panel A: Pre-tick reduction period (2 January 2002 to 2 August 2009) 
 Absolute mispricing Unexpected spot volume 
Absolute mispricing - 7.0084 
 - 0.135 
Unexpected spot volume 21.482 - 
 0.000 - 
Panel B: Post-tick reduction period (3 August 2009 to 31 December 2012) 
 Absolute mispricing Unexpected spot volume 
Absolute mispricing - 8.8313 
 - 0.065 
Unexpected spot volume 1.5987 - 
 0.809 - 
Note: Null hypotheses: Row variable does not Granger-cause column variable. The cell associated with 
the row variable and the column variable shows the statistic and the p-values (in parentheses) 
associated with this test. 
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Fig. 4.3: Impulse response functions for the bivariate VAR with the unexpected spot volume and the 
absolute mispricing (implied by the spot market) for the pre-tick period. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4.4: Impulse response functions for the bivariate VAR with the unexpected spot volume and the 
absolute mispricing (implied by the spot market) for the post-tick period. 
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4.3. Summary of chapter 
In this chapter we assess whether trading volume of the constituent stocks are higher 
after the lowering of tick sizes. The evidence suggests that trading volume is 
significantly higher in comparison to pre reduction period. This indicates that the 
lowering of tick sizes seem to improve liquidity in the underlying stock market. This 
finding is justified given that the constituent stocks are large and that their prices were 
previously constrained by the tick size (Chung et al. 2005). This may have enable 
investors to trade these stocks more efficiently due to higher expected reduction in 
spreads. As such, the lower tick seems to improve the liquidity of the 30 constituent 
stocks that make-up the FBM-KLCI spot index in support of our hypothesis. This 
finding is consistent with Hsieh et al., (2008), where they find the tick reduction in 
Taiwanese Stock Exchange, a pure order-driven market, improves liquidity, especially 
for the higher-priced, larger capitalisation and actively traded stocks. 
 
Based on the cost-of-carry model, we compute two series of mispricing which are 
respectively implied by the spot and futures prices. It is found that mispricing is 
significantly lower after the tick reduction. This suggests that the lower tick improves 
the pricing efficiency of the index futures given that the unexpected spot trading volume 
are found to represent trades that better incorporates stock specific information and 
those of arbitrageurs’ trades. This implies that the tick reduction does not cause the 
index market to incorporate information ahead of the futures. Further, the finding 
suggests that arbitrageurs are not adversely affected by possible decline in market 
depth, especially so traders in Bursa Malaysia do not normally quote higher depth with 
higher tick. In other words, the introduction of the lower tick sizes facilitate traders to 
respond quicker to mispricing (Henker & Martens 2005) and incorporate stock specific 
information more efficiently (Roll et al. 2007). Overall, the evidence suggests that the 
lowering of tick sizes reduces mispricing between these two markets. Alternatively, the 
pricing efficiency of the index futures significantly improves following the introduction 
of the lower tick sizes. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Second empirical study: Lower tick sizes and futures' price discovery 
role 
Our second empirical study focuses on the price discovery of the index futures. The 
following hypothesis is tested: 
 
The reduction of tick size has no significant impact on the spot index speed of 
adjustment towards equilibrium level. 
The reduction of tick size improves spot index speed of adjustment towards 
equilibrium level. 
 
First, the descriptive statistics of the futures and spot returns are presented and 
discussed. In the following section, we discuss the speed of adjustment estimates for 
spot and futures returns, pre- and post-tick reduction periods. For robustness, the long-
term relationship between the spot and futures is also assessed and presented. 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
Fig. 5.1 plots the spot and futures returns for the period from 2 January 2002 to 31 
December 2012. The vertical line marks the date 3 August 2009, when the tick sizes 
were reduced. Both series are less volatile following the tick size reduction and seem to 
be stationary. 
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Fig. 5.1: Spot and futures returns for the period from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2012. The vertical 
line marks the date when the tick sizes in the spot market were reduced. 
 
 
Table 5.1 reports the descriptive statistics of spot returns, and futures returns, for 
the whole as well as for the pre-and post-tick periods. The average returns in the spot 
market (0.034%) are marginally higher than the average futures returns (0.033%). 
However, the standard deviation (0.796%) of spot return is lower than the standard 
deviation (1.018%) of futures return, confirming the higher sensitivity of futures prices 
to information. Similarly, for the two sub-periods the standard deviations of spot returns 
are relatively lower than the futures. However, it is worth noting that the volatility of 
both spot and futures returns are lower in the post-tick period compared to the pre-tick 
period. 
 
Both returns series exhibit significant first order autocorrelation or higher order 
autocorrelation in the first 48 lags. Negative autocorrelation in the futures return series 
is consistent with the bid-ask bounce effect in a traded security, while the effect of non-
synchronous trading induces positive autocorrelation in the underlying index return 
series (Stoll & Whaley 1990). The portmanteau statistics for the squared deviations 
from the mean reveal evidence of heteroskedasticity throughout the sample period as 
well as in the sub-sample periods. 
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It is evident that both returns series are negatively skewed. However, the skewness is 
lesser for the post-tick size reduction period. Also, the positive kurtosis decreases in the 
post-tick period. This has significant implications for investors. A reduction in negative 
skewness with considerable reduction in positive kurtosis indicates a decline in the 
probability of high negative returns in the post-tick period. Further, for the post-tick 
period, there is no significant difference in the kurtosis between spot (4.849) and futures 
(4.669). This suggests that there is no significant difference in the likelihood of 
abnormal positive or negative spot and futures returns for the period following tick size 
reduction. In the next section, we discuss the speed at which both returns revert to the 
equilibrium level. 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics of the spot index and the index futures returns (%)ª 
Descriptive 
statistics    
 
   
 Pre-tick  Post-tick  Whole 
sample 
Pre-tick  Post-tick  Whole 
sample 
T 1863 840 2703 1863 840 2703 
Mean  0.029 0.043 0.034 0.028 0.043 0.033 
Minimum -9.979 -2.531  -9.979  -7.565 -2.793  -7.565 
Maximum 4.259  2.404  4.259  4.833  2.404   4.833 
 0.879 0.572 0.796  1.137 0.683 1.018 
Skewness -0.952  -0.449 -0.942 -0.528 -0.370 -0.550 
Kurtosis 14.249  4.849 14.991 6.468  4.669  7.246 
Jarque-Bera 10103.597 147.841 16592.987 1020.174 116.578 2166.851 
p-value (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 0.133 0.124  0.131  -0.048  -0.068  -0.050  
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.049) (0.008) 
Q(48) 108.273 82.614 129.423  65.828 64.368  82.210 
 (0.000)  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.045) (0.057) (0.002) 
Q²(48) 212.822 490.992 386.786  850.170  342.820 1639.553 
 (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADF -37.723 -25.668   -45.547 -45.236 -30.960  -54.647 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ªThe whole sample period is from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2012. Pre-tick size and post-tick 
sample periods are from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2009, and from 3 August 2009 to 31 December 
2012, respectively. T is the sample size. is the sample standard deviation; is the first-order 
autocorrelation coefficient; Q(48) is the Ljung-Box portmanteau test for the first 48 lags of the 
autocorrelation function; Q²(48) is the corresponding statistic for the squared data; ADF is the 
Augmented-Dickey Fuller test for stationarity; and JB is Jarque-Bera test of normality, p-values are in the 
parentheses.  
 
5.2. Cross-correlations 
The analysis of the summary statistics presented in the previous section offers good 
indication that the lowering of the tick sizes yields positive impact on the markets. With 
regard to the relationship between the spot and futures markets, in particular the price 
discovery role of index futures, we examine the speed at which both markets revert to 
the equilibrium level before and after the introduction of lower tick size. The aim is to 
investigate how the speed at which these markets react to new information is affected 
due to changes in tick rules. Prior to that, we first assess the cross-correlation between 
spot and futures returns to established the existence of a lead-lag relationship.  
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Table 5.2 shows the contemporaneous and five-period leading and lagging return cross-
correlations between futures and spot returns, for the whole sample period as well as for 
pre- and post-introduction of lower tick sizes. The contemporaneous cross-correlations 
are relatively high which suggest that both futures and spot markets possess similar 
information generating process i.e. they respond to the same underlying information. 
Consistent with previous studies in the emerging Malaysian market (Pok 2007; Tan 
2002), futures leads the spot more strongly than lagging it and that both markets 
contribute to price discovery. In other words, futures seem to be leading the spot market 
and that the relationship is not completely uni-directional. Following the tick size 
reduction, the leading role of futures market has become weaker suggesting that 
information is more quickly reflected in the underlying spot market which may be 
attributed to the lower transaction cost caused by the tick size reduction. To investigate 
this further, the speed of adjustment estimators for both returns series are evaluated and 
discussed in the following section. 
 
Table 5.2: Cross-correlation structures between futures and spot returnsª 
Lag Pre-tick Post-tick Whole sample 
-5 -0.0050 -0.0474 -0.0120  
-4 0.0058 0.0084 0.0070  
-3  0.0645*  -0.0332  0.0499* 
-2 0.0196 0.0632 0.0259 
-1 0.0054 0.0306 0.0095 
0 0.8047 * 0.7980*  0.8032* 
1 0.2069*  0.1983*  0.2057* 
2 0.0183  0.0575 0.0242 
3 0.0548*  -0.0021 0.0466* 
4 0.0506*  0.0067 0.0436* 
5  -0.0028  -0.0149 -0.0040 
ª The whole sample frame comprises the period from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2012. Pre-tick 
covers the period from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2009, and post-tick size covers the period from 3 
August 2009 to 31 December 2012.  
* Significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
 
 
5.3. Speed of adjustment estimates 
There are five estimators of the speed of adjustment factors as presented in the 
methodology section. The estimates are shown in Table 5.3 for the period before and 
after the tick size reduction. In this section, we discuss the first four estimators derived 
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assuming that the intrinsic values follow a random walk process. The estimators are: i.) 
the co-variance ratio; ii.) AR(1); iii.) ARMA(1,1); and ARMA (1,X). The fifth speed of 
adjustment estimator, which assumes non-random walk process is discussed in the 
subsequent section. 
 
The second column of Table 5.3 reports the cross-covariance estimates of the partial 
adjustment factor for the futures and the spot markets. The futures seem to adjust to 
equilibrium level at a higher speed i.e. close to unity in comparison to the spot. 
However, in the post tick period, the spot adjust to equilibrium level at higher speed 
compared to the period before the tick was reduced which is an indication that stock 
specific information are reflected faster in the underlying market.  
 
Columns three to five of Table 5.3 present the estimates of the speed of adjustment 
using three estimators based on the ARMA specifications. In general, for the whole 
sample, the results show that the partial adjustment factor for the index futures 
contract, is significantly higher than for the spot, . Further, the results show that 
adjustment factors significantly different from one are more frequently evident in the 
spot market. This implies that, in general, the underlying market under-reacts to 
information. AR(1) specification assumes absence of spread and noise effects. The 
findings show that for all the sub-sample periods the index futures incorporate 
information ahead of stock index. The estimates based on the ARMA(1,1) specification 
are calibrated assuming an absence of thin trading effect. The findings indicate that 
when the noise and spread effects are considered, both futures and spot over-react to 
information. It is noted that the spot adjusts at a considerably lower rate following the 
tick size reduction. This implies that the tick size reduction has a paramount impact on 
the spot market given that tick size reduction directly affects the spread. 
 
The ARMA(1,X) specification takes into account the thin trading effect in the 
underlying. Hence, the estimates for the futures are similar to the ARMA(1,1) 
specification. The optimal lag order of moving average (X) is based on Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). Similarly, the result suggests that the reduction in tick 
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sizes, facilitate traders in exploiting stock specific information, which strengthens the 
linkage between stock index and index futures.  
 
Table 5.3: Estimates of adjustment speeds and underlying processª 
Sample frame  Non-Random 
Walk 
 
 Cross-covariance ratio AR(1) ARMA(1,1) ARMA(1,X)ᵇ   
Whole data set       
 0.988 1.050* 1.305 1.305 1.000** 1.176** 
 0.744 0.869* 0.830 0.869* 1.000** 0.721** 
Pre-tick       
 0.993 1.048* 1.192 1.192 1.000** 1.182** 
 0.743 0.867* 1.134 0.737 1.000** 0.714** 
Post-tick       
 0.959 1.068* 1.716* 1.716* 1.000** 1.145** 
 0.751 0.876* 0.692 0.876* 1.000** 0.763** 
ª The whole sample frame comprises the period from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2012; pre-tick 
period is from 2 Jan 2002 - 2 August 2009 and post-tick is from 3 Aug 2009 to 31 Dec 2012. 
ᵇ The optimal MA components are determined by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
* Statistically significantly different from one at the 5% significance level. Equivalently  is 
significantly different from zero at 5% level. 
**Statistically significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. 
 
 
5.4. Speed of adjustment and the underlying process 
In the last two column of Table 5.3, we report the estimates of Eq. (III.2.16), which 
assumes a non-random walk intrinsic value process. The estimates are obtained by 
using non-linear least squares. Essentially, the intrinsic value process is random walk 
when the gamma values equals to unity, i.e. the model will be same as ARMA (1, 1). 
 
The results indicate that the speeds of adjustment are higher for the futures similar to 
those reported in the previous section. In fact, for the futures, it is higher for the whole 
sample period and in each of the sub-periods. However, the results differ from the 
previous estimates in that the speed of adjustment for futures are significantly higher 
than one (over-reaction) and for the spot it is significantly less than one (under-reaction) 
throughout the whole and for sub-sample periods. This suggests that the speeds of 
adjustments are sensitive to the specification of the underlying intrinsic value process. 
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In general, the spot under-react in relation to intrinsic value while futures, in most 
instances over-react consistent with its price discovery role. With regard to the 
coefficients in the intrinsic value process, , there is no evidence of over-or under-
reaction for both futures and spot. In general, futures’ speed of adjustment is higher and 
closer to unity in comparison to the spot’s speed of adjustment towards intrinsic values. 
Further, it can be established that the intrinsic values for both markets follow a random 
walk process.  
 
5.5. Robustness check: Vector error correction model (VECM) 
The results of the fitted VECM for pre- and post-tick size periods are displayed in 
Tables 5.4 and 5.5, respectively. For the pre-tick period, Panel B of Table 5.4 shows 
that the positive coefficients on in the spot returns equation are significant. This 
implies that the spot index moves in the direction of the previous movement of the 
futures price, underlining the price discovery role of the futures market for the spot 
market. For the post-tick period, Panel B of Table 5.5, shows that the coefficients 
on are positive, however they are insignificant. This indicates that the lead of 
futures over spot weakens post-tick period. Prior to the tick reduction, error correction 
mechanism occurs in both futures and spot markets as indicated by the significant 
coefficient on for both equations. In comparison, it is significant only in the spot 
returns equation after the tick reduction. This indicates that following the tick reduction 
the error correction mechanism is operating primarily through the adjustment of the spot 
prices rather than the futures prices.  
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Table  5.4: Causality testing using VECM for the pre-tick reduction period 
Panel A: Futures returns as dependent variable 
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error   
 -0.142 0.0401 -3.54  0.000 
 -0.0765 0.0527  -1.45 0.146 
 -0.00381 0.0538  -0.07 0.943 
 -0.0185 0.0519 -0.36 0.722 
 0.0749 0.0449  1.67   0.095 
 0.116 0.0634  1.83 0.068 
 0.0178 0.0631 0.28 0.777 
 0.106 0.0612 1.73 0.083 
 -0.0662 0.0525  -1.26 0.207 
 0.000127 0.000264  0.48 0.630 
Panel B: Spot returns as dependent variable 
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error   
 0.0619 0.0303  2.04  0.041 
 0.247 0.0398  6.22   0.000 
 0.136 0.0406  3.34 0.001 
 0.0939 0.0392  2.40 0.017 
 0.0999 0.0339 2.95 0.003 
 -0.160 0.0479  -3.34  0.001 
 -0.138 0.0477  -2.89  0.004 
 -0.0418 0.0462  -0.90  0.366 
 -0.0919 0.0396  -2.32   0.020 
 0.000292 0.000199  1.46   0.143 
Note: Number of observations is 1861. The pre-tick period is from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2012. 
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Table  5.5: Causality testing using VECM for the post-tick reduction period 
Panel A: Futures returns as dependent variable 
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error   
 -0.140 0.112 -1.25 0.211 
 -0.195 0.113 -1.72 0.086 
 -0.051 0.108 -0.47  0.637 
 0.037 0.097  0.39  0.699 
 0.076 0.074  1.03 0.304 
 0.240 0.118 2.05 0.041 
 0.104 0.111  0.94   0.346 
 -0.091 0.099 -0.91 0.363 
 -0.043 0.076  -0.56 0.575  
 0.000479 0.000241  1.99 0.047 
Panel B: Spot returns as dependent variable 
Independent variable Coefficient Standard error   
 0.324 0.091  3.55   0.000  
 0.124 0.093 1.34  0.179 
 0.103 0.088 1.17  0.242 
 0.120 0.079  1.52  0.128 
 0.062 0.061 1.02  0.306 
 -0.051 0.096  -0.53 0.596 
 -0.054 0.090  -0.60 0.546 
 -0.181 0.081 -2.22  0.026 
 -0.050 0.063 -0.80   0.424 
 0.000207 0.000196 1.06  0.291 
Note: Number of observations is 840. The post-tick period is from 3 August 2009 to 31 December 2012. 
 
 
5.6. Summary of chapter 
It is established that the tick size reduction facilitates the incorporation of stock specific 
information, which explains the weakening of futures lead over spot. In all cases, except 
for the ARMA(1,1) specification, it is shown that the spot adjust at a higher speed 
towards their equilibrium prices following the tick reduction period albeit 
insignificantly. However, our results are consistent with the existing literature 
suggesting that cash markets do not move as rapidly as futures markets. For robustness, 
we also estimate the vector error correction model (VECM).  
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In line with previous studies (Pok 2007; Tan 2002), the results show that futures lead 
the spot more strongly than lagging it and that both markets contribute to price 
discovery, that is, the relationship is not completely uni-directional. Interestingly, after 
the tick reduction, the adjustment towards equilibrium occurs primarily in the spot 
market indicating positive effects of the tick reduction. This is consistent with existing 
empirical evidence, which suggests that reduction in tick size improves the reliability of 
index futures as the bellwether instrument as it allows for better incorporation of stock 
specific information. For example, in Toronto Stock Exchange, Beaulieu, Ebrahim & 
Morgan (2003) suggest that tick reduction improves the price discovery role of TSE 35 
index futures, which they attribute to the transaction cost hypothesis. The reason is that, 
the ability to trade the underlying stocks reduces the basis/mispricing (Alexander & 
Barbosa 2008) and thus improves the price discovery role of index futures (Garbade & 
Silber 1983). Taken together, these results suggest that the index futures market is a 
useful price discovery tool and that this is enhanced by the introduction of the lower 
tick sizes on 3 August 2009. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Third empirical study: Lower tick sizes and futures' hedging efficiency 
In this chapter, we investigate the hedging effectiveness of the index futures. As noted 
earlier, given the inconclusive evidence of the impact of a lower tick size on the stock 
market liquidity (see for example, Ahn et al. 1996; Ronen & Weaver 2001; Pavabutr & 
Prangwattananon 2009), and hence on the spot index liquidity, there are possibilities 
that the lower tick may weaken the relationship between the spot and futures indices. 
This in turn may adversely affect the performance of a hedging strategy using index 
futures. The reason is that the underlying liquidity which is directly affected by the 
lower tick size affects the basis risk43 (Roll et al. 2007). Hedging on the other hand, 
transforms price risk to basis risk (Jorion 2007). Consequently, the effectiveness of a 
hedging strategy relies on the magnitude and stability of the basis (Sutcliffe 2006). 
Thus, we test the following hypotheses: 
 
 Hedge ratios estimated for the post-tick period is similar to the pre-tick period. 
 Hedge ratios estimated for the post-tick period is significantly higher compared to 
the pre-tick period. 
 
 Hedge effectiveness for the post-tick period is similar to pre-tick period. 
 Hedge performance is significantly greater for the post-tick period in comparison 
to pre-tick period. 
 
6.1. Descriptive statistics 
We first explore the descriptive statistics of the futures and spot returns as shown in 
Table 6.1 below. For the whole in-sample period, the average returns in the spot market 
(0.0335%) are marginally higher than the average futures returns (0.0328%), as it is in 
the period prior to the lowering of tick sizes (i.e. 0.0291% vs. 0.0278%). However, 
futures returns (0.0456%) are higher in comparison to the spot’s (0.0444%), subsequent 
to the tick size reduction. It is worth noting that both markets experience reduced 
volatility following the tick size reduction.  
                                                            
43 The risk that the change in futures price over time does not track exactly the changes in the price of the 
spot. 
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Spot and futures prices appear to be platykurtic as indicated by the positive kurtosis 
coefficients. Pertaining to the skewness of returns, before the reduction, it is negative 
for both spot and futures (-0.952 and -0.528, respectively). The degree of negative 
skewness and positive kurtosis are however lower in the post-tick reduction period. This 
has significant implications for investors. A reduction in negative skewness with 
considerable reduction in positive kurtosis indicates a decline in the probability of high 
negative returns in the post-tick period. Further, for the post-tick period, there is no 
significant difference in the kurtosis between spot (4.693) and futures (4.495), which 
suggests that there is no significant difference in the likelihood of abnormal positive or 
negative spot and futures returns for the period following tick size reduction. The results 
imply that the lowering of tick sizes has a positive impact on the equity markets. The 
Jarque-Bera tests indicate significant departures from normality and the magnitude of 
departures from normality seem to be quite similar for these two series. 
 
Tests for autocorrelation on the first twelve lags of the sample autocorrelation function 
is significant indicating that autocorrelation are present in both spot and futures returns. 
There is also evidence to support the presence of ARCH effect as indicated by the 
Ljung-Box Q statistic on the squared return series. Therefore, a hedging model that 
allows for time-varying variances and co-variances may be appropriate. Both return 
series are I(0) as indicated by the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Philips-Perron unit root 
tests. Fig. 6.1 plots the futures and spot prices and returns.  
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of the spot index and the index futures returns ( )ª  
Descriptive 
statistics 
  
 Pre-tick Post-tick Whole in-sample Pre-tick Post-tick 
Whole in-
sample 
T 1,863 739 2,602 1,863 739 2,602 
Mean 0.0291 0.0444 0.0335 0.0278 0.0456 0.0328 
Std. 
Deviation 0.879 0.591 0.808 1.137 0.708 1.034 
Minimum -9.979 -2.531 -9.979 -7.565 -2.793 -7.565 
Median 0.0512 0.0853 0.0576 0.0357 0.0738 0.0561 
Maximum 4.259 2.404 4.259 4.833 2.404 4.833 
Skewness -0.952 -0.431 -0.934 -0.528 -0.38 -0.546 
Kurtosis 14.25 4.693 14.71 6.468 4.495 7.077 
JB testᵇ 10103.597 111.154 15237.051 1020.174 86.598 1931.941 
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Q(12)ᵈ 51.733 18.869 63.832 21.981 13.756 28.2 
Q²(12)ᵈ 143.057 191.764 230.558 610.944 121.041 979.329 
ADF testᵉ -11.533 -7.784 -13.809 -11.751 -7.683 -13.968 
PP testᵍ -38.005 -23.915 -44.943 -45.186 -29.267 -53.596 
ª The whole in-sample period is from 2 January 2002 to 31 July 2012. The in-sample period is divided 
into pre-tick size reduction period; from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2009, and post-tick size reduction 
period; from 3 August 2009 to 31 July 2012. ᵇJB test is the Jarque-Bera test for Normality.  
ᵈ Q(12) and Q²(12) are Ljung-Box tests for twelfth-order autocorrelation in the level and squared series, 
respectively. ᵉ ADF test is the Augmented-Dickey Fuller tests. ᵍPP test is the Philips and Perron unit root 
tests. 1%, 5% and 10% critical values for this test are -3.960, -3.410 and -3.120, respectively.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6.1: Spot and Futures Prices/Returns: 02 Jan 2002 to 31 Dec 2012 
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6.2. Model estimation 
The results from the maximum likelihood estimation of  for the GARCH(1,1) 
DVECH, DBEKK and CCC models for the overall in-sample and the in-sample sub-
periods i.e. pre-tick and post-tick are reported in Table 6.2, Table 6.3 and Table 6.4, 
respectively.  
 
For the overall in-sample period, the parameters estimated for each of the models are 
significant in explaining the distribution of spot and futures at the 1% level implying 
that the distributions of spot and futures returns are time-varying. In terms of the log-
likelihood value, the DBEKK dominates the DVECH and CCC. The DVECH also 
dominates the CCC model. Further we observe that the specifications are covariance 
stationary.   
 
For the pre-tick period too, all parameter estimates are statistically different from zero 
for all three models and that the specifications are covariance stationary. The period 
following the introduction of lower tick size reveals a similar pattern whereby all 
parameters estimated for the three models are significant at 1% level and that the 
models are covariance stationary. Next, we discuss the descriptive statistics of hedge 
ratios estimated from these models under risk minimisation and utility maximisation 
criterions. 
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Table 6.2: Maximum likelihood estimation for the overall in sample* 
 Diagonal VECH  Diagonal BEKK  CCC 
 Coef. S.E z-Stat.  Coef. S.E z-Stat.  Coef. S.E z-Stat. 
C(1) 0.0594 0.0126 4.7308 C(1) 0.0536 0.0122 4.3935 C(1) 0.0610 0.0120 5.0692 
C(2) 0.0550 0.0159 3.4528 C(2) 0.0478 0.0168 2.8526 C(2) 0.0616 0.0152 4.0547 
M(1,1) 0.0206 0.0027 7.6347 M 0.0162 0.0018 9.0734 M(1) 0.0101 0.0015 6.5939 
M(1,2) 0.0176 0.0024 7.2521 A1(1,1) 0.3506 0.0085 41.3540 A1(1) 0.0910 0.0059 15.4515 
M(2,2) 0.0192 0.0028 6.9527 A1(2,2) 0.2363 0.0066 35.9281 B1(1) 0.8947 0.0072 124.4001 
A1(1,1) 0.0947 0.0055 17.2312 B1(1,1) 0.9274 0.0037 249.7961 M(2) 0.0122 0.0020 6.1858 
A1(1,2) 0.0652 0.0046 14.2481 B1(2,2) 0.9640 0.0017 558.3558 A1(2) 0.0794 0.0052 15.3354 
A1(2,2) 0.0704 0.0051 13.9361     B1(2) 0.9102 0.0055 164.4592 
B1(1,1) 0.8682 0.0089 97.4367     R(1,2) 0.7980 0.0062 129.6474 
B1(1,2) 0.8999 0.0076 118.3393         
B1(2,2) 0.9081 0.0064 141.2354         
L.likelihood -4907.5340 L.likelihood -4973.5300 L.likelihood -4,923.9580 
* The in-sample period is from 2 January 2002 to 31 July 2012. 
ª Significant at 1% level 
 
Table 6.3: Maximum likelihood estimation for the pre-tick reduction period.* 
 Diagonal VECH  Diagonal BEKK  CCC 
 Coef. S.E z-Stat.  Coef. S.E z-Stat.  Coef. S.E z-Stat. 
C(1) 0.0574 0.0163 3.5220 C(1) 0.0497 0.0160 3.0987 C(1) 0.0589 0.0156 3.7663 
C(2) 0.0534 0.0216 2.4672 C(2) 0.0453 0.0226 2.0048 C(2) 0.0615 0.0204 3.0155 
M(1,1) 0.0283 0.0045 6.3298 M 0.0262 0.0033 7.9678 M(1) 0.0172 0.0029 5.8586 
M(1,2) 0.0259 0.0046 5.7005 A1(1,1) 0.3615 0.0104 34.6024 A1(1) 0.1075 0.0081 13.3493 
M(2,2) 0.0331 0.0057 5.8045 A1(2,2) 0.2277 0.0074 30.6993 B1(1) 0.8729 0.0105 82.9631 
A1(1,1) 0.1008 0.0070 14.3359 B1(1,1) 0.9179 0.0052 176.7057 M(2) 0.0226 0.0038 5.9497 
A1(1,2) 0.0672 0.0058 11.5110 B1(2,2) 0.9631 0.0022 438.6339 A1(2) 0.0840 0.0063 13.3292 
A1(2,2) 0.0718 0.0060 11.8704     B1(2) 0.8993 0.0070 128.3905 
B1(1,1) 0.8575 0.0120 71.3010     R(1,2) 0.7937 0.0078 102.4002 
B1(1,2) 0.8910 0.0107 83.2545         
B1(2,2) 0.8983 0.0087 103.5294         
Log likelihood -3932.2440 Log likelihood -3976.1480 Log likelihood -3930.7110 
* The pre-tick period is from 2 January 2002 to 2 August 2009 
ª Significant at 1% level 
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Table 6.4: Maximum likelihood estimation for the post-tick reduction period* 
 Diagonal VECH  Diagonal BEKK  CCC 
 Coef. S.E z-Stat.  Coef. S.E z-Stat.  Coef. S.E z-Stat. 
C(1) 0.0609 0.0208 2.9227 C(1) 0.0570 0.0195 2.9155 C(1) 0.0590 0.0197 2.9868 
C(2) 0.0571 0.0246 2.3229 C(2) 0.0516 0.0261 1.9785 C(2) 0.0560 0.0234 2.3923 
M(1,1) 0.0394 0.0091 4.3406 M 0.0202 0.0031 6.6096 M(1) 0.0140 0.0039 3.5789 
M(1,2) 0.0287 0.0059 4.8694 A1(1,1) 0.3442 0.0200 17.1742 A1(1) 0.0769 0.0107 7.2125 
M(2,2) 0.0213 0.0045 4.7500 A1(2,2) 0.2100 0.0171 12.3087 B1(1) 0.8791 0.0191 46.0447 
A1(1,1) 0.0956 0.0153 6.2401 B1(1,1) 0.9132 0.0086 106.2615 M(2) 0.0127 0.0039 3.2571 
A1(1,2) 0.0582 0.0128 4.5669 B1(2,2) 0.9583 0.0043 220.9837 A1(2) 0.0671 0.0118 5.6918 
A1(2,2) 0.0566 0.0114 4.9409     B1(2) 0.9071 0.0151 60.2056 
B1(1,1) 0.7834 0.0331 23.6326     R(1,2) 0.8068 0.0108 74.4740 
B1(1,2) 0.8518 0.0251 33.9490         
B1(2,2) 0.8994 0.0166 54.1301         
Log likelihood -955.9869 Log likelihood -977.7391 Log likelihood -980.1943 
* The post-tick period is from 3 August 2009 to 31 July 2012 
ª Significant at 1% level 
 
6.3. Descriptive statistics of the hedge ratios 
Fig. 6.2 plots the time varying hedge ratios under the risk minimisation criterion. The 
conditional hedge ratios fluctuate as new information arrives. The hedge ratios are 
somewhat higher post-tick size reduction period indicating higher correlation between 
futures and spot markets. Indeed, on average the hedge ratio estimates from all three 
models are higher post-tick period as shown in Table 6.5. Further, except for the 
estimates from DVECH model, the standard deviation is lower post-tick period, which 
may indicate positive impact on the equity markets caused by the lower tick size. We 
note further that ADF and PP unit root tests suggest that for the whole in-sample period 
and the two sub-periods, the time-varying hedge ratios are I(0), at the 5% level implying 
that the hedge ratios are mean reverting. The hedge ratios under the utility maximisation 
criterion yield similar observations as shown in Table 6.6.  
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Fig. 6.2 : Time varying hedge ratios under the risk minimisation criterion 
 
Table 6.5: Descriptive statistics for the estimated hedge ratios under risk minimisation criterion 
           Whole in-sample            Pre-tick reduction            Post-tick reduction 
 DVECH DBEKK CCC DVECH DBEKK CCC DVECH DBEKK CCC 
T 2602 2602 2602 1863 1863 1863 739 739 739 
Mean 0.618 0.619 0.626 0.599 0.609 0.601 0.673 0.666 0.670 
Std. Dev. 0.0944 0.120 0.0837 0.0822 0.0848 0.117 0.0968 0.0681 0.113 
Minimum 0.363 0.343 0.411 0.379 0.408 0.340 0.0530 0.517 0.0221 
Median 0.620 0.612 0.623 0.599 0.601 0.587 0.684 0.667 0.663 
Maximum 0.953 1.329 1.066 0.972 1.015 1.388 0.888 1.061 1.043 
Skewness -0.0483 0.593 0.383 0.101 0.551 0.942 -1.205 0.694 -0.464 
Kurtosis 2.560 4.183 3.642 3.028 3.671 5.735 7.534 5.479 8.034 
J.Bera 22.0063 304.1505 108.2538 3.2344 856.1609 129.1394 811.8008 806.8055 248.4612 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1984 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ADF (5) ª -8.1430 -9.5130 -9.0350 -7.986 -8.7510 -8.7560 -5.1410 -6.6490 -4.9000 
PP (5) ª -8.6600 -10.3390 -10.0730 -9.091 -9.5270 -9.7630 -6.7520 -7.0910 -5.6470 
ª Critical values 1% from Mackinnon (1990) for ADF and PP tests with trend and intercept is -3.4342 
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Table 6.6: Descriptive statistics for the estimated hedge ratios under utility maximisation criterion* 
       Whole in-sample  Pre-tick reduction  Post-tick reduction  
 DVECH DBEKK CCC DVECH DBEKK CCC DVECH DBEKK CCC 
T 2,602 2,602 2,602 1,863 1,863 1,863 739 739 739 
Mean 0.599 0.601 0.608 0.586 0.588 0.596 0.637 0.636 0.634 
Std. Dev. 0.593 0.557 0.613 0.519 0.490 0.535 0.764 0.715 0.797 
Minimum -1.605 -1.474 -2.216 -1.244 -1.116 -1.542 -1.887 -1.677 -2.218 
Maximum 3.918 3.881 4.173 3.164 3.291 3.274 4.377 4.227 4.637 
Skewness 0.549 0.492 0.552 0.418 0.385 0.417 0.629 0.583 0.723 
Kurtosis 5.210 5.143 5.770 4.800 4.728 5.111 4.784 4.725 5.274 
Median 0.571 0.577 0.579 0.575 0.574 0.580 0.573 0.572 0.574 
J.Bera 660.1261 602.9476 963.9154 305.7749 277.9588 399.9337 146.7321 133.4235 223.6426 
Probability 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
ADF(5)ª -19.6720 -18.3920 -19.8180 -16.7580 -15.3750 -16.4940 -10.6950 -10.3610 -10.8840 
PPP(5)ª -49.1000 -48.2480 -49.0260 -41.6120 -40.7120 -41.2510 -26.7230 -26.6140 -26.8400 
* For simplicity the risk aversion parameter is assumed one. 
ª Critical values 1% from Mackinnon (1990) for ADF and PP tests with trend and intercept is -3.4342 
 
 
6.4. In-sample and out-of-sample hedging performance 
6.4.1. Variance reduction comparison 
Table 6.7 reports the variance reduction of the hedged portfolio returns compared with 
those obtained for the unhedged portfolio for the in-sample sub-period. It is evident that 
the percentage variance reduction is higher post-tick period indicating more effective 
hedge. This is true regardless of strategy used to implement the hedge. With regard to 
the hedge model, the DVECH seems to produce slightly a better result.  However, it is 
best to decide on which model is superior by looking at the model forecasting ability. 
 
To achieve this, the coefficient estimates of all three models, from the post-tick period, 
were used to up-date continuously throughout the 101 out-of-sample observations. 
Specifically, the hedge ratios were forecasted throughout the out-of-sample period by 
using estimates from the post-tick sub-period. The forecasted hedge ratios were then 
used to compute returns, and the variances for comparison with the unhedged position. 
The results are shown in Table 6.8. In this setting, the DBEKK model seems to be 
superior in comparison to the other two models. 
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Table 6.7: Variance reduction comparison for the in-sample sub-period 
 No hedge DVECH DBEKK CCC 
Overall in-sample     
Mean of return 0.0335 0.0135 0.0127 0.0135 
Variance of return 0.6522 0.2416 0.2551 0.2407 
Percentage of variance reduction -62.9561 -60.8842 -63.0901 
     
Pre-tick period     
Mean of return 0.0291 0.0108 0.0107 0.0115 
Variance of return 0.7725 0.2854 0.3048 0.2840 
Percentage of variance reduction -63.0563 -60.5456 -63.2369 
     
Post-tick period     
Mean of return 0.0333 0.0212 0.0173 0.0190 
Variance of return 0.6522 0.1287 0.1338 0.1321 
Percentage of variance reduction -80.2650 -79.4781 -79.7377  
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Table 6.8: Predictive performance of models under risk minimisation criterion 
Summary of statistics of the actual spot returns, and returns of hedged portfolios computed using 
VECH, BEKK and CCC GARCH(1,1) in the out-of-sample periods. 
Summary of 
statistics Actual DVECH DBEKK CCC 
Mean of return 0.0342 0.0115 0.0165 0.0126 
Median 0.0498 0.0070 0.0136 0.0085 
Maximum 0.9019 0.8018 0.7677 0.7820 
Minimum -1.4127 -0.4867 -0.4925 -0.4763 
Std. Dev. 0.4109 0.2214 0.2138 0.2187 
Variance 0.1688 0.0490 0.0457 0.0478 
Skewness -0.7774 0.4979 0.5275 0.6314 
Kurtosis 4.8215 4.1585 4.0215 4.1984 
Jacque-Bera  24.1353 9.7245 8.9856 12.6286 
Probability 0.0000 0.0077 0.0112 0.0018 
ADF with intercept 
(5) -21.1270 -3.8410 -3.7470 -3.8890 
PP with intercept -45.7000 -12.1280 -12.3030 -12.2980 
T 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 101.0000 
Variance reduction  -0.7097 -0.7293 -0.7166 
ª Critical values 1% from Mackinnon (1990) for ADF and PP tests with trend and intercept is -3.4342 
 
 
6.4.2. Utility maximisation comparison 
The result for utility maximisation comparison is contained in Table 6.9. Again, the 
result suggests a more effective hedging following the tick size reduction given the 
higher expected utility. This implies that the move of lowering the tick size greatly 
benefit the market. Concerning the hedging strategy, the DVECH model seems to be 
superior in comparison to the other strategies both overall in-sample and out-of-sample. 
 
Table 6.9: Hedging effectiveness - Utility and economic significance comparisonª 
 DVECH  DBEKK CCC  
Overall in sample -0.4679 -0.4975 -0.4697 
Pre-tick period -0.5599 -0.5989 -0.5565 
Post-tick period -0.2362 -0.2503 -0.2453 
Out-of-sample -0.0810 -0.0759 -0.0807 
Note: The risk aversion parameter is assumed 1 
ª The overall in sample period is from 2 January 2002 to 31 July 2012; the pre-tick period is from 2 
January 2002 to 2 August 2009; the post-tick period is from 3 August 2009 to 31 July 2012. The 
remaining out-of-sample period runs for the remaining 101 observations ending on 31 December 2012. 
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6.5. Summary of chapter 
The conclusion whether change in market design changes favourably affect the equity 
market is rather controversial. Using bivariate GARCH(1,1) and daily returns of spot 
and futures, we show that the lowering of tick size in emerging Malaysian market 
enhanced the usefulness of the index futures as a price setting mechanism.  
 
Similar finding is observed in Spanish, where Andani, Lafuente & Novales (2009) find 
the optimal hedge ratio gradually coming closer to one due to increased liquidity. This 
support the notion that as trading cost decreases and arbitrage is facillated by ETFs, the 
correlation between futures and spot return increases, and hence on hedging 
effectiveness (Alexander & Barbosa 2007).  
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CHAPTER 7 
Summary, conclusions and limitations 
This chapter concludes the study and discusses the main findings of the empirical 
works. The key contributions and implications of this study and some suggestions for 
further research are also discussed. 
 
7.1. Introduction 
Tick size is one of the most important design features of an exchange. It determines the 
minimum movement that financial instruments are allowed to change, and as such 
directly affects the size of the bid-ask spread, the difference in prices at which buyers 
and sellers are willing to trade. Tick size affects both market liquidity and price 
discovery. Price discovery refers to the ability of the market in finding the equilibrium 
price, while liquidity is defined as the ability to trade at the lowest trading costs. 
 
Exchanges around the world set tick rules as a way to simplify and ease trading. On the 
one hand, if the tick is set too high, liquidity demanders may have to incur higher 
trading cost because the spread, which is the main component of trading cost, would 
never be lower than the size of the tick. Further, price discovery may be disrupted due 
to the fact that traders would not be able to trade near the equilibrium price i.e. they are 
forced to buy (sell) at higher (lower) than the equilibrium price. 
 
On the other hand, if it is set too low, however, liquidity suppliers may incur higher cost 
of providing liquidity. In addition, it is easier for them to step in front of one another at 
order-driven exchanges. As a consequence, they may reduce their supply of liquidity. 
Further, price discovery may be delayed due to higher number of possible prices at 
which to trade. That is, lower tick may complicate negotiation process between buyers 
and sellers. 
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The optimal tick size, therefore, represents a trade-off: a wider tick promotes liquidity 
from limit order traders and market makers, but at the cost of a higher bid-ask spread 
i.e. higher trading costs for investors. 
 
Over the past two decades or so, there is a trend for exchanges around the world to 
reduce the mandated tick size, the effect of which on market liquidity remained open for 
debate. In general, the finding is that reduction in tick results in lower bid-ask spread 
and depth, however the impact on trading volume is less inconclusive. 
 
Further, there are also concerns that the lower tick size may weaken the relationship 
between the index futures and its underlying. The reason is that spot market liquidity 
affects the basis, defined as the deviation of spot and futures prices from the cost-of-
carry model i.e. the mispricing. 
 
If the lower tick size improves the liquidity and this in turn causes the basis to narrow 
down, the price discovery role and hedging effectiveness of the index futures should 
improve because the narrower basis positively affects these two functions of index 
futures (Garbade & Silber 1983). 
 
However, there are possibilities that the basis may widen even if liquidity in the 
underlying market improves following tick reduction. First, the unexpected spot volume 
may not represents arbitrageurs’ trades because there is a possibility that the lower tick 
may cause depth to decline making it difficult or infeasible for them to execute their 
trades.  
 
Second, even if arbitrageurs are not adversely affected by the lowering of tick, the basis 
may widen if speculators trades exceed those of arbitrageurs’ in the composition of the 
unexpected trading volume (Cummings & Frino 2011). This is likely to happen given 
the lower trading cost in the underlying market caused by the lower tick sizes (Bollen & 
Whaley 1998), especially so the stocks that make-up the underlying index are of higher 
market capitalisation where speculators are able to act on stock specific information 
(Sutcliffe 2006).  
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Exchanges would be interested to know what would be the outcome of a lower tick as 
this would assist exchanges in finding the optimal tick size, one that ensures liquidity 
and price discovery. In light of that, we investigate the introduction of lower tick sizes 
in emerging Malaysian market. The ticks were reduced on the 3 August 2009. 
 
In Chapter 4, we examine the impact of the lower ticks on the liquidity of the 30 
constituent stocks that make-up the FBM-KLCI spot index, and in turn on the inter-
market relationship between FBM-FKLI index futures and its underlying. In Chapter 5 
and 6, we examine the price discovery role and hedging effectiveness of the index 
futures, respectively. In the following section, a summary of our empirical analysis is 
presented.  
 
7.2. Lower tick sizes, spot market liquidity and index futures' pricing 
efficiency 
Our first study, in Chapter 4 demonstrates the impact of the ticks reduction on the spot 
index liquidity and in turn on the inter-market relationship between the spot and futures 
indices. 
 
We find significantly higher trading volume for the constituent stocks following the tick 
reduction. This finding is justified given that these stocks are large and that their prices 
were previously constrained by the tick size (Chung et al. 2005). This may have enable 
investors to trade these stocks more efficiently due to higher expected reduction in 
spreads. As such, the lower tick seems to improve the liquidity of the 30 constituent 
stocks that make-up the FBM-KLCI spot index, in support of our hypothesis. This 
finding is consistent with Hsieh et al., (2008), where they find the tick reduction in 
Taiwanese Stock Exchange, a pure order-driven market, improves liquidity, especially 
for the higher-priced, larger capitalisation and actively traded stocks. 
 
As expected, we also find evidence to suggest that the unexpected trading volume 
following the tick reduction represent trades that help in reducing the basis. This implies 
that arbitrageurs are not adversely affected by possible decline in market depth, 
especially so traders in Bursa Malaysia do not normally quote higher depth with higher 
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tick. This also implies that the tick reduction does not causes the index market to 
incorporate information ahead of the futures. In other words, the introduction of the 
lower tick sizes facilitate traders to respond quicker to mispricing (Henker & Martens 
2005) and incorporate stock specific information more efficiently (Roll et al. 2007).  
 
To confirm this, in Chapter 5 we investigate the spot and futures’ speed of adjustment 
towards equilibrium price, which allow as to gauge how quickly the basis or mispricing 
is eliminated in the markets. 
 
7.3. The price discovery role and hedging effectiveness of the index futures 
7.3.1. Price discovery role of the index futures 
We examine whether the reduction in tick sizes improve the price discovery role of the 
index futures, defined as the ability of the market to incorporate information ahead of its 
underlying index. This is so given the inherent advantages of futures trading such as 
absence of short selling restrictions. 
 
Specifically, we investigate the lead-lag relationship between futures and the spot by 
using the cross-correlation function. Next, we investigate the lead-lag relationship in 
terms of the speed at which both spot and futures prices revert to equilibrium level. The 
results show that the futures’ lead over the spot weakens post-tick size reduction. This is 
justified by the fact that the spot returns revert to equilibrium level at a higher speed, 
indicating better incorporation of stock specific information. However, the index futures 
lead the spot both before and after the tick reduction, and that controlling for thin 
trading effects in the spot return series does not alter this conclusion. For robustness, we 
assess the long-term relationship between futures and spot returns using the vector error 
correction model (VECM). Following the tick reduction, we find evidence to suggest 
that the adjustment towards equiblirium is operating primarily through the adjustment 
of the spot prices rather than the futures prices. This is consistent with existing 
empirical evidence, which suggests that reduction in tick size improves the reliability of 
index futures as the bellwether instrument as it allows for better incorporation of stock 
specific information. For example, in Toronto Stock Exchange, Beaulieu, Ebrahim & 
Morgan (2003) suggest that tick reduction improves the price discovery role of TSE 35 
 125 
index futures, which they attribute to the transaction cost hypothesis. The reason is that, 
the ability to trade the underlying stocks reduces the basis/mispricing (Alexander & 
Barbosa 2008) and thus improves the price discovery role of index futures (Garbade & 
Silber 1983). Taken together, these findings suggest that the reduction in tick sizes in 
emerging Malaysian market improves index futures price discovery role.  
 
7.3.2. Hedging effectivenss of the index futures 
In Chapter 6, we examine the hedging effectiveness of the index futures. Sutcliffe 
(2006) suggests that the size of the basis influence the hedging effectiveness of index 
futures. The reason is that hedging transforms price risk into basis risk (Jorion 2007). 
Likewise, a lower basis after the tick should improve the hedging effectiveness of the 
index futures. 
 
First, we compute the optimal hedge ratios using three MGARCH models, namely; 
diagonal VECH, diagonal BEKK and Constant Conditional Correlation (CCC) using 
GARCH(1,1) specification. Consistent with our hypothesis, it is found that the 
estimated hedge ratios are significantly greater post-tick size reduction in comparison to 
pre-reduction period regardless of model used. This support the notion that as trading 
costs decreases and arbitrage is facilitated by ETFs, the correlation between futures and 
spot return increases (Alexander & Barbosa 2007). Similar finding is observed in 
Spanish, where Andani, Lafuente & Novales (2009) find  the optimal hedge ratio 
gradually coming closer to one due to increased liquidity and maturation effect. 
 
Next, the hedging effectiveness of these hedge ratios are compared before and after the 
tick reduction. As anticipated, the results suggest that hedging performance of the index 
futures significantly improved as indicated by the higher variance reduction and higher 
utility in the post-reduction period. Thus, the introduction of the lower tick sizes in 
emerging Malaysian market enhanced the effectiveness of FBM-FKLI index futures as 
a risk management tool.  
 
Overall, our empirical analyses provide evidence that the lowering of tick sizes improve 
the liquidity of the constituent stocks, which in turn strengthened the relationship 
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between the underlying index and its futures derivatives. Alternatively, the usefulness 
of the index futures as a price discovery tool and price-setting mechanism is enhanced 
by the higher liquidity caused by the lower tick size as it improves the pricing efficiency 
of the index futures. In conclusion then, the tick reduction in emerging Malaysian 
market improves market efficiency. 
 
7.4. Contributions of the study 
In the following paragraphs, we briefly discuss some of the important contributions of 
the study. This thesis investigates the impact of the introduction of lower tick on 
liquidity in an emerging pure order-driven market. This is important particularly since a 
lower tick may have larger impact on liquidity in a pure order-driven market. The 
reason is that the size of the tick determines the cost of obtaining order priority in limit 
order book. To the best of our knowledge, besides Chung, Kim & Kitsabunnarat (2005), 
there is no other studies that have investigated the relationship between tick size and 
liquidity in Malaysian market. Further, the impact of tick size reduction seems 
inevitable especially in a relatively less liquid emerging market where the liquidity 
might be strongly affected (Bekaert et al. 2007). 
 
Another contribution of this study is that it also considers how likely the inter-market 
relationship between spot and futures are affected by the lower tick size. While most 
studies have considered only changes in expected trading volume, we consider the 
impact of the unexpected spot trading volume on the basis (mispricing), which allows 
us to glean the source of information arrival in the cash market (Cummings & Frino 
2011). Our finding suggests that the cash market incorporates stock specific information 
better after the tick size reduction. Moreover, in investigating the lead-lag relationship 
between spot and futures, we use the speed of adjustment estimators (Theobald & 
Yallup 1998; Theobald & Yallup 2004; Poshakwale & Theobald 2004) which shows 
how quickly the futures’ mispricing is eliminated. 
 
Finally, we contribute to the literature by assessing the impact of tick size reduction on 
hedging effectiveness of index futures. We are unaware of any studies that have 
investigated this issue. 
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Given the importance of tick rules on the overall functioning of the capital markets, the 
findings of this study should be of interest to regulators, investors and academics alike. 
Perhaps, for example, Bursa Malaysia may use the information to better regulate the 
market. Likewise, investors may be better informed on the impact of a tick reduction on 
market efficiency. Definitely, the issue on what constitutes an optimal tick size presents 
an interesting and challenging avenue for researchers. 
 
7.5. Policy implications 
It is evident that the lowering of the tick sizes has positive impact on the overall 
functioning of the local equity market. We have seen that following the tick reduction, 
liquidity in the underlying market improves as indicated by the higher daily changes in 
trading volume. Further, the unexpected component of the trading volume seems to 
strengthen the inter-market relationship between spot and futures. Collectively, these 
suggest that the objective of lowering the tick size, that is to promote liquidity and 
enable price discovery has been achieved. 
 
However, the commitment to find the optimal tick size is pivotal for the exchange to 
continuously improve its market quality, especially so for an emerging market like 
Malaysia. Currently, the tick sizes are set based on the stock price alone, whereby 
higher tick is assigned for higher price stocks. Bursa Malaysia may consider other 
characteristics in setting the optimal tick size. For example, the tick should be lower for 
actively traded stocks and higher for inactively traded stocks (Cordella & Foucault 
1999). Stock volatility may also be incorporated in setting the optimal tick size amongst 
others (Ascioglu et al. 2010). Perhaps, the firms should be allowed to set their on tick 
size (Comerton-Forde & Rydge 2006). Conclusively, in order to further improve 
liquidity and price discovery, the exchange should continuously strive to attain the 
optimal tick size. 
 
7.6. Limitations and suggestions for further the study 
We have made every efforts to make our results as robust as possible. Nevertheless, the 
study does have some limitations. 
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One of the limitations is the unavailability of data on bid-ask spread and depth. In 
addition to examining the impact of tick reduction on volume, most previous studies 
also assess the impact on spread and depth (Pavabutr & Prangwattananon 2009). The 
availability of these data would certainly make our study more robust as it enables us to 
examine the impact of the tick reduction on numerous measures of market liquidity. 
However, we contemplate that using the spot index trading volume as a proxy for the 
index market liquidity is suffice in addressing the issues at hand, given that trading 
volume is a function of bid-ask spread and depth. That is, increased volume reflects 
increased overall liquidity (Lee et al. 1993). 
 
The unavailability of high frequency data is another limitation that has constrained our 
analysis. With intra-day data, we would be able to address our research questions in a 
more precise manner. For example, we would be able to gauge the bi-directional 
relationship between liquidity and mispricing at a higher frequency, and hence more 
reliable results. Similarly, minute-to-minute lead-lag relationship between futures and 
spot returns could also be investigated using intra-day data.  
 
Given the opportunities, we endeavour to obtain the above unavailable data by getting a 
research grant from the Government of Malaysia. With these data, we intend to not only 
revisit the issues addressed in this study but also to provide new evidence in particular 
to assess the long-term effect of the tick size reduction. It is important to assess the 
long-term of impact of the lower tick size because a report by Grant Thornton dated 
September 201244 suggest that the lower tick size in the US, currently $0.01 for all 
stocks trading above $1, undermines market quality as it contributes to risky trading 
behaviour.45  
 
The risk of a “race to the bottom” whereby competing trading platforms provide venues 
for traders to trade in ever smaller tick. Consequently, all trading platforms adopt the 
lower tick, which leads to reduction in investor protection, and thus degrade market 
                                                            
44 The report is accessible at http://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/acsec/acsec-backgroundmaterials-090712-
weild-article.pdf 
45 O’Hara, Saar & Zhong (2015) suggest that one-size-fits-all tick structure may no longer optimal for the 
US market. 
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quality. In fact it is suggested that the tick size be increased in order to create job 
formation and increase investors’ confidence. We are unable to assess the long-term 
effect of the lower tick given that we use a very recent data set. 
 
In addition, we intend to examine how different clientele i.e. type of traders are affected 
by the tick reduction. For example, retail investors may react differently to a lower tick 
in comparison to institutional investors due to the size of orders they may undertake 
(Pavabutr & Prangwattananon 2009). It would be interesting to investigate the long-run 
impact of the lower tick on market liquidity and the inter-market relationship between 
futures and spot by taking into account the type of traders. 
 
We also note that a successor of the CMP1 known as Capital Market Masterplan two 
(CMP2) was launched on the 12 April 2011. Similar to CMP1, one of the focuses in 
CMP2 is to further improve stock market liquidity. Although, the reduction seems to 
improve liquidity in the underlying market, it is still relatively lower in comparison to 
other markets in the region. For example, the regional turnover velocity in 2010 for 
Malaysia is 32.1%, while it is 94.5% in Thailand (Securities Commission of Malaysia 
2011). 
 
Therefore, the uncertainty concerning the long-run effect of the lower tick sizes and the 
on-going initiatives taken by the regulator in improving liquidity and price discovery 
present an interesting avenue for further research. 
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Tick size standards around the world 
Market Currency Stock price per share Tick size Relative tick size 
Australia AUD < 0.10 0.001 0.10% 
  0.10 to 0.50 0.005 5% to 1% 
  > 0.50 0.01 2% 
Austria EUR All shares 0.01 - 
Austria . ATX stocks EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
Bahrain BHD All shares trading in BHD 0.001 - 
  USD0.01 to USD0.50 USD0.005 50% to 1% 
  > USD0.51 USD0.01 2% 
Belgium EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
  Certain stocks > 10.00 0.005 0.05% 
Brazil BRL All shares 0.01 - 
Bulgaria BGN All shares 0.001 - 
Canada CAD < 0.50 0.005 1% 
  0.5 0.01 2% 
Cyprus EUR < 3.00 0.01 0.33% 
  3.00 to 59.98 0.02 0.67% to 0.03% 
  60 0.05 0.08% 
Czech Republic CZK < 200.00 0.01 0.01% 
  200.00 to 999.9 0.1 0.05% to 0.01% 
  1,000.00 1 0.10% 
Denmark . OMX 
C20 stocks 
DKK < 0.50 0.0001 0.02% 
  0.50 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 4.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5.00 to 9.995 0.005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10.00 to 49.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 499.90 0.1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  500.00 to 999.50 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.00 1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5,000.00 to 9,995.00 5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10,000.00 to 49,990.00 10 0.1% to 0.02% 
   50,000.00 50 0.10% 
Egypt EGP All shares 0.01 - 
*Tick size as a percentage of price per share 
Source: Grant Thornton - Capital Market Series Report (September 2012) 
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Appendix 1:  Continued 
Market Currency Stock price per share Tick size Relative tick size 
Finland EUR All shares 0.01 - 
Finland . OMXH25 
stocks 
DKK < 0.50 0.0001 0.02% 
  0.50 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 4.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5.00 to 9.995 0.005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10.00 to 49.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
France EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
  Certain stocks > 10.00 0.005 0.05% 
Germany EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
Greece EUR < 1.00 0.001 0.10% 
  1.00 to 2.99 0.01 1% to 0.33% 
  3.00 to 59.98 0.02 0.67% to 0.03% 
  60 0.05 0.08% 
Hong Kong HKD 0.25 0.001 0.40% 
  0.255 to 0.50 0.005 1.96% to 1% 
  0.51 to 10.00 0.01 1.96% to 0.1% 
  10.02 to 20.00 0.02 0.2% to 0.1% 
  20.05 to 100.00 0.05 0.25% to 0.05% 
  100.10 to 200.00 0.1 0.1% to 0.05% 
  200.20 to 500.00 0.2 0.1% to 0.04% 
  500.50 to 1,000.00 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
Hong Kong HKD 1,001.00 to 2,000.00 1 0.1% to 0.05% 
(continued)  2,002.00 to 5,000.00 2 0.1% to 0.04% 
  5,005.00 to 9,995.00 5 0.1% to 0.05% 
Hungary HUF Certain shares 1 - 
  Certain shares 5 - 
Hungary . BUX 
stocks 
HUF All shares 1 - 
India INR All shares 0.05 - 
Indonesia IDR < 200.00 1 . 0.5% 
  200.00 to 495.00 5 2.5% to 1% 
  500.00 to 1990.00 10 2% to 0.5% 
  2,000.00 to 4,975.00 25 1.25% to 0.5% 
  5,000.00 50 1% 
*Tick size as a percentage of price per share 
Source: Grant Thornton - Capital Market Series Report (September 2012) 
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Market Currency Stock price per share Tick size Relative tick size 
Ireland EUR All shares 0.001 - 
Ireland . ISEQ 20 
stocks 
EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
Israel ILS All shares 0.01 - 
Italy EUR < 0.25 0.0001 0.04% 
  0.25 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.2% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 1.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.05% 
Japan JPY < 2,000.00 1 0.05% 
  2,000.00 to 2,295.00 5 0.25% to 0.22% 
  3,000.00 to 29,990.00 10 0.33% to 0.03% 
  30,000.00 to 49,950.00 50 0.17% to 0.1% 
  50,000.00 to 99,900.00 100 0.2% to 0.1% 
  100,000.00 to 
999,000.00 
1,000 1% to 0.1% 
  1,000,000.00 to 
19,990,000.00 
10,000 1% to 0.05% 
  20,000,000.00 to 
29,950,000.00 
50,000 0.25% to 0.17% 
  30,000,000.00 100,000 0.33% 
Mexico MXN < 1,000,000,000.00 0.01 1  ~ 10-11 
Netherlands EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
  Certain stocks > 10.00 0.005 0.05% 
New Zealand NZD < 0.20 0.001 0.50% 
  0.2 0.01 5% 
Norway NOK < 0.50 0.0001 0.02% 
  0.50 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 4.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5.00 to 9.995 0.005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10.00 to 49.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 499.90 0.1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  500.00 to 999.50 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.00 1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5,000.00 to 9,995.00 5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10,000.00 to 49,990.00 10 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50,000.00 50 0.10% 
*Tick size as a percentage of price per share 
Source: Grant Thornton - Capital Market Series Report (September 2012) 
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Market Currency Stock price per share Tick size Relative tick size 
Poland PLN < 50.00 0.01 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 499.90 0.1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  500 0.5 0.10% 
Portugal EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
  Certain stocks > 10.00 0.005 0.05% 
Qatar QAR All shares 0.01 - 
Romania RON < 0.10 0.0001 . 0.1% 
  0.10 to 0.499 0.001 1% to 0.2% 
  0.50 to 0.995 0.005 1% to 0.5% 
Saudi Arabia SAR 25 0.05 0.20% 
  25.10 to 50.00 0.1 0.4% to 0.2% 
  50.25 0.25 0.50% 
Singapore SGD < 1.00 0.005 0.50% 
  1.00 to 2.99 0.01 1% to 0.33% 
  3.00 to 4.98 0.02 0.67% to 0.4% 
  5.00 to 9.95 0.05 1% to 0.5% 
  10 0.1 1% 
Spain EUR 50 0.01 0.02% 
  > 50.00 0.05 0.10% 
  Certain stocks 0.005 - 
Spain . IBEX35 and EUR < 10.00 0.001 0.01% 
IBEX medium 
stocks 
 10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100 0.05 0.05% 
Sweden SEK < 0.50 0.0001 0.02% 
  0.50 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 4.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.02% 
Sweden SEK 5.00 to 9.995 0.005 0.1% to 0.05% 
(continued)  10.00 to 49.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 499.90 0.1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  500.00 to 999.50 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.00 1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5,000.00 to 9,995.00 5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10,000.00 to 49,990.00 10 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50,000.00 50 0.10% 
*Tick size as a percentage of price per share 
Source: Grant Thornton - Capital Market Series Report (September 2012) 
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Market Currency Stock price per share Tick size Relative tick size 
Switzerland . Blue 
chip stocks 
CHF < 0.50 0.0001 0.02% 
  0.50 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 4.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5.00 to 9.995 0.005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10.00 to 49.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 499.9 0.1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  500.00 to 999.50 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.00 1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5,000.00 to 9,995.00 5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10,000.00 10 0.10% 
Switzerland . Non-
blue chip stocks 
CHF < 10.00 0.01 0.10% 
  10.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.5% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 249.90 0.1 0.1% to 0.04% 
  250.00 to 499.75 0.25 0.1% to 0.05% 
  500.00 to 999.50 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.00 1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5,000.00 5 0.10% 
Switzerland . SMI 
expanded stocks 
CHF < 0.50 0.0001 0.02% 
  0.50 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 4.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5.00 to 9.995 0.005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10.00 to 49.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 499.9 0.1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  500.00 to 999.50 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.00 1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5,000.00 to 9,995.00 5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10,000.00 to 49,990.00 10 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50,000.00 50 0.10% 
Turkey TRY 5 0.01 0.20% 
  5.02 to 10.00 0.02 0.4% to 0.2% 
  10.05 to 25.00 0.05 0.5% to 0.2% 
  25.10 to 50.00 0.1 0.4% to 0.2% 
  50.25 to 100.00 0.25 0.5% to 0.25% 
UAE (Abu Dhabi) AED 10 0.01 0.10% 
  10.01 to 100.00 0.05 0.5% to 0.05% 
  100.01 0.1 0.10% 
*Tick size as a percentage of price per share 
Source: Grant Thornton - Capital Market Series Report (September 2012) 
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Market Currency Stock price per share Tick size Relative tick size 
UAE (Dubai) AED 0.99 0.001 0.10% 
  1.00 to 9.99 0.01 1% to 0.1% 
  10.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.5% to 0.05% 
  100 0.1 0.10% 
United Kingdom . 
AIM stocks 
GBP < 10.00 0.0001 0.00% 
(GBP/USD/EUR)  10.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.01% 
  100 0.25 0.25% 
United Kingdom . 
AIM stocks 
GBX < 10.00 0.0001 0.00% 
(GBX)  10 0.25 2.50% 
United Kingdom . 
FTSE 100 stocks 
GBP < 1.00 0.0001 0.01% 
  1.00 to 4.9995 0.0005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  5.00 to 9.999 0.001 0.02% to 0.01% 
  10.00 to 49.995 0.005 0.05% to 0.01% 
  50.00 to 99.99 0.01 0.02% to 0.01% 
  100.00 to 499.95 0.05 0.05% to 0.01% 
  500.00 to 999.90 0.1 0.02% to 0.01% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.50 0.5 0.05% to 0.01% 
  5,000.00 to 9,999.00 1 0.02% to 0.01% 
  10,000.00 5 0.05% 
United Kingdom . 
FTSE 250 stocks 
GBP < 0.50 0.0001 0.02% 
  0.50 to 0.9995 0.0005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1.00 to 4.999 0.001 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5.00 to 9.995 0.005 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10.00 to 49.99 0.01 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50.00 to 99.95 0.05 0.1% to 0.05% 
  100.00 to 499.90 0.1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  500.00 to 999.50 0.5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  1,000.00 to 4,999.00 1 0.1% to 0.02% 
  5,000.00 to 9,995.00 5 0.1% to 0.05% 
  10,000.00 to 49,990.00 10 0.1% to 0.02% 
  50,000.00 50 0.10% 
United States USD < 1.00 0.0001 0.01% 
  1 0.01 1% 
*Tick size as a percentage of price per share 
Source: Grant Thornton - Capital Market Series Report (September 2012). 
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Appendix 2: The recommendations of Capital Market Masterplan 
Market Institutions  
1 A single Malaysian exchange should be established through the consolidation of all existing exchanges by 2002  
2 MESDAQ should be merged with KLSE as part of the exchange consolidation process  
3 The Malaysian exchange should demutualise and list on the stock market by 2003  
4 The Malaysian exchange should implement a programme to enhance its value recognition both domestically and internationally  
5 The Malaysian exchange should pursue appropriate strategic alliances internationally  
6 A common trading platform across all exchange-traded products should be established following exchange consolidation  
7 An integrated clearance and settlement system for all exchange-traded products should be established  
8 A single clearance and settlement institution for all exchange-traded products should be created by 2002  
9 The money settlement system should be directly linked with the capital market trading and clearing systems  
10 The settlement cycle should be shortened to T+3 in line with international best practice  
11 A global depository account for each investor will be established in the central depository  
12 The SCANS clearing fee will be reduced from 0.05% to 0.04% with effect from 1 July 2001, subject to a maximum of RM200 per contract  
13 The SCORE fee will be reduced in two stages to 0.005% and 0.0025% with effect from 1 September 2000 and 1 July 2001 respectively. Subsequently, SCORE fees will be reviewed further  
14 The SC levy will be reduced to 0.015% from the present 0.02% with effect from 1 July 2001  
15 Stamp duty should be capped at RM200 per contract for all trades on the KLSE and be further considered for eventual removal  
16 Administrative procedures and rule-structures in relation to portfolio investments should be streamlined in order to reduce operational costs to investors  
Equity Market  
17 A full disclosure-based framework for the offer and issuance of equity securities will be implemented in 2001  
18 The involvement of multiple approving authorities in the fund-raising process should be further rationalised  
19 A shelf-registration scheme for the issuance of equity securities will be introduced  
20 The market for the provision of corporate advisory services will be further deregulated  
21 Technological solutions that enhance the efficiency of the fund-raising process will be identified and implemented  
22 Breadth of listings in the Malaysian equity market will be gradually widened to include listings of foreign companies  
23 The introduction of Exchange Traded Funds will be allowed  
24 Comprehensive measures to enhance MESDAQ’s role as a fund-raising centre for high-growth companies will be implemented  
25 The listing of technology incubators will be allowed in 2001  
26 The promotion and development of the venture capital industry should be centrally co-ordinated  
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27 Venture capital companies will be granted exempt dealer status under the Securities Industry Act 1983  
28 The establishment of venture capital trusts that can invest up to 100% in unquoted companies will be allowed  
29 The SC will undertake a review of the tax framework for the venture capital industry in collaboration with the tax authorities, industry participants and the central co-ordinating agency for the industry  
30 
Joint investment programmes between the government and private sector venture capitalists should be 
increased to boost private sector participation in disbursing government funds for seed and start-up 
capital  
31 The participation of local institutional investors in venture capital funds should be promoted  
32 Greater foreign participation in the venture capital industry should be allowed  
Bond Market  
33 A full disclosure-based framework for the issuance of corporate bonds will be implemented  
34 A shelf-registration scheme for the issuance of corporate bonds will be introduced  
35 The mandatory requirement for credit ratings on corporate bond issues will be removed  
36 A framework for the issuance of asset-backed securities will be introduced  
37 
The existing taxation framework for Special Purpose Vehicles should be clarified to reflect economic 
substance, and the stamp duty and Real Property Gains Tax on transactions relating to the issuance of 
asset-backed securities should be removed to encourage asset securitisation  
38 Liquidity in benchmark issues should be developed and established  
39 A programme to issue Malaysian government securities (MGS) should be encouraged and promoted with a view to establishing them as the immediate benchmark securities for the Malaysian bond market  
40 Regulated short selling of MGS and corporate bonds should be allowed  
41 Non-financial institutions should be allowed to conduct the entire scope of repo activities  
42 Markets in MGS futures and options should be established  
43 Employees Provident Fund’s (EPF) investment requirements should be eased to free up its “captive demand” for MGS  
44 Access to trading on the over-the-counter market should be extended to a wider range of participants  
45 A phased programme to encourage international financial institutions and multinational corporations to issue ringgit bonds should be considered  
46 International ratings for domestic bond issuance will be allowed  
47 A programme for the establishment of a centralised platform for the clearing and settlement of listed and unlisted bonds should be pursued  
48 The participation of retail investors in the corporate bond market will be encouraged through the promotion of the establishment of bond funds  
49 The tax framework should be reviewed to encourage issuance and investment in debt securities  
Derivatives Market  
50 Restrictions on the participation of unit trust funds and closed-end funds in exchange-traded derivatives will be deregulated  
51 Derivatives funds will be allowed to be established and offered to investors in 2001  
52 Restrictions on the participation of local institutions, including EPF and insurance companies, in exchange-traded derivatives should be deregulated  
53 KLOFFE and COMMEX should actively pursue the introduction of more derivative products  
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54 The process for the introduction of new domestic exchange-traded derivative products will be streamlined  
55 Local futures market intermediaries will be allowed to trade approved international financial derivative products by end-2001  
56 A new category of International Members with full derivatives trading and broking rights will be allowed by 2002  
57 Equity ownership requirements of futures broking firms will be liberalised to allow foreign majority ownership by 2003  
58 Foreign Direct Clearing Memberships will be allowed to be established within MDCH by 2002  
59 The SC will introduce guidelines for Introducing Brokers by end-2001  
60 The futures broking commission rate will be fully negotiable by 1 January 2002  
61 The futures clearing and exchange trading fees will be reviewed by 1 January 2002  
62 The commission sharing structure between futures brokers and their representatives will be fully negotiable in 2002  
63 Recognised foreign exchanges will be allowed to place remote access terminals with Malaysian futures brokers in return for reciprocal remote access arrangements by 2002  
64 Regulated short selling and securities borrowing and lending activities should be re-introduced by 2002  
Islamic Capital Market  
65 Efforts to introduce more competitive and innovative Islamic financial products and services will be actively pursued  
66 Efforts to introduce and promote a wider range of Islamic collective investment schemes will be facilitated  
67 Investment restrictions for the Takaful industry should be further liberalised to facilitate greater mobilisation of Takaful funds into the Islamic capital market  
68 Efforts to mobilise untapped Islamic assets through securitisation should be pursued  
69 Efforts to increase the pool of Islamic capital market expertise through training and education will be enhanced  
70 A single Syariah Advisory Council should be established for the Islamic financial sector  
71 A facilitative tax and legal framework should be established for the Islamic capital market  
72 Efforts to develop an appropriate financial reporting framework for the Islamic capital market in collaboration with Malaysian Accounting Standards Board will be pursued  
73 Increased efforts to enhance the awareness of Malaysia’s Islamic capital market at the domestic and international levels will be pursued  
74 Strategic alliances between Malaysia and other Islamic capital markets should be established  
75 The government and government-related entities should consider issuing Islamic debt securities in the global market  
76 The listing of Malaysian Islamic equity funds in international markets should be pursued  
77 Incentives to encourage the entry of foreign intermediaries and professionals with expertise in Islamic capital market-related businesses should be provided  
Stockbroking Industry  
78 Efforts to promote consolidation of the stockbroking industry will be pursued  
79 A new category of full-service intermediaries to be known as Universal Brokers will be introduced  
80 Branching restrictions on stockbroking companies will be deregulated  
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81 The scope of capital market services that may be offered by stockbroking companies will be widened  
82 Stockbroking companies and their representatives will be allowed to offer a range of services under a single license  
83 
Stockbroking commission rates will be liberalised in two stages: Stage 1 - with effect from 1 September 
2000, commission rates for all trades above RM100,000 will be fully negotiable while trades with 
contract values of RM100,000 and below are subject to a fixed rate of 0.75% Stage 2 - with effect from 
1 July 2001, commission rates will be fully negotiable for all trades, subject to a cap of 0.70%  
84 Commission sharing arrangements between remisiers and stockbroking companies will be fully negotiable in 2002  
85 Foreign equity participation in domestic stockbroking companies will be liberalised in stages beginning from 2003  
86 Measures to facilitate online trading will be introduced  
87 Efforts to develop a standardised and centralised back-office system for the stockbroking industry will be facilitated  
88 Efforts to further promote the use of information technology and e-commerce by intermediaries will be facilitated  
89 The scope of activities carried out by remisiers should be expanded to a wider range of value-added capital market services, including financial planning  
Investment Management  
90 A more market-based approach to regulation will be applied to the investment management industry  
91 The process for introducing new investment management products will be streamlined  
92 A uniform regulatory framework streamlining the licensing rules for the investment management industry will be introduced  
93 The management of investment funds should be further deregulated to allow for greater international portfolio diversification  
94 The SC will recognise industry self-regulation within the investment management industry, subject to appropriate criteria and under strong supervision, to complement the SC’s regulatory function  
95 EPF’s investment guidelines should be liberalised to allow the adoption of the “prudent person” approach  
96 EPF should further diversify the management of its funds by placing out a greater portion with external fund managers  
97 The eligibility rules pertaining to the EPF’s Members’ Investment Scheme should be lowered over the longer term  
98 Measures to facilitate the development of a private pensions industry will be actively pursued  
99 The further outsourcing of the management of funds by insurance companies will be liberalised 
100 Restrictions on the management of funds by Foreign Fund Management  companies will be liberalised  
101 Foreign ownership requirements will be liberalised to allow foreign majority ownershhip of unit trust management companies from 2003 
102 The SC will examine the viability of implementing an investor compensation programme 
103 Further tax incentives to encourage investments in collective investment schemes will be examined 
104 Further efforts to promote investors’ investment will be undertaken 
105 Training and professional development needs of the Malaysian investment management industry will be facilitated 
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106 The development of the financial planning industry will be facilitated  
107 The further development of the trust/custodial services industry will be promoted 
Corporate Governance  
108 The recommendations contained in the Report on Corporate Governance will be effected in a timely and comprehensive manner  
109 The SC will further facilitate efforts towards enhancing shareholder rights, especially those of minority shareholders, and broadening avenues for private enforcement of these rights  
110 Minority shareholders’ rights in respect of related party transactions will be further strengthened  
111 Public listed companies will be required to provide appropriate shareholder value disclosures for securities issuance, restructuring, take- overs and merger exercises  
112 A set of principles, best practices and standards will be developed to encourage institutional investor activism in corporate governance and the promotion of shareholder value recognition  
113 The SC will strongly support the efforts of Badan Pengawas Pemegang Saham Minoriti Berhad in promoting shareholder activism in Malaysia  
114 The SC will work with relevant industry bodies in enhancing the quality and independence of auditors of public listed companies  
115 The SC will encourage the improvement of channels of communication between companies and their shareholders  
116 The SC and KLSE will initiate further measures to promote timely, comprehensive and regular dissemination of material and relevant company information to shareholders  
117 Efforts to further enhance disclosures in annual reports by public listed companies will be examined  
Regulatory Framework  
118 The SC will put in place a comprehensive programme that will gradually implement a system of market-based regulation across all segments of the capital market  
119 The SC will maintain the existing regulatory structure in relation to arrangements for the regulation of wholesale and retail markets  
120 Relevant identified market institutions will be established as full front-line regulators to complement the SC’s role in the regulation of capital markets  
121 Appropriate industry associations will be identified and recognised as self- regulatory organisations to complement the SC’s regulatory functions  
122 Further efforts will be pursued to achieve regulatory parity in the treatment of all participants in the capital market through functional regulation  
123 Efforts to create a single licensing regime and consolidation of securities and futures legislation will be pursued  
124 Measures to eliminate market segmentation in respect of underwriting, corporate finance, asset management and brokerage services will be introduced  
125 
Cross-market surveillance as well as co-operation and co-ordination between regulatory authorities 
should be enhanced to strengthen market oversight, and to ensure the consistency and effective pursuit 
of regulatory objectives and priorities 
126 Measures to enhance regulatory transparency, accountability and independence will be introduced  
127 Measures will be introduced to enhance processes and capabilities for effective enforcement  
128 Measures will be taken to enhance the enforcement capacity of the SC  
129 The regulatory framework will be enhanced to provide for appropriate mechanisms for systemic risk management  
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130 The SC will develop a regulatory framework for the implementation of electronic commerce in the capital market  
131 The SC will introduce measures to improve the assessment of regulatory cost-effectiveness  
132 A five-year review to monitor effectiveness of regulatory structure and framework will be conducted  
133 A comprehensive review of the current tax framework relating to the capital market should be carried out  
Technology and E-commerce  
134 Capital market regulation will be technology-neutral and facilitative of innovation  
135 Access to the market’s trading infrastructure will be enhanced  
136 Regulatory issues relating to the primary market offering and secondary market trading of capital market products through electronic means will be clarified  
137 End-to-end straight-through processing in the Malaysian capital market should be achieved, with appropriate linkages with international systems to be facilitated  
138 The facilitation of electronic trade settlement through the integration of the technologies of the clearing and settlement system with the payment system will be examined  
139 The development of online value-added services and innovations such as financial portals and financial hubs will be facilitated  
140 Online trading of units in unit trust funds will be permitted  
141 Surveillance and enforcement capabilities of online capital market activities will be enhanced  
142 Training and education programmes for market institutions, market participants and investors on the use of technology and e-commerce will be enhanced  
143 International standards of security, reliability and privacy will apply to technology infrastructure  
Training and Education  
144 Training programmes to create highly skilled and flexible market professionals will be developed  
145 A culture of continuous learning and skill enhancement will be encouraged through Continuing Professional Education programmes  
146 Skills of regulators, including front-line regulators and self-regulatory organisations, will be strengthened  
147 Efforts will be made to increase the availability of skilled graduates for the capital market through arrangements with universities in curriculum development  
148 Licensing examinations for capital market professionals will be streamlined  
149 Education, training and licensing examinations will be made more accessible  
150 The skills, knowledge and competencies of Bumiputera intermediaries will be enhanced  
151 Investor protection and education will be further promoted through awareness programmes  
152 The SC will develop SIDC as a regional capital market training centre  
Source: Securities commission of Malaysia 
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Appendix 3: New tick sizes for equity based exchange traded funds 
Stock price (Ringgit Malaysia 
(RM))ª 
Old Tick Size (sen) New Tick Size (sen) 
Below 1.00 1 0.1 
1.00 to 2.995 1 0.5 
3.00 and above 1 1 
Source: Bursa Malaysia Annual Report 2009 
RM1 = 100sen ≃ £0.20                            
Note: For ETFs trading below RM1, the tick size was reduced from 1 sen to 0.1 sen, while for ETFs 
trading between RM1 and RM2.995 the tick size was reduced by half i.e. from 1 sen to 0.5 sen. No tick 
size change for ETFs trading above RM3.00. 
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Appendix 4: Summary statistics for daily debt market explanatory variables (%) for the whole sample 
periodª 
    
Levels    
T 2704 2704 2704 
Mean  2.977 1.209 1.137 
Std. Dev. 0.464 0.744 0.171 
Minimum 2.03 -0.506 0.598 
Maximum 3.647 2.695 2.032 
First differences   
T 2703 2703 2703 
Mean  0.0000784 -0.000195  -0.0001067 
Std. Dev. 0.023 0.065 0.079 
Minimum -0.784 -0.604  -0.676 
Maximum 0.307 0.738 0.587 
ª The whole sample period is from 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2012 
: Yield on overnight Kuala Lumpur Inter-Bank Offered Rate (KLIBOR). 
: Yield spread between the constant maturity 10-year Treasury bond and the overnight KLIBOR. 
: Yield spread between Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) Grade AAA 10-year Private Debt Securities 
(PDS) and the constant maturity 10-year Treasury bond. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
References 
 
Ahn, H.-J. et al., 2007. Tick size change and liquidity provision on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange. Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 21(2), pp.173–
194. 
Ahn, H.-J., Cao, C.Q. & Choe, H., 1996. Tick Size, spread, and volume. Journal of 
Financial Intermediation, 5(1), pp.2–22. 
Aitken, M. & Comerton-Forde, C., 2005. Do reductions in tick sizes influence liquidity? 
Accounting & Finance, 45(2), pp.171–184. 
Alexander, C., 2008a. Market risk analysis: Practical financial econometrics. Volume 
II, West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Alexander, C., 2008b. Market risk analysis: Pricing, hedging and trading financial 
instruments. Volume III, West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 
Alexander, C. & Barbosa, A., 2007. Effectiveness of minimum-variance hedging: The 
impact of electronic trading and exchange-traded funds. The Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 33(2), pp.46–59. 
Alexander, C. & Barbosa, A., 2008. Hedging index exchange traded funds. Journal of 
Banking & Finance, 32(2), pp.326–337. 
Alizadeh, A. & Nomikos, N., 2004. A markov regime switching approach for hedging 
stock indices. Journal of Futures Markets, 24(7), pp.649–674. 
Amihud, Y. & Mendelson, H., 1987. Trading mechanisms and stock returns: an 
empirical investigation. The Journal of Finance, 42(3), pp.533–553. 
Andani, A., Lafuente, J.A. & Novales, A., 2009. Liquidity and hedging effectiveness 
under futures mispricing: international evidence. Journal of Futures Markets, 
29(11), pp.1050–1066. 
Angel, J.J., 2012. Tick size regulation: costs, benefits and risks, Economic Impact 
Assessment EIA7, Foresight, Government office for Science, London UK. 
Angel, J.J., 1997. Tick size, share prices, and stock splits. The Journal of Finance, 
52(2), pp.655–681. 
Anshuman, V.R. & Kalay, A., 1998. Market making with discrete prices. Review of 
Financial Studies, 11(1), pp.81–109. 
Ascioglu, A., Comerton-Forde, C. & McInish, T.H., 2010. An examination of minimum 
tick sizes on the Tokyo stock exchange. Japan and the World Economy, 22(1), 
pp.40–48. 
 
 145 
Bacidore, J.M., 1997. The impact of decimalization on market quality: an empirical 
investigation of the Toronto Stock Exchange. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 
6(2), pp.92–120. 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R., 1998. A model of investor sentiment. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 49(3), pp.307–343. 
Bauwens, L., Laurent, S. & Rombouts, J.V.K., 2006. Multivariate GARCH models: a 
survey. Journal of Applied Econometrics, 21(1), pp.79–109. 
Beaulieu, M.-C., Ebrahim, S.K. & Morgan, I.G., 2003. Does tick size influence price 
discovery? evidence from the Toronto Stock Exchange. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 23(1), pp.49–66. 
Becketti, S., 2012. Introduction to time series using Stata, Stata Press. 
Bekaert, G., Harvey, C.R. & Lundblad, C., 2007. Liquidity and expected returns: 
lessons from emerging markets. Review of Financial Studies, 20(5), pp.1783–1831. 
Berglund, T. & Kabir, R., 1995. What explains the difference between the futures' price 
and its ‘fair’ value?: evidence from the European Options Exchange. CentER 
discussion paper, 1995(83), pp.1–16. 
Bessembinder, H., 2003. Trade execution costs and market quality after Decimalization. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 38(4), pp.747–777. 
Bessembinder, H. & Seguin, P.J., 1992. Futures‐trading activity and stock price 
volatility. The Journal of Finance, 47(5), pp.2015–2034. 
Black, F., 1986. Noise. The Journal of Finance, 41(3), pp.529–543. 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A. & Marcus, A.J., 2009. Investments 8 ed., Boston: McGraw-Hill 
Irwin. 
Bollen, N.P.B. & Whaley, R.E., 1998. Are “teenies” better? The Journal of Portfolio 
Management, 25(1), pp.10–24. 
Bollerslev, T., 1990. Modelling the coherence in short-run nominal exchange rates: A 
multivariate generalised Arch Model. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 
72(3), pp.498–505. 
Bollerslev, T., Engle, R.F. & Wooldridge, J.M., 1988. A capital asset pricing model 
with time-varying covariances. The Journal of Political Economy, 96(1), pp.116–
131. 
Brooks, C. & Persand, G., 2001. Seasonality in Southeast Asian stock markets: some 
new evidence on day-of-the-week effects. Applied Economics Letters, 8(3), pp.155–
158. 
 
 146 
Brooks, C., Henry, O.T. & Persand, G., 2002. The effect of asymmetries on optimal 
hedge ratios. The Journal of Business, 75(2), pp.333–352. 
Brooks, C., Rew, A.G. & Ritson, S., 2001. A trading strategy based on the lead–lag 
relationship between the spot index and futures contract for the FTSE 100. 
International Journal of Forecasting, 17(1), pp.31–44. 
Brown, S., Laux, P. & Schachter, B., 1991. On the existence of an optimal tick size. 
Review of Futures Markets, 19(1), pp.50–72. 
Buti, S. et al., 2013. Tick size regulation and sub-penny pricing. Available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2324862, pp.1–67. 
Butterworth, D. & Holmes, P., 2000. Mispricing in stock index futures contracts: 
evidence for the FTSE 100 and FTSE mid 250 contracts. Applied Economics 
Letters, 7(12), pp.795–801. 
Bühler, W. & Kempf, A., 1995. DAX index futures: mispricing and arbitrage in 
German markets. Journal of Futures Markets, 15(7), pp.833–859. 
Campbell, J.Y., Lo, A.W. & MacKinlay, A.C., 1997. The econometrics of financial 
markets, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
Chan, K., 1992. A further analysis of the lead-lag relationship between the cash market 
and stock index futures market. Review of Financial Studies, 5(1), pp.123–152. 
Chen, S.-S., Lee, C.-F. & Shrestha, K., 2004. An empirical analysis of the relationship 
between the hedge ratio and hedging horizon: A simultaneous estimation of the 
short- and long-run hedge ratios. Journal of Futures Markets, 24(4), pp.359–386. 
Chen, W.-P., Chou, R.K. & Chung, H., 2009. Decimalization, ETFs and futures pricing 
efficiency. Journal of Futures Markets, 29(2), pp.157–178. 
Chen, Y.L. & Gau, Y.F., 2009. Tick sizes and relative rates of price discovery in stock, 
futures, and options markets: Evidence from the Taiwan stock exchange. Journal of 
Futures Markets, 29(1), pp.74–93. 
Chiang, R. & Fong, W.-M., 2001. Relative informational efficiency of cash, futures, 
and options markets: The case of an emerging market. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 25(2), pp.355–375. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R. & Subrahmanyam, A., 2008. Liquidity and market efficiency. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 87(2), pp.249–268. 
Chordia, T., Roll, R. & Subrahmanyam, A., 2001. Market liquidity and trading activity. 
The Journal of Finance, 56(2), pp.501–530. 
Chou, R.K. & Chung, H., 2006. Decimalization, trading costs, and information 
transmission between ETFs and index futures. Journal of Futures Markets, 26(2), 
pp.131–151. 
 147 
Chou, W.L., Denis, K.K.F. & Lee, C.F., 1996. Hedging with Nikkei index futures: The 
conventional versus the error correction model. The Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance, 36(4), pp.495–505. 
Choudhry, T., 2003. Short-run deviations and optimal hedge ratio: Evidence from stock 
futures. Journal of Multinational Financial Management, 13(4), pp.171–192. 
Choudhry, T., 2004. The hedging effectiveness of constant and time-varying hedge 
ratios using three Pacific Basin stock futures. International Review of Economics & 
Finance, 13(4), pp.371–385. 
Chu, Q.C. & Hsieh, W.-L.G., 2002. Pricing efficiency of the S&P 500 index market: 
evidence from the Standard & Poor's Depositary Receipts. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 22(9), pp.877–900. 
Chu, Q.C., Hsieh, W.-L.G. & Tse, Y., 1999. Price discovery on the S&P 500 index 
markets: An analysis of spot index, index futures, and SPDRs. International Review 
of Financial Analysis, 8(1), pp.21–34. 
Chung, D.Y. & Hrazdil, K., 2010. Liquidity and market efficiency: analysis of Nasdaq 
firms. Global Finance Journal, 21(3), pp.262–274. 
Chung, K.H. & Chuwonganant, C., 2002. Tick size and quote revisions on the NYSE. 
Journal of Financial Markets, 5(4), pp.391–410. 
Chung, K.H., Kang, J. & Kim, J.-S., 2011. Tick size, market structure, and market 
quality. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 36(1), pp.57–81. 
Chung, K.H., Kim, K.A. & Kitsabunnarat, P., 2005. Liquidity and quote clustering in a 
market with multiple tick sizes. Journal of Financial Research, 28(2), pp.177–195. 
Comerton-Forde, C. & Rydge, J., 2006. The current state of Asia-Pacific stock 
exchanges: a critical review of market design. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 
14(1), pp.1–32. 
Cordella, T. & Foucault, T., 1999. Minimum price variations, time priority and quote 
dynamics. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 8(3), pp.141–173. 
Cummings, J.R. & Frino, A., 2011. Index arbitrage and the pricing relationship between 
Australian stock index futures and their underlying shares. Accounting & Finance, 
51(3), pp.661–683. 
Ederington, L.H., 1979. The hedging performance of the new futures markets. The 
Journal of Finance, 34(1), pp.157–170. 
Ekaputra, I.A. & Ahmad, B., 2007. The impact of tick size reduction on liquidity and 
order strategy: evidence from the Jakarta stock exchange (JSX). Economics and 
Finance in Indonesia, 53, pp.89–104. 
 
 148 
Engle, R.F., 1982. Autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity with estimates of the 
variance of United Kingdom inflation. Econometrica, 50(4), pp.987–1007. 
Engle, R.F., 1987. Co-integration and error correction: representation, estimation, and 
testing. Econometrica, 55(2), pp.251–276. 
Engle, R.F. & Kroner, K.F., 1995. Multivariate simultaneous generalized ARCH. 
Econometric Theory, 11(1), pp.122–150. 
Fassas, A.P., 2010. Mispricing in stock index futures markets – The case of Greece. 
Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873949, pp.1–12. 
Figlewski, S., 1984. Hedging performance and basis risk in stock index futures. The 
Journal of Finance, 39(3), pp.657–669. 
Figlewski, S., 1985. Hedging with stock index futures: theory and application in a new 
market. Journal of Futures Markets, 5(2), pp.183–199. 
Finnerty, J.E. & Park, H.Y., 1988. How to profit from program trading. The Journal of 
Portfolio Management, 14(2), pp.40–46. 
Fleming, J., Ostdiek, B. & Whaley, R.E., 1996. Trading costs and the relative rates of 
price discovery in stock, futures, and option markets. Journal of Futures Markets, 
16(4), pp.353–387. 
Floros, C. & Vougas, D.V., 2004. Hedge ratios in Greek stock index futures market. 
Applied Financial Economics, 14(15), pp.1125–1136. 
Foster, F.D. & Viswanathan, S., 1990. A theory of the interday variations in volume, 
variance, and trading costs in securities markets. Review of Financial Studies, 3(4), 
pp.593–624. 
Frino, A. & West, A., 1999. The lead–lag relationship between stock indices and stock 
index futures contracts: further Australian evidence. ABACUS, 35(3), pp.333–341. 
Frino, A., Walter, T. & West, A., 2000. The lead–lag relationship between equities and 
stock index futures markets around information releases. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 20(5), pp.467–487. 
Gagnon, L. & Lypny, G., 1997. The benefits of dynamically hedging the toronto 35 
stock index. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 14(1), pp.69–78. 
Garbade, K.D. & Silber, W.L., 1983. Price movements and price discovery in futures 
and cash markets. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 65(2), pp.289–297. 
Gay, G.D. & Jung, D.Y., 1999. A further look at transaction costs, short sale 
restrictions, and futures market efficiency: the case of Korean stock index futures. 
Journal of Futures Markets, 19(2), pp.153–174. 
 
 149 
Ghosh, A., 1993a. Cointegration and error correction models: Intertemporal causality 
between index and futures prices. Journal of Futures Markets, 13(2), pp.193–198. 
Ghosh, A., 1993b. Hedging with stock index futures: Estimation and forecasting with 
error correction model. Journal of Futures Markets, 13(7), pp.743–752. 
Gibson, S., Singh, R. & Yerramilli, V., 2003. The effect of decimalization on the 
components of the bid-ask spread. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 12(2), 
pp.121–148. 
Goldstein, M.A. & Kavajecz, K.A., 2000. Eighths, sixteenths, and market depth: 
changes in tick size and liquidity provision on the NYSE. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 56(1), pp.125–149. 
Graham, J.R., Michaely, R. & Roberts, M.R., 2003. Do price discreteness and 
transactions costs affect stock returns? Comparing ex-dividend pricing before and 
after decimalization. The Journal of Finance, 58(6), pp.2611–2636. 
Grünbichler, A., Longstaff, F.A. & Schwartz, E.S., 1994. Electronic screen trading and 
the transmission of information: an empirical examination. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 3(2), pp.166–187. 
Hameed, A. & Terry, E., 1998. The effect of tick size on price clustering and trading 
volume. Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, 25(7&8), pp.849–867. 
Harris, Larry, 2003. Trading and exchanges: market microstructure for practitioners, 
Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 
Harris, Lawrence, 1997. Decimalization: a review of the arguments and evidence. 
Unpublished working paper, University of Southern California. 
Harris, Lawrence, 1991. Stock price clustering and discreteness. Review of Financial 
Studies, 4(3), pp.389–415. 
Harris, Lawrence, 1999. Trading In pennies: a survey of the issues. Unpublished 
working paper, University of Southern California, pp.1–13. 
Harris, Lawrence E., 1994. Minimum price variations, discrete bid-ask spreads, and 
quotation sizes. Review of Financial Studies, 7(1), pp.149–178. 
Henker, T. & Martens, M., 2005. Index futures arbitrage before and after the 
introduction of sixteenths on the NYSE. Journal of Empirical Finance, 12(3), 
pp.353–373. 
Hsieh, T.Y., Chuang, S.S. & Lin, C.C., 2008. Impact of tick-size reduction on the 
market liquidity—evidence from the emerging order-driven market. Review of 
Pacific Basin Financial Markets and Policies, 11(4), pp.591–616. 
 
 150 
Johansen & Juselius, 1990. Maximum likelihood estimation and inference on 
cointegration - with application to the demand for money. Oxford Bulletin of 
Economics and Statistics, 52(2), pp.169–210. 
Johnson, L.L., 1960. The theory of hedging and speculation in commodity futures. The 
Review of Economic Studies, 27(3), pp.139–151. 
Jones, C.M. & Lipson, M.L., 2001. Sixteenths: direct evidence on institutional 
execution costs. Journal of Financial Economics, 59(2), pp.253–278. 
Jong, F.D. & Nijman, T., 1997. High frequency analysis of lead-lag relationships 
between financial markets. Journal of Empirical Finance, 4(2-3), pp.259–277. 
Jorion, P., 2007. Financial risk manager handbook. 4 ed., New Jersey, USA: John 
Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Judge, A. & Reancharoen, T., 2014. An empirical examination of the lead–lag 
relationship between spot and futures markets: Evidence from Thailand. Pacific-
Basin Finance Journal, 29(1), pp.335–358. 
Karpoff, J.M., 1987. The relation between price changes and trading volume: a survey. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 22(1), pp.109–126. 
Kawaller, I.G., Koch, P.D. & Koch, T.W., 1987. The temporal price relationship 
between S&P 500 futures and the S&P 500 index. The Journal of Finance, 42(5), 
pp.1309–1329. 
Koenker, R. & Basset, G., Jr, 1978. Regression quantiles. Econometrica, 46(1), pp.33–
50. 
Kroner, K.F. & Sultan, J., 1993. Time-varying distributions and dynamic hedging with 
foreign currency futures. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 28(4), 
pp.535–551. 
Kumar, P. & Seppi, D.J., 1994. Information and index arbitrage. Journal of Business, 
67(4), pp.481–509. 
Kuo, S.-W., Huang, C.-S. & Chen, C.-C., 2010. Impact of the change in tick size on 
transaction costs and liquidity: an empirical investigation of the Taiwan stock 
exchange. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 39(4), pp.524–551. 
Kurov, A., 2008. Tick size reduction, execution costs, and informational efficiency in 
the regular and e‐mini Nasdaq‐100 index futures markets. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 28(9), pp.871–888. 
Kurov, A. & Zabotina, T., 2005. Is it time to reduce the minimum tick sizes of the 
E‐mini futures? Journal of Futures Markets, 25(1), pp.79–104. 
 
 151 
Kurov, A.A. & Lasser, D.J., 2002. The effect of the introduction of Cubes on the 
Nasdaq‐100 index spot‐futures pricing relationship. Journal of Futures Markets, 
22(3), pp.197–218. 
Kutner, G.W. & Sweeney, R.J., 1991. Causality tests between the S&P 500 cash and 
futures markets. Quarterly Journal of Business and Economics, 30(2), pp.51–73. 
Lau, S.T. & McInish, T.H., 1995. Reducing tick sizes on the Singapore stock exchange. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 3(4), pp.485–496. 
Lee, C.M.C., Mucklow, B. & Ready, M.J., 1993. Spreads, depths and the impact of 
earnings information: An intraday analysis. The Review of Financial Studies, 6(2), 
pp.345–374. 
Lee, Y.T., Wu, W.S. & Yang, Y.H., 2013. Informed futures trading and price discovery: 
Evidence from Taiwan futures and stock markets. Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, 
20(3), pp.219–242. 
Lien, D., 2004. Cointegration and the optimal hedge ratio: the general case. The 
Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 44(5), pp.654–658. 
Lien, D. & Tse, Y.K., 1999. Fractional cointegration and futures hedging. Journal of 
Futures Markets, 19(4), pp.457–474. 
MacKinlay, A.C. & Ramaswamy, K., 1988. Index-futures arbitrage and the behavior of 
stock index futures prices. Review of Financial Studies, 1(2), pp.137–158. 
Neal, R., 1996. Direct tests of index arbitrage models. Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis, 31(4), pp.541–562. 
O'Hara, M., 2001. Designing markets for developing countries. International Review of 
Finance, 2(4), pp.205–215. 
O'Hara, M., Saar, G. & Zhong, Z., 2015. Relative tick size and the trading environment. 
Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1873949, pp.1–45. 
Olgun, O. & Yetkiner, I., 2011. Determination of optimal hedging strategy for index 
futures: Evidence from Turkey. Emerging Markets Finance and Trades, 47(6), 
pp.68–79. 
Pan, W., Song, F.M. & Tao, L., 2012. The effects of a tick-size reduction on the 
liquidity in a pure limit order market: evidence from Hong Kong. Applied 
Economics Letters, 19(16), pp.1639–1642. 
Park, T.H. & Switzer, L.N., 1995. Index participation units and the performance of 
index futures markets: Evidence from the Toronto 35 index participation units 
market. Journal of Futures Markets, 15(2), pp.187–200. 
Pavabutr, P. & Prangwattananon, S., 2009. Tick size change on the stock exchange of 
Thailand. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 32(4), pp.351–371. 
 152 
Pizzi, M.A., Economopoulos, A.J. & O'Neill, H.M., 1998. An examination of the 
relationship between stock index cash and futures markets: A cointegration 
approach. Journal of Futures Markets, 18(3), pp.279–305. 
Pok, W.C., 2007. Chapter 13 Temporal causality of returns of index futures and stock 
markets: evidence from Malaysia. In S. J. Kim & M. D. McKenzie, eds. Asia-
Pacific financial markets: integration, innovation and challenges. International 
Finance Review. pp. 263–288. 
Pok, W.C. & Poshakwale, S., 2004. The impact of the introduction of futures contracts 
on the spot market volatility: the case of Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Applied 
Financial Economics, 14(2), pp.143–154. 
Pok, W.C., Poshakwale, S.S. & Ford, J.L., 2009. Stock index futures hedging in the 
emerging Malaysian market. Global Finance Journal, 20(3), pp.273–288. 
Porter, D.C. & Weaver, D.G., 1997. Tick size and market quality. Financial 
Management, 26(4), pp.5–26. 
Poshakwale, S.S. & Theobald, M., 2004. Market capitalisation, cross-correlations, the 
lead/lag structure and microstructure effects in the Indian stock market. Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money, 14(4), pp.385–400. 
Purwoto, L. & Tandelilin, E., 2004. The impact of the tick size reduction on liquidity: 
empirical evidence from the Jakarta stock exchange. Gadjah Mada International 
Journal of Business, 6(2), pp.225–249. 
Puttonen, V., 1993. Stock index futures arbitrage in Finland: Theory and evidence in a 
new market. European Journal of Operational Research, 68(3), pp.304–317. 
Puttonen, V. & Martikainen, T., 1991. Short sale restrictions: implications for stock 
index arbitrage. Economics Letters, 37(2), pp.159–163. 
Roll, R., Schwartz, E. & Subrahmanyam, A., 2007. Liquidity and the law of one price: 
the case of the futures‐cash basis. The Journal of Finance, 62(5), pp.2201–2234. 
Ronen, T. & Weaver, D.G., 2001. “Teenies” anyone? Journal of Financial Markets, 
4(3), pp.231–260. 
Roope, M. & Zurbruegg, R., 2002. The intra‐day price discovery process between the 
Singapore Exchange and Taiwan Futures Exchange. Journal of Futures Markets, 
22(3), pp.219–240. 
Securities Commission of Malaysia, 2011. Capital Market Masterplan 2: Growth with 
Governance, Kuala Lumpur. 
Shyy, G., Vijayraghavan, V. & Scott-Quinn, B., 1996. A further investigation of the 
lead‐lag relationship between the cash market and stock index futures market with 
the use of bid/ask quotes: The case of France. Journal of Futures Markets, 16(4), 
pp.405–420. 
 153 
Sim, A.-B. & Zurbruegg, R., 2001. Dynamic hedging effectiveness in South Korean 
index futures and the impact of the Asian financial crisis. Asia-Pacific Financial 
Markets, 8(3), pp.237–258. 
Smith, B.F., Turnbull, D.A.S. & White, D.R.W., 2006. The impact of pennies on the 
market quality of the Toronto Stock Exchange. The Financial Review, 41(2), 
pp.273–288. 
Stein, J.L., 1961. The simultaneous deterimination of spot and futures prices. The 
American Economic Review, 51(5), pp.1012–1025. 
Stoll, H.R. & Whaley, R.E., 1990. The dynamics of stock index and stock index futures 
returns. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 25(4), pp.441–468. 
Sugato, C., Wood, R.A. & Van Ness, R.A., 2004. Decimals and liquidity: A study of the 
NYSE. The Journal of Financial Research, 27(1), pp.75–94. 
Sutcliffe, C.M.S., 2006. Stock Index Futures 3rd ed., Ashgate Publishing Company. 
Switzer, L.N., Varson, P.L. & Samia, Z., 2000. Standard and Poor’s depository receipts 
and the performance of the S&P 500 index futures market. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 20(8), pp.705–716. 
Tan, J.H., 2002. Temporal causality between the Malaysian stock price and stock-
indexed futures market amid the selective capital controls regime. ASEAN 
Economic Bulletin, 19(2), pp.191–203. 
Theobald, M. & Yallup, P., 2004. Determining security speed of adjustment 
coefficients. Journal of Financial Markets, 7(1), pp.75–96. 
Theobald, M. & Yallup, P., 2001. Mean reversion and basis dynamics. Journal of 
Futures Markets, 21(9), pp.797–818. 
Theobald, M. & Yallup, P., 1998. Measuring cash-futures temporal effects in the UK 
using partial adjustment factors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 22(2), pp.221–243. 
Van Ness, B.F., Van Ness, R.A. & Pruitt, S.W., 2000. The impact of the reduction in 
tick increments in major U.S. markets on spreads, depth, and volatility. Review of 
Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 15(2), pp.153–167. 
Wahab, M. & Lashgari, M., 1993. Price dynamics and error correction in stock index 
and stock index futures markets: A cointegration approach. Journal of Futures 
Markets, 13(7), pp.711–742. 
Wang, C. & Low, S.S., 2003. Hedging with foreign currency denominated stock index 
futures: evidence from the MSCI Taiwan index futures market. Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management, 13(1), pp.1–17. 
Werner, I. et al., 2015. Tick size: Theory and evidence. Rotman School of Management 
Working Paper No. 2485069, pp.1–60. 
 154 
Working, H., 1953. Futures trading and hedging. The American Economic Review, 
43(3), pp.314–343. 
Wu, Y., Krehbiel, T. & Brorsen, B.W., 2011. Impacts of tick size reduction on 
transaction costs. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 3(6), pp.1–9. 
Yadav, P.K. & Pope, P.F., 1990. Stock index futures arbitrage: international evidence. 
Journal of Futures Markets, 10(6), pp.573–603. 
Yadav, P.K. & Pope, P.F., 1994. Stock index futures mispricing: profit opportunities or 
risk premia? Journal of Banking & Finance, 18(5), pp.921–953. 
Yang, W. & Allen, D.E., 2005. Multivariate GARCH hedge ratios and hedging 
effectiveness in Australian futures markets. Accounting & Finance, 45(2), pp.301–
321. 
Zhao, X. & Chung, K.H., 2006. Decimal pricing and information‐based trading: tick 
size and informational efficiency of asset price. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting, 33(5 & 6), pp.753–766. 
Zhong, M., Darrat, A.F. & Otero, R., 2004. Price discovery and volatility spillovers in 
index futures markets: Some evidence from Mexico. Journal of Banking & 
Finance, 28(12), pp.3037–3054. 
 
